

**INSTITUTIONALIZED, HORIZONTAL AND BOTTOM-UP
SECURITIZATION IN ETHNIC CONFLICT
ENVIRONMENTS: THE CASE OF CYPRUS**

BY

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the manner in which some environments, such as ‘ethnic’ conflict situations, provide fertile ground for securitization process to develop into a more institutionalized form. Once institutionalized, securitization is no longer limited to the typical unidirectional top-down (i.e. elite-driven) path, but rather it becomes subject to bottom-up and horizontal forces, creating what is termed in this thesis ‘horizontal’ and ‘bottom-up’ securitization. These horizontal and bottom-up forces lead to ‘involuntary’ acts at the actor and audience levels, which in turn contribute to the perpetuation and further institutionalization of an already securitized environment. Within this framework the audiences have a much more active role in the development and perpetuation of security narratives and threats than they do in the ‘mainstream’ reading of the theory.

The Cyprus conflict, as an intractable ‘ethnic’ conflict, is used to test the abovementioned arguments. Empirical evidence from the case study demonstrates that the social context dominating such environments contributes significantly to the development of institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization, obstructing desecuritization and subsequently also the prospects for conflict resolution.

Key words: securitization, ethnic conflicts, Cyprus conflict, institutionalization, Copenhagen School

DEDICATION

To my family and friends who have so generously given me their constant and unwavering support throughout this long academic journey, and to the two newest members of my family: my beautiful niece and goddaughter Sophia and my incredible godson Haris.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL: Progressive Party of Working People [Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού]

BATNA: Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement

DISY: Democratic Rally [Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός]

DIKO: Democratic Party [Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα]

ECJ: Europea Court of Justice

ECHR: European Court of Human Rights

EDEK: Movement for Social Democracy [Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών]

EOKA: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters [Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών]

EU: European Union

MEP: Member of the European Parliament

MP: Member of Parliament

NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations

PIO: Press and Information Office

PRIO: Peace Research Institute Oslo

PSC: Protracted Social Conflict

RoC: Republic of Cyprus

RSC: Regional Security Complex

SBAs: Sovereign British Areas

SG: Secretary General

TMT: Turkish Resistance Organization [Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı]

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UNFICYP: United Nations Forces in Cyprus

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UK: United Kingdom

US / USA: United States / United States of America

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Waiting for the Barbarians

What are we waiting for, assembled in the forum?

The barbarians are due here today.

Why isn't anything happening in the senate?
Why do the senators sit there without legislating?

Because the barbarians are coming today.
What laws can the senators make now?
Once the barbarians are here, they'll do the legislating.

Why did our emperor get up so early,
and why is he sitting at the city's main gate
on his throne, in state, wearing the crown?

Because the barbarians are coming today
and the emperor is waiting to receive their leader.
He has even prepared a scroll to give him,
replete with titles, with imposing names.

Why have our two consuls and praetors come out today
wearing their embroidered, their scarlet togas?
Why have they put on bracelets with so many amethysts,
and rings sparkling with magnificent emeralds?
Why are they carrying elegant canes
beautifully worked in silver and gold?

Because the barbarians are coming today
and things like that dazzle the barbarians.

Why don't our distinguished orators come forward as usual
to make their speeches, say what they have to say?

Because the barbarians are coming today
and they're bored by rhetoric and public speaking.

Why this sudden restlessness, this confusion?
(How serious people's faces have become.)
Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly,
everyone going home so lost in thought?

Because night has fallen and the barbarians have not come.
And some who have just returned from the border say
there are no barbarians any longer.

And now, what's going to happen to us without barbarians?
They were, those people, a kind of solution.

Constantinos Kavafys, 1904
(Translated by Edmund Keely)

1.1. Thesis overview

Kavafys wonders: what do we do without the barbarians and who are ‘we’ without them? Why does the absence of the barbarians create such anxiety? As discussed in this thesis, the prospects of losing the enemy ‘other’ does not necessarily create comfort for ‘us’, as one would assume; rather it could create anxiety as it jeopardizes the existence of ‘our’ identity. As the poem suggests, the enemy and the associated threats therefore can potentially create ‘a kind of solution’ for ‘us’; they can provide the justifications to sustain ‘our’ routines – even conflict-perpetuating ones – which in turn help sustain ‘our’ identity.

This thesis argues that in ‘protracted ethnic conflict’ environments perceived threats are routinely securitized, leading inevitably to the perpetuation of the conflict and to the reiteration of the negative perceptions of the ‘enemy other’.¹ The thesis also explores how in such environments the processes of securitization are considerably different. At the core of this argument is the premise that under certain conditions the securitization process itself could change from ad hoc to an institutionalized and routinized form. Institutionalization then leads to different ‘modes’ of securitization namely horizontal,

¹ It is acknowledged that the term ‘ethnic conflict’, especially in its primordial connotation, is a contested term with empirical and conceptual problems (Gilley 2004). That said, the term is still useful not least because it allows for a broad and easy categorization of different kinds of conflicts. In this thesis the term ‘ethnic conflict’ refers to cases where the conflict – which is defined as ‘a social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more parties’ – is perceived by at least one side in ethnic terms and the confrontation is due to ethnic distinctions (Cordell and Wolff 2009: 4-5; Kaufmann 1996: 138).

bottom-up and involuntary that exist along with the ‘mainstream’ top-down elite-driven processes.

Securitization is a process or mechanism that helps us analyze political practice and more specifically, as Buzan et al. (1998: 27) state, ‘[w]ho can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects’. Security, therefore, in the securitization context is a speech act; ‘by saying it something is done’ (Wæver 1995: 55). Successful securitization occurs when the audience accepts the securitizing actors’ claims that a referent object is under existential threat. This means that Buzan et al.’s ‘*definition* and *criteria* of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (1998: 25, emphasis in original). More sociologically-influenced approaches view the securitization process in terms of practices, context and power relations. Securitization, when viewed this way, is defined as ‘*a set of interrelated practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that bring threats into being*’ (Balzacq 2011: 3, emphasis in original). This thesis follows Balzacq’s approach as the incorporation of social context and practices are deemed as integral variables for the research questions of this thesis considering that the securitization processes are examined within the context of protracted ethnic conflicts.

The three main hypotheses of this thesis are:

- I. It is possible, under certain conditions, for the process of securitization to become institutionalized;
- II. Once institutionalized, securitization need not be always a top-down process, but can also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal;
- III. The institutionalization of securitization induces actors and audience alike to engage in ‘involuntary’ actions.

The concept of institutionalized securitization remains underdeveloped, especially if one follows the theory as originally developed by the so-called Copenhagen School scholars.² Buzan et al. point out that the persistence or recurrence of specific threats could lead to an institutionalization of the sense of urgency, while issues already defined as security threats may not need to be dramatized or prioritized (Buzan et al. 1998: 27-28). The focus thus is limited to the existence of recurrent ‘actual’ threats (for example ongoing violence between two sides as is the case for instance between Israel and Hamas), and not on the perpetuation of *perceptions* regarding potential threats, or the reasons behind the elite and public needs and incentives to maintain a threat-ridden securitized environment. This is essentially as far as the idea was developed in the mainstream reading of the theory, meaning there is no in-depth analysis of how the entire process, and not just the sense of urgency, could become institutionalized or what kind of impact this would have on the theory.

It is worth noting that subsequent works, primarily by the so-called Paris School scholars, have examined the idea of routinized securitization practices in a more profound way, albeit this was done mainly on an empirical level and only for some referent objects, such as migration, border controls and policing (see e.g. Bigo 2005; Bigo et al. 2007; Tsoukala 2005) and always from a ‘domestic’ angle (i.e. intra-state) not an international one. Routine securitization as discussed in chapter 3 is part of the institutionalization process in the sense that the former (i.e. routines) is a prerequisite for the latter (i.e. institutionalization), but they are not one of the same.

Institutionalized securitization in this thesis goes beyond the persistence of threats and the sense of urgency that Buzan et al. describe. It also goes beyond the frequent (i.e. routine) securitization of specific issues. It refers to instances where the entire *process* of securitization – i.e. referent objects, source of threats, securitizing actors and audiences, and even speech acts – evolves into a state of permanency becoming inevitably part of the society’s political and social routines; it becomes in other words part of the actors’

² The term ‘Copenhagen School’ was coined by Bill McSweeney and refers to the scholars who developed the concept of securitization. Most of these scholars worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute; hence the name ‘Copenhagen School’.

and audiences' identity influencing thus the way they deal with specific security-related issues. To use a business term, securitization processes become part of a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for elite and audiences that create in a way cognitive shortcuts and limitations for the actors involved. These 'standard' procedures are not created in vacuum; on the contrary they are heavily influenced by the social habitus in which the actors and audiences operate. These deeply routinized procedures therefore eliminate, to a great degree, the *ad hoc* part of the securitization process and transform it into something more institutionalized.

Institutionalized securitization is not something that could 'simply take place' after a speech act and a brief intersubjective process, as is the case with the 'mainstream' reading of securitization. On the contrary, certain conditions must be present and a specific process is required. This process is similar to that of the 3-stage life cycle of norms: the birth of norms, the growing (i.e. spreading or expanding) stage, and lastly the internalization of norms (Kowert and Legro 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the case of securitization the birth stage commences after a pivotal event – such as armed conflict – or the opposite, a potential conflict resolution settlement. A pivotal event is, in other words, anything that changes or threatens to change the people's existing routines and could or does create significant anxiety to the society as a whole. This stage is followed by an 'unchallenged period' where perceived threats are routinely securitized on an actor and audience level and frequently remain uncontested by most elite and the public. This period leads to the third and final stage, the actual institutionalization phase when the perceived threats are internalized and securitization processes become part of the political and social routines and mechanisms for dealing with specific security-related issues.

Once the securitization processes are institutionalized they become part of the society's every day routines and more importantly part of its norms. Norms in their turn become legitimate social variables that are accepted and created by the community (Kowert and Legro 1996), while they also create collective expectations and set the 'rules' for proper behavior for each identity sharing those norms (Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996;

Legro 1997). Thus, when securitization processes become part of the society's norms it means that a community may 'automatically' accept a specific security discourse and even maintain it in its routines. More importantly, specific expectations are formed on how actors and audiences should behave; expectations that significantly influence the creation and perpetuation of securitization processes. The reason therefore that the study of ethnic conflicts is essential for this thesis is precisely because protracted ethnic conflict environments are dominated by social contexts with 'strict' parameters of accepted and expected behavior and norms and specific audience and elite psycho-cultural predispositions which support the development of routinized and eventually institutionalized securitization.

How securitization processes evolve and reflect the aforementioned different stages is examined theoretically in chapter 3 and tested empirically in chapter 6, using the Cyprus conflict as a case study. In brief, the main argument is that the social context in ethnic conflicts and the unchanging threat-perpetuating routines influence the relationship between audiences and securitizing actors. The speech acts in those environments change format and scope; dramatization is less necessary and the actors' goal is not so much to convince the audiences of an existential threat, but rather to remind them of their presence. Actors do, however, try to convince the audiences that they are the most appropriate agents to handle these threats, meaning that securitization may not revolve around the perceived threats per se, but rather around the more or least suitable agents to handle them.

The thesis, in line with a growing literature on the role of audiences (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; Huysmans 2006, 2011; Leonard and Kaunert 2011), argues that the audience should receive more attention in the theory as it has a much more important role to play in the securitization process than simply being the 'judge' of securitizing acts. Several arguments have been developed on how the presence of multiple audiences (Salter 2008; Huysmans 2006; Roe 2008; Vuori 2008; Leonard and Kaunert 2011) and their distinct psycho-cultural pre-dispositions (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007) influence the process of securitization. This thesis accepts these arguments and builds upon them,

arguing that the social context and the presence of multiple audiences and their distinct psycho-cultural pre-dispositions, coupled with the conflict-perpetuating routines frequently found in protracted ethnic conflict environments, open the door for different modes of securitization, namely bottom-up, horizontal and ‘involuntary’.

These different forms of securitization – along with the notion of institutionalization of the process – constitute the primary theoretical contribution of this thesis. Horizontal securitization, as the name suggests, takes place on a horizontal level making the process essentially ‘peer securitization’. Bottom-up securitization refers to cases where the audiences either become securitizing actors themselves or they apply so much pressure to the ‘mainstream’ actors (for example political elite and media) that the latter are ‘forced’ to engage in securitizing acts. The impact of the bottom-up pressure depends on how powerful the horizontal processes are, therefore making the two forms of securitization inter-wined. The outcome of these two processes could lead to ‘involuntary’ securitization on an actor and audience level. If the pressures are significant enough, actors are ‘forced’ to engage in securitizing acts and audiences are ‘forced’ to accept them. The degree of pressure varies and is subject to the social context and the existing conflict norms and routines. It must be noted that the term ‘involuntary’ is not used here in a strict sense; it does not connote the absence of choice per se. Rather it refers to either the possibility that some individuals (elite and public) may be conditioned to see routine securitization as the only available and rational path to follow, or they can contemplate that there are alternative options (e.g. desecuritization), but given the social context those options become unviable due to their high cost and are thus abandoned. What is argued in this thesis is that the degree of institutionalization determines the degree of ‘involuntariness’

1.2. Case study: the Cyprus conflict

In chapter 5 the thesis examines the characteristics of ethnic conflicts and the variables found in such environments that increase the likelihood for institutionalization and the different forms of securitization to occur. In the same chapter the hypotheses of the thesis

are tested using the Cyprus problem as a case study, given that the latter is a conflict that shares all the attributes of protracted ethnic conflicts. The fact that the Cyprus problem has the characteristics of intractable ethnic conflicts makes it a suitable case study as it provides a clear social context and distinct sets of identities that support the perpetuation of conflict routines and the development of institutionalized, horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary securitization processes. It must be noted that while the Cyprus conflict clearly involves both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, the empirical focus is limited to the former for methodological purposes. The reasoning behind this choice is explained in detail in chapter 4.

Like most conflict cases the Cyprus conflict has some peculiarities that are worth noting. One of the thorniest issues of the Cyprus problem is that of recognition: Turkish Cypriots struggle to gain international recognition for the area north of the Buffer Zone and Greek Cypriots struggle to prevent them from doing so. Subsequently, Greek Cypriots are particularly careful with the terminology they use so as not to connote, or be accused of connoting, direct or indirect recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).³ As a result, any reference to people, institutions or organizations in the areas not controlled by the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) – that is in the TRNC – is accompanied and prefaced with the word ‘pseudo’ (in Greek ‘ψευδό’) as in pseudo-police, pseudo-state, pseudo-ministry of interior, or they are enclosed in inverted commas (e.g. ‘TRNC’, ‘president’, etc.). The word ‘pseudo’ allows for a *direct* delegitimization of any entity north of the Buffer Zone by indicating that it is not something real (e.g. a fake state, or a fake president), as opposed to the areas controlled by the RoC that are perceived as legitimate and ‘real’. The same applies to the use of inverted commas, albeit in this case the connotation is more indirect and subtle.

³ The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was created after a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1983. The United Nations Security Council called the declaration ‘legally invalid’ and called ‘upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus’ and for ‘all States not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus’ (UNSC 541, 1983, available at <http://www.un.int/cyprus/scr541.htm>). As a result the TRNC remains internationally unrecognized with the sole exception being Turkey, which also does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus.

In this thesis there is no use of either the word ‘pseudo’ or the inverted commas when referring to TRNC. Sharing Constantinou (2010) argument, in non-official documents (e.g. scholarly work), the non-usage of inverted commas does not and cannot elevate the status of a de facto state to a de jure one, nor does it connote directly or indirectly acceptance of the specific regime’s positions and policies.⁴ Similarly, the thesis uses less ‘loaded’ and in general internationally accepted terms to describe the geographical distinctions of the island.⁵ For instance, the term ‘government-controlled areas’ is used to describe the areas south of the Buffer Zone where the RoC has control, as opposed to the term ‘free areas’, which is used in most of the official Greek Cypriot narratives. Similarly, terms such as ‘areas *not* controlled by the RoC’, the ‘area north of the buffer zone’, ‘the area north of the Green Line’ are preferred to terms such as ‘North’ or ‘occupied areas’.

Another terminological issue worth noting is the interchangeable use of the terms ‘conflict’, ‘problem’ and ‘question’. The terms ‘Cyprus conflict’ and ‘Cyprus problem’, and even ‘Cyprus question’, have all been adopted in the literature and the official discourses and are many times used interchangeable. As is the case with most scholarly works the use of any of the terms mentioned above in this thesis refers to the same thing, namely the situation in Cyprus.

1.3. Methodological approaches

The thesis uses a mixed-method approach, collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data using five different kinds of sources. For qualitative data the author conducted twenty-five semi-structured interviews with potential securitizing actors and indicative members of the audience, and organized five bi-communal focus groups with individuals from different sectors of the society: artists, academics, students, NGOs and

⁴ That said, it must still be stated explicitly that the author’s choice not to use inverted commas in this thesis does *not* connote in any way direct or indirect recognition of TRNC or its institutions.

⁵ The EU for instance refers to the areas south of the Buffer Zone as ‘area controlled by the Republic of Cyprus’ (http://ec.europa.eu/languages/documents/cy_en.pdf) and the areas north of the Zone as ‘areas which the Government of Cyprus does not exercise effective control’ (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm).

civil servants. Both approaches were used to examine the impact of institutionalized securitization on the society and whether and how horizontal processes develop.

For the quantitative data the thesis utilizes several surveys conducted by bi-communal NGOs and major television stations, as well as one designed and implemented by the author for the purpose of this thesis; the latter focuses explicitly on the Greek Cypriot academic community, which is one of the numerous distinct sets of audiences that exists in Cyprus. Both were used to identify the overall audience perceptions regarding potential threats and to quantify – to the degree this is possible – the impact institutionalized securitization has on the society.

The most elaborate approach used for empirical data collection is the daily press analysis of the three most widely circulated Greek Cypriot newspapers for a period of 2,356 days (2003-2009). The data collected was used in a quantitative and qualitative manner to test the centrality of the conflict and its importance to the Greek Cypriot identity as well as the specific phrasing used to constantly securitize a number of different referent objects. Several images from newspapers and political advertising billboards were also collected and incorporated in the aforementioned analysis.

1.4. Thesis plan

The thesis is separated into seven chapters, including this introductory one. The second chapter provides an extended review of the securitization literature, focusing on the development of the theory, the link to J.L. Austin's (1962) speech acts concept and the five securitization sectors. It then explores the under-examined areas of the theory and the relevant criticisms leveled against it, paying particular attention to the absence of social context and the prospect of multiple audiences in the mainstream reading of securitization. Chapter 3, starting with the under-examined areas identified in the previous chapter, elaborates on the thesis hypotheses and research questions and develops the conceptual model of institutionalized securitization and the subsequent forms, namely horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary securitization. Following that is the methodology chapter; in

chapter 4 I firstly explain the reasoning behind my choice of the Cyprus conflict as a case study and then proceed with a detailed description on the different qualitative and quantitative approaches used to gather and analyze the empirical data. Chapter 5 starts with a brief introduction of the different forms of ethnic conflicts, their characteristics and the impact they have on conflict-ridden societies. It then continues with an analysis of the case study, the Cyprus conflict, making the argument that the Cyprus situation is indeed a 'protracted ethnic conflict'. The case study analysis commences with a historical timeline of the conflict and proceeds with an examination of the causes of the conflict as understood by the two sides, as well as the multiple resolution efforts that took place over the five-decade period. The next chapter provides empirical evidence for the theoretical claims made throughout the thesis. Chapter 6 commences with evidence on how the securitization process could indeed become institutionalized, and then proceeds to present why ethnic conflicts provide a social context that supports conflict-perpetuating actions and routinized securitizing acts. The final parts of the chapter provide evidence of bottom-up, involuntary and horizontal securitization.

The final chapter briefly summarizes the overall theoretical and empirical contribution made by the thesis to the literature on securitization and the Cyprus conflict. It also examines how the thesis' contribution could be a stepping-stone for the further advancement of securitization theory and security studies in general.

Chapter 2: Review of the securitization literature

2.1 Introduction

Towards the end of the Cold War and soon afterwards, the realist and rationalist-based approaches to security studies were being challenged and new concepts and ideas were introduced, including among other critical security studies (Booth 1991; Krause and Williams 1997; Jones 1999), sociological approaches (e.g. Der Derian 1995) and those approaches which focus on securitization. The focus of this the chapter is on the latter and has a twofold aim: (i) to examine the literature on securitization and more specifically the main premises of the theory and how they developed over time and (ii) to identify the theoretical gaps and the subsequent criticisms leveled against the theory.

Particular attention is given to the ‘constructivist’ nature of the theory. Buzan’s and Wæver’s view that securitization is ‘constructivist all the way down’ (1997: 245) is perhaps exaggerated, as the authors do not take into sufficient consideration either the social context in which securitizing acts take place or the prospect for multiple audiences, each with its own specific identity and psycho-cultural pre-dispositions. These two elements are at the core of the criticisms examined in this chapter, while they also form the basis for the conceptual framework of the thesis.

The chapter is separated into three broad sections. Following this brief introduction, section 2.2. examines the development of the theory, explaining, inter alia, how securitization works and how it is ‘used’ in different fields. Section 2.3. is a brief analysis of the five securitization sectors that form the foundation for the widening security agenda, elucidating why security is no longer limited to the military and the state and how it is extended to other sectors and referent objects. The last section deals with the theoretical gaps as portrayed in the literature and the criticisms leveled against the theory.

The last part forms the basis for the thesis' research questions and sets the ground for the thesis' hypotheses and conceptual framework that are outlined in detail in chapter 3.

2.2. Securitization

2.2.1 Developing the theory

Securitization is about processing a threat through a specific security format; hence 'a discussion of security *is* a discussion of threat' (Wæver 2011: 472-3, emphasis in original). Given that 'discussions of threats' could be very broad and potentially vague, the Copenhagen School scholars clarified from the outset that securitization provides a clear sense 'of what security is', rejecting the traditionalist concerns of 'everything becoming security' (Wæver 1994). Specifically, within the securitization framework threat-arguments justifying the use of extraordinary measures must i) establish that there is indeed a threat, ii) that the threat is potentially existential and iii) establish the relative advantages of security handling as opposed to non-securitized handling (Wæver 2011: 473).

The notion of securitization emerged with Ole Wæver's 1995 *Securitization and Desecuritization*, even though there has been earlier work on the subject in unpublished manuscripts such as Wæver's 1989 article *Security, the Speech Act*. The development of securitization, as with most theories, was influenced by the work of other scholars in tangential areas such as (but not exclusively) Kenneth Waltz's (1979) definition of security as an issue of survival, J.L. Austin's speech act theory (1962) and Jacques Derrida's work on how text matters for what it does rather than for what it says. But, as Williams (2003: 514) points out, the 'baptism' of issues as 'existential threats' and their subsequent 'upgrade' into security issues reflects a Schmittian influence.

While securitization explores security in a widened multi-sector approach, originally – discounting the societal sector – the theory was relatively state-centric and opposed the excessive widening of security along the referent object axis, (Wæver 1995: 48). As

Wæver argued, '[t]he *concept* of security belongs to the state' (ibid: 49, emphasis in original). At a later stage, after the end of the Cold War, the securitization scholars revised their work arguing that security should no longer be limited only to the state, broadening thus the security agenda to other sectors, namely societal, economic, political, military and environmental (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Little 2000). While each of these sectors identifies distinct patterns of security discourses, each one is still part of a 'complex whole' (Buzan et al. 1998: 8). What exactly a 'whole' means however remains unclear (Albert and Buzan 2011: 415). This ambiguity coupled with the possibility for the securitization of numerous referent objects in several sectors gave rise to debates regarding a potential expansion of the list or the disassociation of some issues from specific sectors (Bagge Laustsen and Wæver 2000).

Since its conception securitization has been used to study security-related issues and processes in several areas including terrorism (Buzan 2006), immigration (Bigo 2002; 2005, Bigo and Walker 2002; Alexseev 2011), human security (Floyd 2007), environment (Wishnick 2010) and women's rights (Hansen 2000). Securitization is also used to explain inter-state security relationships. Specifically, it has a central role in the literature of Regional Security Complexes (RSC), which are defined as 'a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan et al. 1998: 201)'.

How does securitization 'work'?

Securitization is essentially a mechanism of political practice; the study of securitization considers 'who can "do" or "speak" security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects' (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). The essence of securitization therefore lies in the idea that security is a speech act: by labeling something as a security issue, something is done. 'The utterance *itself* is the act'; 'the word "security" is the *act*' (Wæver 1995: 55, emphasis in original). That said, it should be noted that the actual utterance of the word *security* is not a necessary a prerequisite for a security speech act. Security and the need for emergency measures (i.e. appeal for urgency) could be

connoted or inferred with the use of other words or terms (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). As demonstrated later, inference could also be achieved even without the use of any words with the use of images.

A securitizing actor performs the securitizing act by claiming that a particular referent object faces an existential threat. According to the Copenhagen School, the actor is a specific someone, or a group, who performs the security speech acts; some of the most obvious actors are political elites, bureaucrats, lobbyists and pressure groups (ibid: 40). With the speech act, the actor claims the right to use extraordinary measures (i.e. break free of normal rules) to handle the existential threat and maintain the referent object's survival (Wæver 1995; Buzan *et al.* 1998). The 'handling' of the issue, according to the Copenhagen School, no longer takes place in the sphere of normal politics as it is moved in the realm of emergency politics. As the argument goes, if these (alleged) threats are not dealt with immediately then everything else will become irrelevant (Wæver 1996: 104), meaning that the situation can no longer be handled by normal politics and extraordinary measures are therefore required. The securitizing move – that is, the labeling of an issue as an existential threat for a specific referent object – does not necessarily constitute securitization. For the latter to happen the audience must accept the securitizing move, or at least tolerate it (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Thus, the securitizing act is a negotiation between the securitizing actor and the audience (ibid: 26) and security, in the securitization theory, is the derivative of a discursive process where 'threats are represented and recognized' (Williams 2003: 513). It is important to note that the Copenhagen School scholars do not always consider the process of securitization to be a positive development even if the goal of this process is to achieve more security. The aim, they argue, should be towards desecuritization, or 'the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere' (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). That said, they also point out that desecuritization is not always better than securitization as the latter is preferable in the abstract, but some concrete situations may call for securitization instead (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 2011).

What constitutes acceptance of a securitizing act is not entirely clear in the mainstream reading of the theory. Given that there are no referenda after every securitizing act, it cannot definitively be determined if the audience indeed accepted a specific act. Buzan et al. (1998) argue that if an act gains enough ‘resonance’ it should be seen as a form of acceptance. But as the authors admit even resonance is difficult to assess (ibid: 25). An equally important shortcoming of the theory is the ambiguity of who the audience actually is. According to Buzan et al (1998: 41) the audience is ‘those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issues’. But as Leonard and Kaunert (2011: 59) point out there is no criteria to ‘identify who exactly constitutes the audience in practice’. Perhaps a more important gap, which is discussed in greater detail later, is that theory does not recognize the presence of multiple audiences. The mainstream reading of the theory implicitly assumes there is only one audience, which leads to some of the aforementioned shortcomings. The role of audience(s) in the theory is an issue that receives growing attention in the literature and is discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Not all securitizing acts are successful and, not surprisingly, unsuccessful cases are very rarely analyzed in the literature and inevitably they are almost never theorized. A notable exception is Salter (2011) who used counter-terrorism programs in the US as a case study to offer three theories of failure: normal failures; internal failures; and external failures. Normal failures are the outcome of ‘non-purposive results of complex, interdependent systems’ (ibid: 122), or in simple words they are the outcome of competing bureaucracies in a complex society and that of accidents that could occur in such societies.⁶ Internal failures refer to moves that fail to meet the grammatical conditions of the act, namely to portray the threat as political and as existential. Lastly, the external failures are those that meet the grammatical conditions, but are rejected by the audience (ibid: 123-126).

Security as a self-referential practice: If security in the securitization theory is seen as a speech act, it means that it is the securitizing actors that define security, which

⁶ The idea of failed securitizing acts because of accidents is based on the Normal Accident Theory (NAT), as originally framed by Perrow (1984).

subsequently means that ‘security is what actors make of it’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48). Security therefore is a self-referential practice as it is the practice of labeling an issue as a threat itself that makes something a security issue and not necessarily a real existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Therefore, the construction of security is all about being able to successfully produce a ‘security label’ (Wæver 1995: 50). This means that if an actor manages to produce such a security label successfully (i.e. convince the necessary audience of the threat’s validity), the threat need not be ‘real’; the impact this labeling has could be sufficiently real, as it either provides the actor the necessary audience tolerance to take certain actions or it provides him with access to extraordinary measures to handle this (perceived) threat. Similarly, a real threat does not guarantee that actors will acquire access to extraordinary measures if they do not successfully process the threat through a specific security format; as Wæver notes there are many real threats, but they do not all come with a ‘label’ (2011: 472).

In the securitization framework, therefore, there is a de-contextualization of the meaning of security for the actor (e.g. national security), as well as of his intentions (e.g. militarization). The only thing that really matters is the practices followed – e.g. breaking free of rules. The meaning of security subsequently is perceived as fixed by each securitization sector (and the relevant audience); it is thus a self-referential practice since security has meaning only within the securitization framework. This approach, however, given that it focuses on the process of securitization – i.e. ‘making’ something a security issue – ignores the intentions of the securitizing actors. It also ignores the context in which the process occurs, despite the possibility that the former could influence the latter. The mainstream reading of the theory therefore ignores that security is entrenched in a symbolic and cultural order, which influences the actors as well as the audiences in the way security is practiced (Huysmans 2002).

Securitization as a political practice analysis tool: The study of securitization is essentially a mechanism to help us analyze political practice. Vuori’s (2008) work helps elucidate why this is the case by separating securitization into four strands. According to Vuori securitization is used in order to achieve one of the following four goals:

- a. To raise an issue on the agenda.
- b. To act as deterrence.
- c. To legitimize past acts or reproduce existing securitization.
- d. To acquire more control.

In the first case – raising an issue on the agenda – the aim is to use securitization as a warning mechanism so as to bring an issue to the attention of decision-makers who are in a position to take the appropriate measures to handle a specific perceived threat. In this case therefore, the actors who initiate the process (e.g. scholars, journalists, politicians, media, etc.) are not the ones asking for access to, or tolerance for, extraordinary measures. Their goal is to get the appropriate agents (e.g. political elite) to do something about a potential threat (ibid: 77).

The second strand – deterrence – refers to securitizing acts aimed at legitimizing activities that have not yet occurred but are likely to occur in the future. The goal therefore is to ‘justify actions that would otherwise be judged illegitimate by the evaluators of legitimacy’ (ibid: 79-80). The evaluators of legitimacy in this case are specific audiences such as journalists and voters, while the actors are the decision-makers and elites who can take action but require the necessary legitimacy, which essentially guarantees them tolerance or access to measures.

The third strand – legitimization of past actions and reproduction of ongoing securitization – is not about the future but about the past and the present. The goal in this case is to legitimize past actions that were deemed as illegitimate by the ‘evaluators’ (ibid: 84-5). This is particularly useful for securitizing actors who, as discussed in the next chapter, would like to portray themselves as the most ‘suitable agents’ to handle a particular kind of threats. This is even more important in cases where threats are part of the people’s routines and are thus constantly repeated.

The final strand – acquisition of control – refers to securitizing acts aimed at granting the actor more control. In this case the audience is under the ‘authority of the actor’, as is the

case for instance of members of political parties, while the actor is someone in a formal position with the ability to ‘authorize compelling directives’ (ibid: 88). The aim of the actor in this case is ‘to get the audience to do the acts required by the actor or to forbid them from doing certain acts’ (ibid).

The four strands analyzed above provide a clearer picture of the motivations behind the different ‘kinds’ of securitizing actors (e.g. elite, scholars, journalists, etc.), and also how analysts can use securitization as a mechanism to analyze political practices. More importantly however, and even though it is not explicitly stated, the four strands refer to multiple audiences. By incorporating several different audiences in the analysis the theory becomes much more lucid when it comes to identifying ‘who’ the specific audience is and whether or not an act has been successful.

2.2.2. Speech Acts

As mentioned above, security in securitization theory is not viewed as an objective condition but rather as the outcome of a social process, meaning that ‘the social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured and from what) is analyzed by examining the “securitizing speech-acts” through which threats become represented and recognized’ (Williams 2003: 513). In other words, the use of speech acts turns non-security issues into security issues by representing them as such, hence the self-referential nature of security. It is worth citing Wæver in length here to clarify this very important issue.

What then *is* security? With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (1995: 55)

The theory of speech acts was developed by John L. Austin in his 1955 work, *How to do things with words*. According to Austin, statements that are not part of the true or false

dichotomy are statements that perform actions and thus he calls them performative utterances or performative speech acts (1962: 6-7). They are performative because by saying something, something is done, as is the case, for example, of marriage, where with the groom's and bride's 'I do', something is done (i.e. a marriage). Thus, '[t]he utterance of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action (ibid: 5).'⁷ Speech acts, to have the wanted impact, must meet some specific conditions that Austin calls 'felicity conditions'.⁸

Speech acts in securitization frameworks have similar 'felicity' conditions. Not being part of the original securitization work they were incorporated at a later stage primarily to deal with criticism that the theory is not applicable to the real world. They also contributed towards incorporating – albeit insufficiently – a social context dimension in the theory. Specifically, there are three 'facilitating conditions' that are separated into internal and external. The internal condition dictates that it is necessary 'to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out' (Buzan et al. 1998: 32-33). The focus is thus solely on how the act is articulated.

The external aspect of securitizing speech acts incorporates the remaining two conditions, namely the social capital of the enunciator (i.e. securitizing actor) and the threat per se (ibid). The former condition notes that the enunciator must be in a position of authority,

⁷ There are, according to Austin, three different types of speech acts: the locutionary, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary. In the first type, meaning is given to an utterance. For instance: 'He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot', shoot and by referring by 'her' to her' (Austin 1962: 5). The second type adds to the meaning of the utterance a performative aspect as well. For example 'He urged (or advised, ordered) me to shoot her' (ibid). The third, perlocutionary, act incorporates the characteristics of the first two (i.e. meaning and performative force), but also includes an effect. For instance, 'He persuaded me to shoot her' (ibid). Securitization is based on the second type, the illocutionary aspect of the speech acts.

⁸ The six conditions would make speech acts felicitous (the alternative being infelicitous, as speech acts cannot be right, or false, but rather infelicitous). In brief these six conditions are:
(1) The utterance of a speech act must follow the 'accepted conventional procedure' (ibid: 14); (2) 'the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked' (ibid: 15); (3) 'the procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly' [...] and [...] (4) and completely' (ibid); (5) the actor performing the speech act must indeed mean it (be sincere) (ibid); and (6) the actor performing the speech act 'must actually so conduct themselves subsequently'.

albeit not necessary official authority, since it is the position a person holds rather than the person per se that could potentially influence a significant audience. For instance, a state president or a party leader has more chances of persuading a given audience that an issue is an existential security threat, than say a bank teller. This facilitating condition is certainly useful in making the theory more applicable to real world situations, but it still remains underdeveloped, as it does not sufficiently incorporate the social context in the theory (McDonald 2008: 565).

The second external facilitating condition has to do with the threat per se. As Buzan et al. (1998: 33) note, 'it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters'. Thus, 'real' threats per se cannot make securitization, but they are facilitating conditions into making a speech act appear credible. This condition, straight forward as it may be, is still underdeveloped. Specifically, 'real threats' (e.g. armies and hostile sentiments) could have a much more significant impact if they are incorporated into a specific social context (e.g. ethnic conflict environments) and tailored to the perceptions of specific audiences (e.g. ethnic groups) that have associated or developed their identities with the specific realities. For instance the presence of the French army at the borders of Switzerland is not perceived as a threat for the Swiss, but the presence of the Turkish army is for Greek Cypriots given the specific social context of the area.

As discussed in detail in the next chapter the role of speech acts in environments where securitization is institutionalized is significantly different. What is argued specifically is that the social contexts in which speech acts take place significantly influence the impact the latter have on the securitization process. In some cases speech acts become completely unnecessary for a securitizing act to be successful, while in others they have a different scope: not to construct a security threat but rather to remind the audiences of the existence of one.

2.3. Securitization sectors

The introduction of new security ‘sectors’ led to a widened security agenda and subsequently a major deviation from the ‘strict’ view of security studies where only one referent object (i.e. the state) exists. According to Buzan the security of human collectivities could occur in a number of different sectors, namely political, military, societal, economic and environmental (Buzan 1991: 19), with each one having specific referent objects, such as identity, economic viability and sovereignty. This means, according to Buzan, that the focus of security studies should not be on just one sector (i.e. military) and on just one referent object (i.e. the state), but rather on all sectors, individually and across the board (Buzan et al. 1998: 168).⁹

The proposal for a widened security agenda has not been unchallenged. Critics pointed out that despite the widening security agenda the focus still remained on the state and Buzan’s work did not really differ significantly from the conventional (Realist) security analysis (Booth 1991, Wyn Jones 1999). This criticism was to a degree valid as Buzan’s earlier work on the sectors did indeed revolve, to a significant degree, around the state. However, the criticism was also to a degree unfair since Buzan’s view of states was different from those of ‘traditionalists’ who view threats as objective facts. As Buzan argues, states are ideational constructs and the construction of any issue as a threat is ‘a political choice rather than objective facts’ (Buzan 1991: 115). At a later stage and in response to such criticisms there was a significant shift from the state-centric approach and the state was no longer the only referent object in any of the sectors. Even with this shift however the Copenhagen School scholars do acknowledge that states are the most important referent object and they still have an integral role to play in the securitizing process given that they are the ideal securitizing actors (Buzan et al. 1998: 37).

Military Sector: Military security deals with the ‘offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and the states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions’ (Buzan 1991: 19; Buzan et al. 1998: 51). The main referent object in this sector is still the state, even though it is not the

⁹ It is for this reason that Buzan and the Copenhagen School scholars in general are frequently characterized as ‘wideners’; they have widened the security agenda.

only one (Buzan et al. 1998: 49); non-state referent objects such tribes (e.g. in Afghanistan and Somalia), private armies and warlords, or even religion (e.g. in former Yugoslavia and the Middle East) could also become the referent objects (ibid: 52-53). The military issues revolve around the traditional 'national security concerns' (Buzan 1991: 116) that threaten the 'distortion or destruction of institutions' and subsequently the 'idea of the state' (ibid: 117). As Buzan notes, military threats usually enjoy a top spot in a nation's security concerns as military actions against a state could also lead to the destruction of other sectors (e.g. societal, political and economic) (ibid). In extreme cases, therefore, the impact on a state would be total (i.e. on all sectors) as was the case for instance with the Nazi threat towards France. Threats in the military sector are not limited to inter-state wars and total destruction in one or more sectors; there are also military related threats but with a smaller impact on any of the aforementioned sectors. Similarly, military threats could be indirect, as they may not be addressed directly towards a state, but rather towards a state's interest (e.g. threats to allies or shipping lanes) (ibid). Military threats therefore could vary from 'harassment of fishing boats, through punishment raids [...] to full invasions' and territorial seizures (Buzan 1991: 118).

Political Sector: The political sector is concerned with issues that threaten the state's ability to maintain its organizational stability. The threats could 'range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack' (Buzan 1991: 119). The latter is obviously the worst-case scenario as it is the one that links political threats to military ones. In addition, 'political threats are [also] about giving or denying recognition, support or legitimacy' (Buzan et al. 1998: 142) to other states or units within a state. Especially in ethnic conflict environments, such as the one in Cyprus, these forms of threats are not only possible but also frequent; they are also usually linked with other sectors including the military.

According to Buzan it is the rivalry among the different ideas and traditions that primarily leads to the emergence of political threats (1991: 70). Identifying such threats however is particularly complex as it is difficult to 'rate' the seriousness of each issue so

as to decide whether it qualifies as a threat. Making the distinction between normal political/ideological rivalry and threats that qualify as ‘issues of national security’ is not straightforward and usually there is no universal understanding among actors and audience(s). In addition to the ideational rivalries, political threats could also revolve around the survival of the nation, meaning that the national identity is the referent object facing an existential threat. In such cases the construction of such threats aim to ‘heighten the separate ethno-cultural identities of groups within the target state’ (ibid: 120). Both kinds of threats (ideational or national) could be either intentional or non-intentional (Buzan 1991: 120, Buzan et al. 1998: 155-159). The intentional threats are ‘action-specific’, meaning they depend on particular actions from one party to another and could range from direct actions (e.g. US embargo against Cuba) to denial of diplomatic recognition (e.g. Taiwan). The unintentional ones are structural political threats and arise from the nature of the situation rather than from specific actions and intentions. In Buzan (1991: 121) words’:

Structural political threats arise when the organizing principles of two states contradict each other in a context where the states cannot ignore each other’s existence. Their political systems thus play a zero-sum game with each other whether they will it or not.

There are also threats that are geared towards the internal legitimacy of the political unit and towards the external recognition of the state (Buzan et al. 1998: 144). Threats towards the internal legitimacy of the political unit revolve around issues of ideologies and ideas that define the state. Threats regarding the external recognition of states revolve around the issue of sovereignty and the state’s external legitimacy (ibid). What is argued in this thesis is that protracted ethnic conflict environments are susceptible to all forms of threats: intentional and structural threats as well as internal and external ones. Most of these threats are not *ad hoc* in the sense that they do not just emerge out of thin air. On the contrary, they are usually institutionalized as there are conscious and repeated efforts from the securitizing actors to establish that the ethnically distinct ‘other’ poses a threat to ‘us’ on all levels and in all sectors.

Societal Sector: Buzan, during his earlier work on societal sectors, defined societal security as ‘the sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional

patterns of language, culture and religious and ethnic identity and custom (1991: 19, 123)'. Societal threats, when defined in this way, could thus emerge from outside the state as well as from within; indeed they come more frequently from within than from the outside (ibid: 123). In later work (e.g. Buzan et al. 1998) the focus on security within the societal sector changed and the referent object of societal security changed from the state to that of identity.

According to Buzan et al. (1998: 121) there are essentially three kinds of issues that could be threats to societal security:

- i. Migration: When a community with X people are overrun or diluted by a large number of Y people. In such a case, the community of X will change significantly (due to demographic shifts), and the identity of X is thus threatened.
- ii. Horizontal Competition: The population of X is dominant but is influenced significantly (culturally, linguistically, etc.) from the neighboring Y (e.g. as the Quebecois are influenced by the Anglophone Canadians). The threats in such cases are thus more indirect and inadvertent, and any potential impact will most likely develop at a slow rate.
- iii. Vertical Competition: In such scenarios, population X stops considering itself as being X. This could be because they are pulled towards a wider identity (due to integrating projects such as the EU) or towards a narrower one (due to secessionist projects, e.g. Quebec, Catalonia) (ibid).
- iv. Depopulation. As the name suggests, the identity of X no longer exists because the population X is eliminated or has severely diminished. This could occur in cases of war, diseases, natural catastrophes or extermination policies.

There could be another reason that Buzan et al. do not explore, namely the possibility of voluntary emigration and thus voluntary depopulation. For example, in the northern part of Cyprus a significant percentage of the Turkish-Cypriot population migrated to the UK and other countries during the 1960's and after the *de facto* 1974 partition of the island to seek better economic and social conditions, while many more are expected to leave if

there is no settlement to the Problem.¹⁰ As a result there was a case of voluntary Turkish-Cypriot depopulation of Cyprus.¹¹

Societal threats that fall in the first two categories – migration and horizontal competition – are of particular importance in protracted ethnic conflicts as they could become deeply internalized and easily securitized in a routine-institutionalized manner.

Economic Sector: Security in the economic sector revolves around the state's ability to have access to sufficient resources, finance and markets to sustain 'acceptable levels of welfare and state power' (Buzan 1991: 19). This sector is particularly broad as referent objects could range 'from the individuals through classes and states to the abstract and complex system of the global market itself' (ibid: 100). According to Buzan, the strongest securitization attempts in the economic sector are those that do not place the emphasis on the economic losses, but rather on the possible collapse of welfare (ibid: 102). This way the referent objects are either entire states or groups of individuals, but not just individuals. The problem with defining economic existential threats is that there are several economic threats that could be attributed to the market system (global or local) and thus cannot be interpreted as national security threats (ibid: 125). However, when economic threats influence the political and military power of a state and its social stability, then they could be classified as national security issues (ibid: 126). It is therefore difficult to argue the logic of survival within the economic sector alone; it is usually linked to referent objects in other sectors (ibid: 115). As is the case with the aforementioned sector, in ethnic conflict environments the economic survival of one or both sides is frequently directly linked to the conflict and the 'enemy other', while it is almost always linked to other sectors such as societal and political.

Environmental Sector: According to Buzan 'environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on

¹⁰ <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/young-turkish-cypriots-will-leave-if-there-no-solution>

¹¹ With the term 'voluntary' I do not argue that there were no pressures within the Turkish Cypriot community (e.g. economic hardships, social problems, isolation, etc.) that led to emigration waves. I refer to the fact that Turkish Cypriots were not *forcefully* (e.g. violently) driven away.

which all other human enterprises depend' (1991: 19-20). These threats go beyond the natural and uncontrolled conditions, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes, and include ecological threats that derive from human activities, such as river or atmospheric pollution that leads, *inter alia*, to the depletion of the ozone layer and the greenhouse warming. Some of the major issues in the environmental sector are: disruption of the ecosystem; energy problems; population problems (e.g. epidemics, declining literacy rates, uncontrollable migrations) and food problems (Buzan et al. 1998: 74-5).

As with the economic sector, the problem with this sector is that such global and macro-level threats cannot easily fit in a national security framework (Buzan 1991: 132). This does not apply to some (primarily) small island-states that are severely influenced by ecological changes; they could classify ecological changes as issues of national security – as is the case for instance with the small Lohachara island (of the coast of India), which was the first inhabited island to disappear under the rising sea level.¹²

2.4. Criticisms and under-examined areas of securitization

The theory of securitization has made a significant contribution to the field of security studies but it is certainly not problem-free and as is the case with almost all theories it is not universally accepted. This section highlights the most important challenges leveled against the theory, paying particular attention to the ones that are relevant to the thesis research questions, namely those revolving around the absence of social context and multiple audiences.

2.4.1. Security threats everywhere

Given that the Copenhagen School widened the security agenda it is not surprising that one of the first criticisms revolved around the notion of security. Traditionalists, such as Stephen Walt (1991: 213), argue that the broadening of the security agenda and the introduction of non-military issues undermines the field's 'intellectual coherence', and

¹² <http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/disappearing-world-global-warming-claims-tropical-island-429764.html> [accessed December 10, 2010].

the focus should be instead on a stricter meaning of security and the conditions that make the use of force more likely. Similarly, Huysmans (1998; 2002) argues that there is a danger of not being able to differentiate between existential and ordinary risks; in his words ‘securitization loses its element of prioritizing and hierarchizing risks in societies’ (Huysmans 1998: 500). Therefore, if no such differentiation is possible there will be security questions everywhere that would subsequently undermine the securitization logic of security as seen in the theory’s framework (given that threats are singled out as existential). Thus, if there is an ‘equalization of risks’ then the distinction between existential security challenges and those that are not existential would be impossible and the security logic itself would be challenged (ibid). Wæver (2011) responds to this criticism pointing out that the theory escapes the ‘everything-becomes-a-security’ trap by tying security in a specific figure, that of securitization. As he argues the problem was resolved by ‘fixing *form*’. Specifically he points out that:

‘When something took the form of a particular speech of securitization. When a securitizing actor claims there is an existential threat to a valued referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that otherwise would not have been acceptable, this is a case of securitization; this way therefore one could ‘throw the net’ across all sectors and actors and still not drag everything with the catch, only the security part’ (Wæver 2011: 469, emphasis in original).

Huysmans’ argument is interesting and particularly relevant for protracted ethnic conflicts, like the one in Cyprus, where there is an abundance of threats. In such cases, where there are multiple threats, there is indeed the risk of ‘diluting’ the meaning of existential threat if one sees constantly security threats everywhere. As discussed in detail in chapter 6, this became evident during the bi-communal focus groups observations when NGO participants noted that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots (but especially the former) ‘see threats and conspiracies everywhere and all the time’.¹³ Thus, if one constantly sees security threats everywhere and all the time, how can one distinguish the

¹³ In chapter 4 I describe in detail the structure of the bi-communal focus groups, conducted for the purpose of this thesis.

existential from the non-existential ones? According to the aforementioned response by Wæver, an argument could be made that only the successfully securitized issues would qualify as security (and existential) issues and not everything across the board. This means that only the ones for which the audience is willing to tolerate extraordinary measures can 'qualify' as existential threats. What is argued in this thesis is that under certain conditions (found in protracted conflicts) some issues once successfully securitized they become part of an institutionalized process and cannot be desecuritized. Threats therefore remain securitized (i.e. qualify as existential threats) not because they are necessarily perceived as an existential threat, but rather because the social context does not allow for their desecuritization; indeed, desecuritization attempts may be securitized.¹⁴ More importantly however such environments allow for the effortless and 'automatic' securitization of other new tangential issues that could be potentially perceived as threats as long as they are linked to the 'other' and the already deeply securitized objects. This leads to an environment that everything related to the 'other' is a threat; there are in other words security threats everywhere. The social context of protracted conflicts therefore could have a significant impact on securitization in this respect as 'qualified' existential threats may not be determined on their own merit, but rather on how routinely they (or other objects) have been securitized in the past.

A tangential question emerges here, namely how the audience(s) and elites function in an environment where there are multiple and ongoing (perceived) threats. Specifically, how do actors engage in constant securitization without diluting their power and thus their ability to successfully securitize specific referent objects? Similarly, do the audiences constantly accept all securitizing acts as valid, despite the high frequency and duration of such acts and frequently the absence of 'objective' threat indicators (e.g. violence)? Have the audiences conditioned themselves not to distinguish between existential and non-existential threats and accept automatically everything related to the 'other' as 'existential'? The thesis' conceptual framework (chapter 3) offers a recommendation on how the securitization process changes in such environments and specifically how actors and audiences alike behave.

¹⁴ See chapter 3 and 6 for more on the argument of securitizing desecuritization.

2.4.2. Context, audiences and the not-so-constructivist approach

Critics such as McSweeney (1996) and Huysmans (1998) question the theory's constructivist approach to security arguing that the Copenhagen School's work is not truly or completely constructivist in nature, but rather 'swings' somewhere between realism and constructivism. This criticism is grounded on a number of different areas with one of the most important ones being how the theory deals with the issue of identity. Specifically, the argument is that the securitization scholars do not really adopt a constructivist approach to identity, i.e. that identity is not 'fixed and incorrigible', but rather 'fluid', where each subject could have multiple identities (McSweeney 1996: 87). Buzan and Wæver (1997: 243) responded to McSweeney's criticisms by arguing that they do not oppose the notion that identity is 'fluid', but at the same time they argue that identity can take a more stable form ('become a thing') and as such it can be examined and become a security referent object.

Along the same lines, the Copenhagen School does not profoundly examine another identity-related issue, namely the existence of nested identities within a society. For instance in Cyprus there are not just Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also (for example) leftist and rightist Greek Cypriots. When attempting to securitize the Greek Cypriot identity therefore, one should consider the impact on the *leftist* Greek Cypriot identity and vice versa: how the latter sub-identity (i.e. leftist) influences the securitization outcome of the overall Greek Cypriot identity. This gap is part of a wider omission from the original work on securitization, namely that of the absence of multiple audiences from the analysis.

The role of the audience in the theory still remains very underdeveloped (e.g. Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Williams 2011), especially when compared to the attention securitizing actors and the process (i.e. speech acts) received in the literature. The biggest gap is that of 'multiple audiences', or rather their absence from the securitization analysis (Balzacq 2005, Stritzel 2007, Salter 2008, Roe 2008; Huysmans 2006). Identifying this gap, Roe (2008) offers an interesting suggestion and 'splits' potential audiences into those who can provide formal support and those that can provide informal support. As he

points out, the public – as one potential audience – could provide moral and informal support for the use of extraordinary measures, while the policy-makers, such as MPs – which is another set of audience – could offer formal support for the use of necessary measures to deal with a security issue. Huysmans (2006) makes a case for two broad sets of audiences: popular and technocratic, whereas Salter (2008; 2011) breaks down these two into four settings: elite, technocratic, scientific and popular. As the arguments go, securitization could occur in any of the different sets of audiences and success in one or more setting, such as scientific and technocratic, does not necessarily mean that there will be success in another setting such as the general public (Salter 2008). Similarly, the presence of an external audience, namely the public, is not a prerequisite for successful securitization in a specific setting as he convincingly demonstrated using the Canadian air transport security authority (*ibid*).

The presence of multiple audiences and the fact that the audience need not always be the general public is indeed of particular importance and at the heart of this thesis, as it allows for a more flexible use of securitization. Specifically, it opens the door for horizontal and bottom-up processes, not least because the securitizing actors need sufficient social capital only within their social settings and in the eyes of a specific audience who can either grant them access to measures or tolerate their actions. In addition, the existence of multiple audiences allows for the prospect of successful bottom-up pressures and securitization, as the aim of each audience is to influence their respective relevant decision-makers and not necessarily all decision-makers.

Incorporating multiple audiences in the theory also eliminates another obstacle, that of identifying ‘who’ the audience is. With the mainstream reading of the theory, identifying the audience is essentially impossible. An audience, according to Vuori (2008: 72), qualifies as ‘audience’ only if it is in a position to provide access to what the actor wants. The flip side of this idea is that a securitizing actor could be anyone as long as he has the necessary audience that would grant him his demands. This opens the door to multiple actors, with limited social capital, who could engage in ‘micro-securitization’ in order to influence only small but specific audiences, thus widening the pool of potential

securitizing actors, which in the mainstream reading of the theory are usually limited to political elite, bureaucrats and influential lobbyists. An indicative example of such candidates with narrow audiences could be a Dean or Head of Departments in academic institutions. Indeed, as demonstrated in chapter 6, actors with relatively small social capital can be very successful within their respective environment and audiences.

The idea that securitizing actors may choose their target-audiences is relatively old. Schneider and Ingram (1993: 336) point out that actors create ‘maps of targeted populations’ based on one hand on their own perceptions on which referent objects are indeed important, and on the other based on what they believe is (or will be) important for the public. Balzacq (2005: 173) also points towards this direction as he argues that the success or failure of the securitizing actor to persuade a significant audience is based, *inter alia*, on the latter’s point of reference (i.e. what it knows about the world). Actors not only consciously choose specific audiences but also, as Vaughn (2009: 275) argues, they ‘behave differently in different settings according to the audience expectations and norms of different audiences’. The different audiences’ expectations in turn depend, to a degree at least, on the audiences’ social environments. As Wendt (1999: 330) points out, the meaning one gives to objects and actors depends on his understanding of the situation. The ‘social context’ therefore is closely linked to the idea of multiple audiences and is indeed a particularly important variable in the securitization analysis not least because it helps elucidate why certain acts are accepted while others are not. Similarly, it elucidates why certain actors engage in *constant* securitization even in the absence of ‘real’ threats.

The social context, and more specifically its absence from the mainstream reading, has also been receiving growing attention. Stritzel (2007) argues that the Copenhagen School has a static approach, which does not examine how the relational dynamics of social and political processes generate meaning for actors and audiences alike. As the argument goes, ‘an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts (Stritzel 2007: 367)’. Similarly, Balzacq (2005: 171-172) argues that to

understand securitization better it is vital to examine the objective context in which the security agents operate, as well as the psycho-cultural predisposition of the audience. Salter (2011: 118) explains further this view, pointing out that securitization is indeed a dialogical or relational process (as the Copenhagen School argues), but not one that takes place in a vacuum; it is one that ‘takes place within existing bureaucratic, social, economic and political structures’. If this is indeed the case then there is a need for a complex sociological method of analysis for the securitization process; one that takes into consideration the different cultures, linguistic, historical and affective context (ibid).

Incorporating social context into the theory is also useful in explaining why securitization could become part of the elites’ and audiences’ political and social routines and subsequently why the process could become institutionalized. As elaborated in chapter 3, the social context and the specific audiences’ identities are utilized as tools to promote securitization and hinder desecuritization. That is actors use the audiences’ identities to maintain some issues constantly securitized. This is not surprising though; what is more interesting and less intuitive is that the existing identities (perhaps) inadvertently promote the institutionalization of threat discourses and hinder those of desecuritization. Specifically, the psycho-cultural pre-disposition of the audience and the audience’s understanding of the situation may not allow for desecuritizing acts or may even expect and demand the perpetuation of a securitized environment. This is a view that is not explored at all in the literature, as the focus is primarily on how the social context may influence the ‘acceptance’ of an act.

2.4.3. Social processes and the notion of intersubjectivity

Securitization is a conscious political choice made by the securitizing actors as they know that if they are successful they will be able to ‘break free of the rules’ and suspend normal politics (Williams 2003: 518). Actors are allowed to do that because the articulation of a security threat does not just describe an environment but also creates a reality. As mentioned already security – or insecurity for that matter – is not necessarily an objective condition, but is rather the outcome of a specific social process and the

social construction of security issues (Williams 2003: 513). This social process is essentially an intersubjective process, or in other words, the negotiation between the actors and the audiences.

The intersubjectivity of the theory lies in the fact that the representation and recognition of any (proposed) threat is “‘negotiated” between an actor and the relevant audience’, with the latter being the final decision-makers on whether the threat is accepted or not (Stritzel 2007: 363). This means that both ‘negotiation’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ are inevitably part of a social process. Stritzel makes an interesting argument that if this is indeed the case, then this process goes contra to the Copenhagen School’s argument that ‘it is the utterance itself that is the act’ (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 26) and that by saying ‘security’ something is done. The creation of a threat cannot be both a process (i.e. intersubjective) and ‘just an utterance’ (Stritzel 2007: 364). The underlying argument is that anything that is subject to intersubjective processes takes time to become accepted. Therefore, any outcome that occurs immediately after a simple ‘utterance’ cannot be part of an intersubjective process. Stritzel (2007: 365) thus suggests that the performativity of security utterances and the social process of securitization, with the pre-existing actors, audiences and contexts, form two different centers of gravity: the internalist and the externalist positions.

The internalist position holds, *inter alia*, that there is no social process involved but rather just the text. Thus the actors have no power position that could contribute towards privileging one text over another. Moreover, there is no historical path dependency or intensification over time (ibid: 376). An externalist position on the other hand argues among other things that texts are always ‘interwoven with relational dynamics of power and meaning’ and are frequently ‘historically intertextual’ meaning that they could transform past meaning structures into the present (ibid). Texts are thus incorporated in the social context that influences their meaning and the subsequent impact they have on the process.

The Copenhagen School has an internalist position, as it does not consider securitizing

acts or securitizing actors as being embedded in ‘broader social and linguistic structures’ (ibid: 368). While this is a very important criticism, it would be unfair to argue that the social sphere is completely excluded from their work. On the contrary, the facilitating conditions – and especially the two that deal with the enunciator’s social capital and the ‘kind’ of threat in question (Buzan et al. 1998: 32-3) – aim specifically to tackle this problem. However, this is as far as the Copenhagen School scholars developed their position and thus the incorporation of the social sphere in the theory still remains very underdeveloped.

Stritzel’s argument that securitization cannot be ‘just an utterance’ and an intersubjective process at the same time is also particularly interesting and to a certain degree valid. As discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is possible that a simple utterance may actually be enough to convince an audience without much intersubjective process. This however could occur only under certain conditions, namely in environments where securitization is institutionalized. In such environments, it is possible for a ‘simple utterance’ to be accepted by specific audiences without any significant negotiation period, as the social context and the internalized beliefs regarding potential threats reduce the need for constant actor-audience negotiations. Precisely because the same threats are frequently securitized and have become part of the audiences’ routines, sometimes all that is required is the speech act, which could be accepted without much negotiation. The end result however appears to be the outcome of an intersubjective process as the actors engaged in a securitizing act (speech act) and the audience accepted it, either by actively endorsing it or by silently tolerating (i.e. by not raising objections). This occurs either because the audience expects some threats to be securitized – and thus the act per se is expected and unquestionably accepted – or because the same threat has been negotiated in the past and any re-securitizing acts aim to ‘remind’ the audiences of the specific threats rather than to ‘convince’ them of their validity.

The Copenhagen School’s internalist approach, or essentially the reliance solely on speech acts is, as Williams (2011: 212) argues, too constrained and very thin to capture the dynamics, strategies and forms that securitization acts take place. The mainstream

reading of the theory ignores the possibility that actors could and do engage in long-term strategic processes to increase their chances for successful securitization. This problem too is part of the aforementioned issue, namely the absence of social context.

Balzacq offers an alternative reading, arguing that securitization could be better understood not as the ‘conventional procedure’ of the speech act – which depends on the full prevalence of the ‘felicity conditions’ to work – but as ‘a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to their attention’ (Balzacq 2005: 172); this is essentially an externalist approach as defined above. Strategic practice essentially refers to the way issues are framed and in what context they are framed. It is not just the content of the speech act – what is being secured – that matters, but also the way the issue at hand is framed and how much the words and images resonate within the existing culture and how much they support or oppose existing norms and personal belief systems. As Entman (2004: 6) notes, words and images that are ‘highly salient in the culture’ – meaning they are understandable, memorable and emotionally charged – are considered to have more cultural resonance and thus have a greater potential for influence. Strategic practices are conscious and long-term decisions on behalf of the securitizing actors, aiming at specific targeted audiences and within a specific context, increasing therefore the chances for successful acts. In addition, these practices do not necessarily rely on ad hoc verbal speech acts that occasionally take place, but rather on routine actions regarding specific issues, such as for instance immigration policies. This way, as Bigo (2002) points out, the securitizing acts have more chances of being successful as they are more likely to remain unquestioned by the specific audiences.

Strategic practices therefore essentially refer to a ‘narrow’ form of institutionalized securitization. What is argued in the next chapter is that in protracted conflicts securitization is more commonly practiced as part of a long-term strategy to establish and handle threats. Similarly, any new potential security threats are usually linked to ones that are already routinely securitized. They become, in other words, part of a macro-

securitization framework, as was the case for instance the Mohammad cartoon crisis, which was not a stand-alone event but rather part of the overall macro-securitization environments that involve the ‘clash of civilizations’ (e.g. Islam and the West) and the ‘war on terror’ (Hansen 2011).

The challenges outlined above allow for a more inclusive approach that extends beyond the use of speech acts as the only mechanisms for successful securitization. The externalist approach – with more emphasis on the audiences and the social context in which securitization takes place – can make the theory more comprehensive and more useful in analyzing political practice. The next chapter builds upon the aforementioned challenges and refines the theory with the advancement of the idea of institutionalized securitization, exploring at the same time the ideas of bottom-up and horizontal processes.

Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

3.1. Introduction

Chapter 2 provided a review of the securitization literature focusing, *inter alia*, on the criticisms leveled against the theory and the relevant challenges, such as the absence of context and multiple audiences and more specifically the under-theorized role of the latter. This chapter, using the identified challenges as a starting point, introduces the thesis research questions in greater detail, as well as the conceptual framework of the thesis. The proposed framework aims to contribute to the theoretical debates by exploring the idea of institutionalized securitization and the different forms of the process in a specific social context, namely that of protracted ethnic conflicts. This way the thesis makes a direct contribution to the theory of securitization, but also to the literature on ethnic conflicts and on the Cyprus conflict specifically.

In the existing scholarship there is no profound link between protracted conflicts (ethnic or otherwise) and securitization. Similarly, in the Cyprus conflict literature it is assumed that Cyprus is a securitized environment (Demetriou 2004a, 2004b, Diez et al. 2002, 2006) and even though this is a valid assumption, these arguments are not supported by substantive empirical evidence that examine i) why this is the case, ii) the frequency and breadth of securitization, or iii) the actual impact it has on the conflict and the resolution efforts. In addition the focus in much of the literature tends to be on the impact that securitization has upon the conflict, but not the other way around: the impact conflict environments have on the securitization processes; it is perhaps assumed that protracted conflicts are by definition securitized. This chapter aims to fill these gaps by examining the link between protracted conflicts and securitization on a theoretical level, which is then used as a foundation for the empirical analysis of the case study, namely the Cyprus conflict.

The chapter is split into three broad sections. The first part, the introduction, presents the thesis' main research questions and hypotheses and defines the key terms, namely institutionalized, horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary securitization. The second section elaborates on the arguments made in the second chapter and focuses on the importance of social context and the role of conflict-perpetuating routines. The third and most important part of this chapter engages in a detailed analysis of how the process of institutionalization takes place, as well as the subsequent impact this has on the theory, by introducing a framework in which the process of securitization is no longer unidirectional but rather multidirectional. The first part of this section explains the institutionalization process by introducing the three steps: 'birth', 'unchallenged period' and 'institutionalization'. The second and third parts explain how and why horizontal and bottom-up securitization is possible and the way these different modes have an impact on the theory as a whole. Following that is a brief analysis on the different role speech acts have in an institutionalized environment and more specifically how they may no longer be used to convince the audiences but rather to remind them of specific existential threats. The final section provides a brief summary of the chapter's main arguments, highlighting the theoretical contribution of the thesis in the literature of securitization, conflict and security studies, and links them to the other chapters of this thesis.

3.1.1. The thesis' hypotheses

The thesis' research questions are based on the idea that under certain conditions securitization could and does become institutionalized. Once institutionalized there are possibilities for new forms of securitization and an expanded view of the process, as it is no longer limited to the typical unidirectional top-down (i.e. elite-driven) path, but rather it becomes subject to bottom-up and horizontal forces as well. It is these forces that lead the different modes of securitization, termed in this work as 'horizontal', 'bottom-up' and 'involuntary' securitization. The main hypotheses of the thesis are outlined and defined below:

H.I: It is possible that securitization becomes an institutionalized process.

H.II: Once institutionalized, securitization need not always be a top-down process, but could also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal

H.III: The institutionalization of securitization coupled with the horizontal and bottom forces induces securitizing actors and audiences alike to engage in ‘involuntary’ actions.

It is obvious from the description above that Hypotheses II and III are essentially contingent on the first one. In other words, bottom-up, horizontal and involuntary, securitization (i.e. Hypotheses II and III) could occur only if there is first an environment where securitization is institutionalized (i.e. Hypothesis I). The following sections of the chapter elucidate why this is the case by explaining how institutionalization occurs and the impact this has on the securitization processes. This section continues with more elaborate definitions of the three hypotheses.

H(I): It is possible that securitization becomes an institutionalized process.

As mentioned in chapter 1, Buzan et al. observe that ‘securitization can be either ad hoc or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). They also acknowledge that issues that are already defined as security issues need not be dramatized or prioritized (ibid: 28). This is how the Copenhagen School scholars see the notion of institutionalized securitization. As also mentioned, their focus remains under-theorized and limited to the possibility of institutionalization if there are recurrent (‘real’) threats.¹⁵ Even in that case, the reference to institutionalization is in regards to an institutionalized ‘sense of urgency’ (ibid), but does not focus on the securitization process per se. The focus therefore remains almost exclusively on the need for dramatization, but

¹⁵ The term ‘real’ refers to the distinction between threats based on actual events as opposed to issues that are perceived as threats but are not based on *ongoing* actual events. For instance, a protracted war with violent acts would create ‘real’ threats for the people. *Potential* terrorist attacks on the other hand create ‘perceived’ threats, but not necessarily ‘real’ ones; the latter could be either based on a one-time event (e.g. September 11 attacks) or even on simply the possibility of an event happening in the future (e.g. Iranian nuclear attack).

it ignores the overall changes on the securitization process. Similarly, there is no examination of the underlying factors that play a role in the development of this institutionalization, or why certain issues are persistently defined as security issues. It also does not examine the role of speech acts once processes are institutionalized or how actors and audiences behave in such environments.

Institutionalized securitization in this thesis goes beyond the persistence of threats as Buzan et al. argue, as it also refers to cases where the entire *process* of securitization – including the behavior of securitizing actors, the audience, and even the role of speech acts – evolves into something diachronic, or almost permanent, and becomes part of the society's political and social routines. As already mentioned in chapter 1, institutionalization is also different from routine securitization. Routine securitization could refer to simply the frequency of acts. Institutionalization on the other hands refers to cases where securitization acquires a state of permanency and becomes part of the actors' and audiences' identities. This in turn creates shortcuts, conscious and subconscious, that dictate to a significant degree behavior, including what *needs* to be securitized and what needs to be accepted as an existential threat. Once institutionalized the question is not just how routinely certain things are securitized but also the way they are. What is claimed in this work is that institutionalization leads to a specific 'format' (i.e. use of specific expressions, images, links to past events, etc.) that all actors are expected to follow in a routine manner and all audiences are expected to accept and even reiterate. This understanding of institutionalized securitization is clearly different and more comprehensive than Buzan et al.'s position that issues may not need to be dramatized.

It is also argued that institutionalization occurs only under certain conditions and in some contexts, such as the ones found in protracted ethnic conflicts. The context fosters internalized perceptions of 'enemy others' and zero-sum mentalities, which in turn influence significantly prospects for successful and repeated securitization.¹⁶ It is worth

¹⁶ The characteristics of ethnic conflicts that open the door for institutionalized securitization are discussed in detail in chapter 5.

noting that ethnic conflicts environments are not the only contexts in which some of form of institutionalized securitization could take place. There is evidence that specific referent objects, such as immigration and border controls, became subject to institutionalized securitization (Bigo 2005; Bigo et al. 2007, Tsoukala 2005). However, these are cases where elites managed to securitize a specific referent object and thus routinize specific processes to deal with the issues at hand without the need to constantly dramatize the potential threats. This approach useful as it may be, it still remains bounded by the mainstream reading of the theory, namely that securitization occurs in a top-down manner and routines are only limited to one specific referent object. What this thesis identifies and conceptualizes is the institutionalization of the process on an ‘across the board’ way and not always in a top-down manner, but also in a bottom-up and/or horizontal one.

H.II: Once institutionalized, securitization need not always be a top-down process; it can also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal.

Scholars dealing with the theory always assume that securitization is a top-down process. This is not surprising as the theory suggests that the first step of the process is the speech act, which is assumed to be the outcome of a conscious political choice of the securitizing actor (e.g. political elite, influential organizations, media, etc.). These actors are always assumed to be at the ‘top’ and their acts aim at influencing the ‘bottom’ (i.e. audience) and not the other way around. Thus, the process is perceived to be unidirectional: from top to bottom. While I agree with the assessment that influential actors such as political elites and media agents are still the primary securitizing actors, in this thesis an argument is made that the audiences themselves could also become securitizing actors in two ways. The first way is through a ‘role reversal’, where the traditional audiences become the actors and the elite and decision-makers who are the traditional actors become the audience. The second way is peer-to-peer securitization, where (parts of) the audiences are both the actors and audience at the same time.

The bottom-up and horizontal modes of securitization are possible because, as discussed in chapter 2, in any environment there may be multiple audiences and not just one as the

Copenhagen School suggests. This means that the audience need not always be the general public but also specific groups that could give the securitizing actor the validation he or she requires. This also means that actors may only need sufficient social capital within their specific environment so as to influence their targeted audience – and not necessarily social capital to influence the entire public – thus creating multiple securitizing actors who under the mainstream reading of the theory would not qualify as such. The presence of multiple audiences could also lead to small-scale top-down securitization processes, as well as horizontal peer-to-peer ones. It could also however create bottom-up processes as specific audiences may be in a position to more easily influence the decision-makers in their respective settings; indeed, the audience in the setting could securitize an issue in an attempt to influence their decision-makers into taking specific actions to deal with a given problem. In this case therefore there is a role reversal where the audiences become the actors and the latter become the audiences. This argument is discussed in greater detail in section 3.3.2.

The second part of this hypothesis, namely horizontal securitization, introduces an argument that challenges to a degree the mainstream reading of the theory, as the ‘top’ (e.g. political elite) is excluded from the process. As the argument goes, securitization could take place on a micro-level, where the securitizing actors are individuals without any significant social capital and their aim is not to influence the masses (i.e. the wider audience), but rather their immediate periphery (peers, family, colleagues, etc.). This is a form of ‘horizontal securitization’; a peer-to-peer process and not one that is either actor-to-audience or audience-to-actor. The horizontal mode of securitization is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.1.

H.III: The institutionalization of securitization coupled with the horizontal and bottom forces induces securitizing actors and audiences alike to engage in ‘involuntary’ actions.

Buzan argues that when the importance of some threats is not self-sustained and when those threats are beneficial to some actors’ aims, the latter – who are described as ‘agent provocateurs’ – will seek to exacerbate the situation on purpose to achieve their goals

(Buzan 2006: 1107). What Buzan describes is the reasoning why some agents might seek to maintain a security threat by convincing the necessary agents that the threat is as important as it used to be. While I agree that such cases are indeed possible, what is argued here is the opposite: the audiences will sometimes seek to perpetuate a threat regardless of what the agents want.

Thus, the bottom-up and horizontal forces in some environments are such that they influence the mainstream top-down process. Specifically, they limit the options securitizing actors have in *not* engaging in securitizing acts, and they limit the audiences' options of *not* accepting them. The first case occurs through bottom-up forces, when the audiences apply pressure on their respective elites and decision-makers to keep specific referent objects securitized. In such cases the audiences expect that certain issues should become or remain securitized; there is therefore, on an audience-level, what is termed here 'expected securitization'.¹⁷ The audiences in these cases may either securitize the issues themselves trying to convince their respective elite to do the same, or apply pressure to them by expressing their views and preferences (but not in a securitization manner). These audience expectations may leave few options to potential securitizing actors, creating thus in a sense 'involuntary' securitization on an elite level. In these cases therefore the securitization is still top-down and the outcome of a conscious political choice, albeit an 'involuntary' one.¹⁸ Volition for elites in these cases is therefore limited because the alternative options – i.e. of not securitizing – are too costly and not because they do not exist.

These bottom-up pressures do not influence only the securitizing actors, but also the audiences. Specifically, in the same way that actors may not have an option but to securitize an issue, part of the audience may have no choice but to accept some acts. The cost in this case for those who do not 'cooperate' could be peer pressure, social exclusion

¹⁷ Why the audience may want things to remain securitized is subject to a number of factors, including the social context, past experiences and internalized perceived threats. These conditions are discussed later in this chapter and tested empirically in chapter 6.

¹⁸ It is worth reiterating that the word involuntary here is not used in a strict sense – e.g. actors are under physical threat and thus have no choice but to cooperate - but in a loose way – failure to satisfy the public demand will lead to significant costs, political, financial or otherwise. I do not argue, therefore that a securitizing act is not a conscious choice.

or penalties at the work place. Thus, securitization could be ‘involuntary’ both at the top as well as at the bottom.

All three of the aforementioned forms of securitization do not take place in vacuum, but are rather within specific social contexts that provide the necessary conditions for such forms of securitization to occur. Specifically, what is argued is that bottom-up, horizontal and involuntary securitization take place in environments where the audiences have internalized threats and have zero-sum mentalities. It is for this reason that the presence of social context is considered in this thesis to be an integral part of the theory. Even more specifically, what is argued is that protracted social conflicts, such as the one in Cyprus, provide the most suitable environments for institutionalized securitization and the subsequent different modes as outlined in the three hypotheses above. The next section examines the role of social context in the development of institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization.

3.2. Securitization in a social context

3.2.1. Incorporating the social context: securitization within a habitus

Chapter 2 discussed the absence of context from the theory and the need to take the latter into consideration; this section discusses why this is the case. In every social context there are unwritten rules that securitizing actors and audiences tend to follow. These rules, just like in games, do not determine the outcome but they do create expectations on how the game will be played out. These expectations also apply in cases of securitization where the social environment creates rules that limit how players could behave if they want to be successful. Specifically, on an actor level there are expectations, or ‘rules’, on what issues must be securitized and by whom, while on an audience level there are expectations on how receptive the audiences should be to certain acts. The social constraints therefore essentially set the boundaries of what securitizing actors should securitize. In the case of Cyprus for instance the settlers, the army, or even specific people such as the UN Special Envoy in Cyprus Alexander Downer, are issues that actors

are expected to securitize and audiences are expected to accept them as threats. Subsequently, if players, actors and audiences alike, follow the same rules it means that the process of securitization is to a great degree predictable if not pre-determined.

The game analogy has a flaw, namely that in any game the rules *must* be followed; the social context rules however are expected to be followed, but it is not mandatory. In cases of securitization therefore actors and audiences are not forced by anyone to either securitize or accept anything, but are rather expected to do it. While the choice to follow or not to follow the 'rules' is theoretically voluntary, in reality (as discussed earlier) there is little flexibility for either the securitizing actors or the audiences not to follow them. As demonstrated later players who do not follow these rules are likely to 'lose' (i.e. occur heavy costs), just like players in a game would.

It is useful to understand the impact of social context using Bourdieu's (1991) concept of habitus that elucidates why players are inclined to follow rules, official or unofficial. A habitus is a sociological concept designed to capture the dimension of practice and links structure and agency. Agents are influenced by the rules of social life but at the same time they retain their ability to move creatively. It provides individuals, according to Bourdieu (1991), with guidelines, or a sense of how to act and respond in the course of their daily lives, without however strict restrictions; it gives a sense of what is appropriate in the circumstances and what is not. Thus, as Thompson (1991: 12) notes, a habitus is 'a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways'. These dispositions become internalized to a degree that they become 'second nature', which subsequently means that they are also durable and resistant to change (ibid: 13).

What does this mean for securitization? Securitization takes place within a habitus, which means that actors' and audiences' securitizing choices are influenced by the specific set of dispositions of the social context. Specifically, the context sets guidelines (even without strict restrictions) of how actors and audiences should behave and dictates in a sense what the appropriate behavior is, which could be the perpetuation of a securitized environment. If the expected proper behavior is internalized then actions could become

‘second nature’ or essentially institutionalized and inevitably part of the actors’ identities. The social context therefore does not take away the choices from (securitizing) actors, but rather limits them to a significant degree; indeed choices could be limited to a degree that their actions become in a sense ‘involuntary’. This ‘involuntariness’ therefore could derive either from the social constraints – meaning that agents may want to choose something else but might not do so because it is not ‘proper’ or expected – or from the actors’ identity that does not ‘allow’ them to see alternative options (e.g. desecuritization instead of securitization).

Social contexts and internalized habitus, is argued in this thesis, influence directly the chances for successful securitizing acts. Specifically, for any securitizing actor to convince any audience that a particular issue is an existential threat is not an easy task if that audience does not already believe, at least partly, that the particular issue could indeed be a threat. For instance, it will be very difficult to convince a Cypriot audience that it could be a victim of a terrorist act, regardless of who the securitizing actor is and how much his social capital is. How and why securitized issues are recognized and accepted as threats is thus just as important as the actual process of presenting them as threats (i.e. speech acts). Balzacq points towards this direction as he argues that the success or failure of the securitizing actor to persuade a significant audience is based, inter alia, on the latter’s point of reference (i.e. what it knows about the world) (2005: 173; see also Wendt 1999: 330 for a similar argument). Thus, it is the identity and the internalized beliefs of both the actors and the audiences that essentially have the deciding role on how the process develops (Sheehan 2005: 142). If the acts are in line with the audiences’ internalized beliefs, or what Balzacq (2005) calls their psycho-cultural predisposition then securitization is more likely to be successful.

Not surprisingly the focus in the literature is how the psycho-cultural predisposition of the audience and the social context in general has an impact on securitizing acts, but not on desecuritizing ones. Specifically, there is a theoretical and empirical gap on i) whether and how the social context influences the acceptance or rejection of *desecuritizing* acts, and ii) how the social context poses restrictions to the development of desecuritization in

general. It is this idea that forms the basis that habitus can and do create environments where not only is desecuritization improbable, but securitization is rather ‘mandatory’ (i.e. involuntary).

3.2.1.1. Effective social capital as part of the social context

The closest the Copenhagen School has come to incorporating social context into securitization theory is with the introduction of the facilitating conditions and specifically the actor’s social capital. While it is indeed a vital addition to the theory, the context is still an under-examined variable. The major assumption is that the bigger the actor’s social capital, the bigger the influence on the audience will be. This however is a problematic assumption as it is seen in absolute terms – i.e. as if social capital is a quantifiable variable – and not in a relative sense. In addition, it is assumed that social capital is important for convincing *the* audience, ignoring as mentioned the prospects for the presence of multiple audiences. What is argued here is that social capital should be examined relative to each specific audience and always within the context in which securitization takes place.

In any given social context securitizing actors develop ‘roles’ and perceived competencies, which are supported by specific political routines and re-iterated discourses. This is especially the case in protracted ethnic conflicts where the context is dominated by internalized threats and perceptions of the ‘enemy other’. In these environments, where threats are already established and are part of the audiences’ identities, it becomes particularly important for securitizing actors to cultivate the perception that they are indeed capable of handling specific threats. Subsequently, we tend to see actors engaging in a securitization bidding battles with other potential actors to prove not necessarily that something is a threat – as that may already be taken for granted – but rather that they are the most suitable agents to handle the threat. Successful actors are those who manage to be more in line with the audiences’ psycho-cultural pre-dispositions vis-à-vis perceived security issues. Their success derives from the increased

possibility that the audiences will be keener to accept, almost automatically, those actors' securitizing acts.

With this in mind the size of the securitizing actors' social capital is subject to i) how successful they are in the outbidding struggles with other actors and ii) how much in line their discourse is with the audiences' pre-dispositions; the latter clearly influences the former. The latter condition is linked to the presence of multiple audiences given that while an actor's social capital may be beneficial for one set of audiences it may act as a negative factor for other. There are therefore two issues that need to be taken into consideration when examining the actors' social capital: the first concerns the securitization competition from other actors and the second with the identity compatibility between actors and audiences; both are part of the social context in which the process takes place. What follows is a more elaborate demonstration of the two points mentioned above.

Condition 1 – securitizing actors' competition: If actor 'A' securitizes a referent object, actor 'B' is likely to pursue one of the following three options: i) counter-securitization; ii) desecuritization; or iii) out-bidding securitization. All three options aim to benefit 'B' or at least diminish the gains of 'A'. Counter-securitization refers to the securitization of the alternative option.¹⁹ In the second case, if 'A' attempts to securitize an issue, 'B' may attempt to desecuritize it, so that all or most audiences reject A's acts. Again, the aim may not be for 'B' to gain anything but rather to prevent 'A' from benefiting. The last case, which is the most interesting scenario, takes place in environments where many issues are already securitized. In contexts where the audiences have internalized perceptions regarding specific threats and thus expect certain issues to remain securitized, actors cannot afford to either engage in counter-securitization or desecuritization for the reasons mentioned above. They therefore engage in an outbidding process of constant securitization in an attempt not in order to convince the audiences that something is

¹⁹ For instance, during the Annan Plan period in Cyprus actors were securitizing either the rejection or the acceptance of the Plan, creating thus a situation with mutually exclusive positions. Both choices for the referendum (accept or reject the Plan) were deeply securitized, creating therefore an environment where the same issues were securitized from different angles or essentially counter-securitized.

indeed an existential threat, but rather that they are the most suitable to handle the threat. In these cases we see routinized securitization of the same issues by multiple actors. If this outbidding takes place for a long time it also becomes institutionalized as it becomes ‘standard’ behavior even when there is no securitization ‘outbidding war’.

Condition 2 – identity compatibility: The Copenhagen School measures the actor’s social capital in an absolute way and it is usually linked to the position an individual holds; a president for instance has more social capital than a teacher. A more comprehensive view would be one that incorporates both the position as well as the ‘identity compatibility’ with specific audiences – i.e. how compatible are his/her positions with those of the audiences’. The argument is that these views may actually be the determining factor for a successful act and not necessarily one’s position or ‘absolute’ social capital. This is particularly the case in deeply politicized environments where individual elite and political parties have diachronic positions on certain issues, very loyal followers as well as very loyal opponents and ‘incompatible audiences’. Thus, an act may fail not necessarily because a particular audience does not believe a particular issue is a security threat, but rather because it questions the securitizing actor’s ideology or motives.

The actors’ identities are by themselves important and not only in relation to the audiences’ identities. According to Hermann and Keggle (1995) there are two kinds of elite: crusaders and pragmatists. Crusaders are ideologically driven and interpret their environment through a lens that is structured by their attitudes, beliefs and motives’ (ibid: 521). On the other side there are the more pragmatist leaders who see themselves as flexible and try to make their behavior fit the demands of the situation, take into consideration the other’s positions, and ‘act how other governments are likely to act’ (ibid: 522).

The ‘kind’ of leadership is important in the process of securitization, especially when coupled with the social context in which these leaders operate. Specifically, in protracted ethnic conflict environments where security threats are already widely accepted, crusader-leaders are more likely to build upon these established perceptions and promote

their agenda by institutionalizing the securitization process, as that serves their ideologically-driven goals more efficiently and effectively. In these cases therefore the local social context with the internalized threats becomes part of such elites' arsenal to engage in constant securitization. Such leaders are also unlikely to contemplate alternative options to the perpetuation of the existing securitization framework, making thus desecuritization a very unlikely option. 'Crusaders', given their ideologies and the social context in which they operate, may not be in a position to even consider any option other than the perpetuation of a routinized security discourse revolving around the same threats. Therefore, while the choice to continue securitizing specific referent objects is a conscious one, the possibility that there is no alternative path may be an unconscious one for some individuals.

Pragmatists on the other hand, who are more flexible and are influenced by the external environment, are more likely to 'float along' with the dominant views (i.e. social context) and give in to domestic and foreign pressures. In ethnic conflict environments this could lead to a struggle between internal and external pressures. Internal pressures may demand further or constant securitization, while external may seek desecuritization. A pragmatist's approach in such situations is determined by how powerful the domestic bottom-up and horizontal pressures are relevant to the external ones. These elites are thus likely to engage in 'involuntary' acts because of the high costs of the alternative options and not because they fail to see the other possible choices that may not include routinized securitization.

This struggle, as well as the impact the horizontal and bottom-up forces have on the path elites follow, is demonstrated in chapter 6. Specifically, during the period under examination (2003-2009) at the top of the Greek Cypriot leadership there were both crusaders and pragmatists with clearly different agendas. They both however followed the same path. What is argued therefore in this thesis is that once securitization becomes an institutionalized process, the bottom-up and horizontal forces become so powerful that not even pragmatist leaders can escape from the habitus that asks for constant securitization. Thus, if the domestic social context is dominated by conflict-perpetuating

social and political routines the external forces that could have potentially influenced leaders into a desecuritization path are not sufficiently powerful to have such an impact. This is one of the main reasons that protracted ethnic conflicts such as the one in Cyprus remain unresolved despite the multiple leadership changes and international efforts to settle the conflict. This is also the reason why conflict-perpetuating routines remain unchanged despite the changes in leaderships. The next section examines the role of these routines.

3.2.2 Conflict-perpetuating routines and the path to institutionalized securitization

A factor leading to the emergence and perpetuation of conflicts is the lack of credible commitment between opposing parties that they will uphold mutually beneficial agreements and will not exploit the other party in the future (Lake and Rothchild 1996). This is usually the case when there is a shift in the balance of ethnic power; that is when one side becomes stronger than the other (Fearon 1995). This fear of exploitation creates anxiety as a failed agreement and future exploitation could mean, for the 'loosing' side, higher costs compared to the status quo (i.e. stalemate). Provided that individuals tend to overweigh losses relative comparable gains they are more likely to engage in risk-averse behavior (Levy 1992), meaning that in such cases the less risky decision may be the perpetuation of the status quo (i.e. the conflict). Individuals therefore may be willing to maintain conflict-perpetuating routines because that is the option with the perceived least risk.

What makes scenarios where the conflict may be the preferred option particularly interesting is how the conflict routines could actually provide individuals with more ontological security. Mitzen (2006) argues that people need ontological security as much as they need physical security. Ontological security refers not to the security of the body, but to the security of the self and to the subjective sense of who one is (Mitzen 2006:

344).²⁰ A similar situation could take place on a state level. As Steele explains, ‘nation-states seek ontological security because they want to maintain *consistent self-concepts*’ (2008: 3, emphasis in original). This sense of identity is sustained through routinized actions as the latter regulate social life and eliminate the anxiety of the unexpected, creating thus a sense of security regarding the perpetuation of the ‘self’ (Giddens 1991). Thus, any disruption of those routines creates anxiety and potentially ontological insecurity, which is ‘the deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which not’ (Mitzen 2006: 345). The counter-measure to avoid this uncertainty is the establishment of routines that create cognitive and behavioral certainty (ibid: 341). Routines could vary from perpetuating a specific perception about the ‘enemy-other’ (e.g. Turkey for Greek Cypriots), to how specific issues are portrayed (e.g. the settlers as a threat to ‘our’ identity), to how issues should be handled (e.g. accept or reject specific proposals dealing with specific issues, report specific activities to the UN, negotiate in a given way, etc.).²¹ These routines therefore create in a sense a habitus which, as discussed above, offers guidelines on how people should behave in each specific social context.

What makes the study of such routines interesting and relevant is that they promote securitization (sometimes inadvertently) and subsequently the perpetuation of the conflict. This takes place when identities are sustained through the perpetuation of a conflict and the necessary presence of an ‘enemy other’. This means that the continuation of the conflict becomes necessary for the perpetuation of specific identities. As a result, a conflict may be desired and maintained precisely because it is through its perpetuation that ontological security could be achieved. What is worth noting is that this form of identity construction is not limited to the individual level. Alexander Wendt explains how states need the ‘other’ to play the role of the enemy in order to help ‘us’ define who ‘we’

²⁰ See also Wendt (1999): chap. 3 for identity security and for a similar argument on ‘collective needs’ see Kelman (1997) and Burton (1990).

²¹ These routines could be observed through media analysis – e.g. how frequently the aforementioned routines appear in the press and in what ways – as well as through the observation of political discourses – e.g. examine the elite positions and official positions. Similarly, by observing opinion polls one can identify how important certain issues, that are part of the media and elite routines, are for the public. In chapter 6 I examine such routines for the Greek Cypriot community.

are (1999: 274). Campbell (1992), using the United States as an example, makes a similar argument, namely that states use a 'discourse of danger' which is generated and/or overstated by elite in order to produce a clear distinction between 'us' and 'them'.

It is not unlikely therefore for a society to prefer conflict to cooperation, as people feel that it is only through the conflict and the associated routines that they know 'who they are' (Mitzen 2006: 348-9). Such scenarios could be more possible in cases where the conflict is non-violent and the stalemate is not hurtful as the risk for change is even higher compared to the potential gains. This is not to say that conflict resolution will always lead to insecurity. As Steele points out, routines could be disrupted when a state 'realizes that its narrative actions no longer reflect or are reflected by how it sees itself'; once one sense of identity is changed the actor will seek to re-establish new routines that could again maintain a new identity (Steele 2008: 3). Therefore, if a new set of routines could be established that would provide a new sense of identity without the use of the enemy-other, then there could be a resolution to a conflict without the risk of ontological insecurity. Such conditions however are not easy to develop, especially in protracted conflicts, where identities have been formed in or by conflict environments with the presence of 'other-enemies' for decades or even centuries. In these environments any potential disruption of the routines is likely to be securitized, reducing thus the possibility for change.

The quest for ontological security does not just create the need for predictability and order (i.e. a routinized environment), but also creates specific roles for each set of identities, such as 'enemies', 'friends', 'protectors', etc. (Wendt 1999: 339). The importance of these roles lies not only in the construction of a 'self', but also on the understanding of how 'things are done'. Thus if two sides that consider each other as enemies repeatedly engage in practices that ignore each other's needs or if they practice power politics, they will end up creating and internalizing a shared knowledge that they are indeed enemies (Wendt 1999: 332), creating in a sense self-fulfilling prophecies. In protracted ethnic conflict environments, as discussed in chapter 5, such behavior is 'typical' which subsequently means that the construction and internalization of 'enemy

identities' is inevitable. It is not surprising therefore that in environments dominated by such routines desecuritization is very unlikely. Any act from the 'enemy other' is almost automatically perceived as negative and could therefore easily be presented as a security threat for 'us' and thus become securitized. Similarly, desecuritization is highly unlikely for as long as the negative perceptions of the 'other' remain unchanged. This is because there is little or no will to interrupt routines that maintain the negative perceptions about the 'other' and subsequently there is little hope to perceive any acts from the 'other' in ways that are not perceived as threatening.

What has been argued so far is that people may be unwilling to disrupt certain routines. An argument could also be made that they might also be unable to do that. This 'inability' is essentially the outcome of institutionalized and 'involuntary' securitization as described above and could be attributed primarily to the very high political and social costs associated with their disruption, but also in some cases with the inability of some individuals to see any path other than the one that supports the conflict. Such routines are inevitably intertwined with securitization as the latter contributes to the perpetuation of the former. The routines themselves are securitized; they become thus a referent object that could be under threat.

The disruption of conflict-perpetuating routines and constant securitizing acts could be, as explained above, particularly difficult. This raises the question of how change could take place. What is argued here is that under certain conditions routine disruptions are possible. Disruption in our case is translated into either the desecuritization or the discontinuation of frequent securitization of specific referent objects. For either option to be possible without significant political cost for the actors and without audience anxiety and ontological insecurity, new identity-sustaining routines must be established that would replace the old ones. Thus, for the public to accept the elimination of old routines the new ones must serve the same purpose, namely sustain the people's identities.²² Given that the creation of new routines through desecuritization discourse is particularly

²² This is not the same argument mentioned above, namely that a change of self-conception will create new routines to sustain this new identity (Steel 2008). The argument here starts from the opposite end, namely that it is the change in routines that will change the identity and not the other way around.

difficult in some social contexts for the reasons mentioned above, a more plausible scenario is the creation of new routines without constant securitizing acts, which would lead to 'less-securitized' environment. In protracted conflicts environments there is some possibility to delink the 'enemy other' from *some* threats, but it is almost impossible to 'sell' an argument that the 'other' is not in any way a threat to 'us' or is even a friend, (i.e. desecuritize the environment completely). For 'decreased' securitization to take place there must not be severe horizontal pressures and competition on an elite level, namely outbidding struggles. In other words, it is very difficult for only one set of elites (e.g. one political party or newspaper) to adopt a less securitizing or desecuritizing approach, if the opponents (e.g. other political parties and newspapers) continue to engage in frequent securitization. It is difficult because of the associated costs deriving from non-securitization approaches. Specifically, and as demonstrated in chapter 6, any actors who adopt such approaches could easily be perceived as 'soft' and uninterested to the public demands and fears.

An alternative option to interrupt conflict-perpetuating routines is to securitize the impact that securitization has on the environment (i.e. society, community, etc.). What is securitized is therefore the perpetuation of the securitized environment. Thus, by securitizing the status quo and by emphasizing the missed opportunities of a potential change, it could be possible to disrupt the conflict-perpetuating routines. However, as is the case above, for this to take place there must little or no horizontal competition among securitizing actors. Such a task becomes even more difficult in cases like Cyprus where the conflict is 'comfortable' and the stalemate is not hurting. The more comfortable a conflict is the less likely it is for the public to be convinced of potential benefits (relative to the costs) deriving from the any deviation from the status quo.

This chapter has so far introduced the thesis' hypotheses and defined the relevant terms (i.e. horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary securitization) and elaborated on the identified gaps (chapter 2), namely why the social context, the idea of multiple audiences and the presence of conflict-perpetuating routines are important and should be integrated further

into the theory. The next section builds on the previous parts and introduces a framework on how institutionalized securitization could take place.

3.3. Institutionalization: the process

Institutionalized securitization is not something that could ‘simply take place’, that is being the outcome of a speech act and a brief intersubjective process, as is the case with ‘mainstream’ securitization. On the contrary, some conditions must be present and a specific process is required. The process introduced here is similar to that of the 3-stage life cycle of norms: the birth (i.e. creation) of norms, the growing (i.e. spreading or expanding) stage, and lastly the internalization of norms (Kowert and Legro 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the case of securitization to reach the third stage (i.e. institutionalization), there must also be the birth stage, which takes place (primarily) after pivotal events (see Figure 3.1. below). But unlike the case of norms where the ‘birth’ takes place mainly because of the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ – agents with strong beliefs of what is appropriate or desirable within a community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) – the pivotal events could be so dramatizing that no specific actors are required to argue what is appropriate, desirable or a threat.

The second stage of institutionalization is the ‘unchallenged period’. This is the period during which any perceptions regarding threats that derive directly from the pivotal event remain unchallenged for a period of time from either the entire or significant parts of the population and the elites (all or most of them). During this period the prospects for internalization of specific perceptions is particularly high, not only because they remain unchallenged by elite and public alike, but also because after pivotal events these perceptions are usually holistic, meaning they affect the entire population and not just parts it. At the same time they also shape the community’s identity, especially when it comes to perceptions about the enemy and source of potential threats. During this stage many conflict-related issues become part of the people’s routines.


For institutionalization to fully take place (i.e. 3rd stage) there needs to be an ‘active’ and repetitive discourse on security issues on an elite and public level. The key to institutionalization is the repetition of securitizing act until the process becomes ‘formalized’ in terms of content, structure and even frequency. Thus, the way to determine whether or not securitization is institutionalized is to examine the political and social security discourses and see whether, how and to what degree they are routinely repeated. As mentioned, once institutionalized the securitizing acts become part of the elite’s political routines and the process of accepting or rejecting them becomes part of the audiences’ social routines. In practical terms this means that elite and media, who are some of the usual securitizing actors, will routinely repeat the same discourse and focus on the same referent objects and source of threats using many times the same phraseology. The (majority of the) audiences will then routinely and essentially unquestionably accept those acts and even reiterate them in a horizontal manner when and if necessary. Chapter 6 demonstrates how thousands of daily front-page references in the newspapers regarding the Cyprus Problem could be grouped in just 14 categories, which indicates, among other things, a repetitive discourse. Similarly, political elites reiterate the same positions regarding potential threats since the pivotal event of 1974. The institutionalization impact on the audience could be measured through opinion polls where it is demonstrated that the public (or parts of the public in case of targeted audiences analysis) internalized the same threats reiterated in the press and political discourses. The quantifiable data is corroborated by the interviews and focus groups that also indicate the high degree of internalization of specific security discourses.

What must be noted is that the routines do not start after the ‘unchallenged period’, but rather they emerge during that period. Thus the institutionalization phase is not very distinct from the unchallenged phase; on the contrary the two evolve concurrently. That said, it is worth reiterating the distinction between routinized securitization and institutionalized securitization. The former connotes high frequency of the same or similar threat discourses on an elite and audience level. Institutionalization on the other hand refers to routinized processes, which however are deeply internalized and occasionally even embedded in official processes (e.g. in political parties, government,

diplomatic corps, etc.) or official narratives (e.g. in education books, government websites, etc.). Once institutionalization occurs then securitization takes the form of a standard operating procedure that incorporates pre-determined discourses, approaches to potential threats and even phraseology.

When institutionalized, securitization also becomes ‘expected’ in the sense that the audiences and even political elite anticipate a specific response for referent objects or issues that have been routinely securitized in the past. There are in other words expectations that those standard procedures will not be interrupted. On an audience level therefore these expectations could easily lead to bottom-up and horizontal forces if there is evidence that there might be a deviation from expected behavior. These forces in turn contribute to further top-down routinized securitization as they ‘force’ the actors at the top to continue securitizing the same objects. This process inevitably leads to an even more holistic acceptance of threats (i.e. face II), creating thus a vicious cycle that cannot be easily interrupted.

Figure 3. 1: The three stages to institutionalization



Stage 1: Pivotal Events

An integral part of the institutionalization process is the presence of conflict-perpetuating routines that lead to the creation of bottom-up and horizontal forces, which in turn maintain the those routines. This creates a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma since there is no intuitive view on how such routines and unchallenged periods are generated. What is argued here is that such developments are the outcome of pivotal events.

Pivotal events could be any events that would create major disruption to the existing routines and significantly change the security perceptions of a society. Such events could be, for instance, violent acts between states, intra-state actors, or between state and non-state actors. An indicative example of an intra-state pivotal event would be a civil war or a coup d’état or even terrorist attacks from domestic militants. Intra-state cases involve invasions (full-scale) or interventions (e.g. harassment of vessels in the open sea). The third category could be, for example, terrorist attacks from non-domestic groups, as was the September 11, 2011 case in the USA. Thus the duration of the pivotal events could range from one day (e.g. 9/11 attacks), a few days (e.g. short war, invasion, or brief interventions) or years (e.g. civil wars).

What makes pivotal events so important is that they involve major disruptions of the existing routines and major changes in security perceptions. For this to happen the events must be very ‘central’ for the society as a whole affecting the entire or significant parts of the population. After a pivotal event the public forms strong perceptions about who or what the enemy is and which referent objects are under threat. These perceptions could be formed without the intervention (or major interventions) of securitizing actors and subsequently (potentially) without any speech acts, meaning that the process of securitization may commence in a fundamentally different way. The impact of the pivotal event determines how strong and adamant the threat perceptions will be and how long the subsequent unchallenged period will last. A very powerful and influential pivotal event for Greek Cypriots was the 1974 Turkish invasion as it disrupted completely the political and social routines and formed at the same time very clear perceptions among the

audience about the potential existential threats. Moreover, and as demonstrated in chapter 6, the event was so powerful that the unchallenged period for some issues is still ongoing and the environment is dominated by a series of conflict-perpetuating routines and institutionalized securitization processes.

Stage 2: The Unchallenged period

The post-pivotal event period is termed as ‘unchallenged’ as not many individuals or organizations (actors or audiences) are willing to challenge the widely-held perceptions created from the event. No political elite, for example, after a pivotal event such as the 1974 invasion would consider challenging the Greek Cypriot established perceptions regarding the threat (i.e. Turkey) and the referent objects under threat (e.g. sovereignty, political stability, etc.). Similarly the vast majority of the audiences are also unwilling to challenge the existing security-related perceptions. It is a period therefore where there is a consensus among elite and audiences on what constitutes a security threat.

This period is therefore characterized by a repetitive security discourse that contributes to the internalization of the specific perceptions. These perceptions are also further internalized because of the silencing of alternative views and the tacit agreement among and between elites and audiences regarding the perceived threats. During this second phase specific securitization routines develop. These routines are also part of the third phase that commences after the early stages of the second phase; once the routines are formed the two phases then continue to exist simultaneously. The last two stages therefore are neither mutually exclusive nor do they depend on the completion of one another. On the contrary they ‘feed of’ each other: the more unchallenged some issues are the more likely they are to lead to institutionalized processes and the more institutionalized a process becomes the more likely it is to perpetuate the unchallenged period.

The notion of an unchallenged period is translated in practical terms as the unwillingness of potential securitizing actors to question for a long period of time, in their official and unofficial activities, the established views regarding security issues. Elite and media

would be unwilling to express or publish articles or views that would challenge the established security perceptions, at least not without offering first an ‘alternative threat’ that could be securitized.

On an audience level the unchallenged period translates into the unwillingness of the public, or specific groups within the general population, to question the existing security perceptions and subsequently any securitizing acts from the various ‘mainstream’ actors (e.g. political elite, media, the Church, etc.). During this period therefore there is little, if any, reaction to the securitizing acts, which is subsequently equated to the acceptance of those acts either in the form of active endorsement and support or in the form of tacit agreement and thus tolerance. Thus the social context during the unchallenged period is particularly important as it contributes to the elimination of ‘negotiation’ between actors and audiences. The context in which securitization takes place creates such forces that the process becomes rather ‘automatic’; acts are expected to take place and the ‘acceptance’ is essentially guaranteed.

‘Automatic acceptance’ is possible because people tend to create cognitive shortcuts when they are faced with multiple possibilities. Vultee (2011: 80), using the threat of terrorism in the US as a case study, argues that securitization could be signaled as a heuristic cue that provides actors and audiences with such cognitive shortcuts that allow them to make quick judgments about a particular issue (in Vultee’s case, terrorism). What is argued here is that the longer issues remain unchallenged, the stronger these heuristic cues can become and subsequently the easier it is for actors and audience alike to choose the ‘shortest way’ to dealing with specific security issues. This means that for certain issues there is a decreasing need for negotiation between actors and audiences when it comes to specific issues such as, in the case of Greek Cypriots, the presence of the Turkish army and the settlers. The development of such ‘shortcuts’ and the elimination or reduction of negotiation between actors and audiences is one of the primary factors that allow for routinized and eventually institutionalized securitization.

Stage 3: Institutionalization

The third part of the process starts taking place during the unchallenged period, albeit not at the very early stages. Specifically, the third stage commences after the securitizing actors go beyond simply not challenging the existing norms, into explicitly engaging, in a routinely manner, in acts to perpetuate the existing securitized environment. Routine securitization is attributed on one hand on the actors' motivation to keep re-securitizing the same issues and to the public need or requests to maintain specific referent objects securitized.

The creation of security-related routines is not unexpected in conflict (violent or not) cases given, as Kelman (1997: 69) points out, that the political environment is shaped by the daily struggles of the people on both sides of the conflict. In practical terms this means that actors incorporate into their daily routines securitizing acts. Knowing what is important for the people and what has remained unchallenged over long periods, securitizing actors such as political elite and media choose to re-emphasize the presence of specific threats in their daily official and unofficial discourse, even though there is no reason to convince anyone of their existence; the audiences are already convinced as it too has incorporated those threats in their daily routines. Eventually this routinized behavior transforms into typified discourses that are used 'automatically' by actors. Similarly, these discourses are internalized by the audiences who expect to hear them constantly in order to feel safe that what they consider as threats are treated as such without any deviations.

Once securitization is institutionalized the aim of securitizing actors is not to negotiate with the audiences about the presence of security threats – which is no longer necessary – but rather to present themselves as the most suitable actors to handle the threat. Actors that have managed to establish themselves as appropriate agents to handle a situation have therefore a personal interest to perpetuate the securitized environment as they continue to have access to extraordinary measures, enjoy the tolerance for some of their policies, or simply benefit because of their position vis-à-vis the handling of specific

threats. Actors are thus unwilling either to desecuritize certain issues or to disrupt their securitization routines because of the political or financial cost such actions would have for them. In order to re-affirm their appropriateness they need to constantly remind the audiences of the potential threats; hence the need for routine securitization. The most efficient way of doing that is through an institutionalized process with ‘formalized’ discourses. What is more important however is that many times actors are trapped into re-securitizing old or new referent objects even if they do not necessarily believe there is indeed an existential threat. The alternative, either desecuritization or less securitization, could potentially lead to personal costs, political or financial and is thus avoided.


A similar logic applies for the audience as well. The audiences’ internalized perceptions deriving from the pivotal events and the unchallenged period create an environment with specific expectations and high costs of deviation, both of which lead to the desire and many times need for repetition of securitizing acts. The audiences, as already explained, may desire the perpetuation of securitized referent objects, as it helps them maintain their identities (ontological security). As a result, they too incorporate into their routines the acceptance of the frequent securitizing acts as it helps them meet their goals, namely the perpetuation of their identities. There are cases however that the incorporation of ‘acceptance’ in daily routines may be ‘involuntary’. Just like the elite may not have the option not to securitize something, the public has few options not to accept certain internalized security issues as existential threats. As demonstrated in chapter 6, any individuals or groups that question the ‘validity’ of securitized referent objects experience significant social pressure, run the risk of being negatively identified as traitors or even be ‘penalized’ at their work place. In practical terms incorporating ‘acceptance’ in the routines is demonstrated in multiple ways, ranging from accepting and repeating the political discourse, to becoming themselves securitizing actors (on a horizontal level) to help maintain the specific routines.

Thus, the main difference between the two stages is that while in the 2nd stage securitization is simply ‘unchallenged’ in the 3rd stage securitization is sought after. More importantly, in this 3rd stage potential securitizing actors create standard routine

procedures that utilize the audiences' sensitivities on specific issues and the internalized perceptions regarding perceived security threats. Specifically, they follow a standard discourse that repeatedly presents the same issues as threats and priorities, creating a repetition that acts as a 'conditioning mechanism' for the potential audiences, who in turn get accustomed to the specific discourse to the degree they anticipate it and even desire it. They also learn to immediately and essentially unquestionably accept the securitizing acts as valid, while in some cases they even repeat it themselves during horizontal securitization processes. The problem is that these routines become so internalized that they cannot be easily interrupted even if the securitizing actors wanted to. This is the biggest impact of institutionalized securitization and the primary factor behind 'involuntary' securitization.

Figure 3.2. describes what happens when institutionalization takes place. The outcome is a 'circular' process where the attitudes and the activities at the bottom (i.e. audiences) influence the activities at the top (i.e. actors), which in turn influence again the bottom. The top-down process therefore is not independent of the securitization processes that take place at the bottom on a horizontal level and the opposite: the bottom-forces are influenced by the ongoing top-down securitizing acts. It is not thus argued that bottom-up processes replace the top-down ones. On the contrary, the latter influence the development of the former by contributing to the internalization of security threat perceptions among audiences. The argument is that once these perceptions are formed and internalized they take a 'life of their own' and become self-empowered influencing in their turn securitization at the top level.

Figure 3. 2. Institutionalization Process



Horizontal securitization, which takes place within the audiences, deserves particular attention as it influences both the top-down (i.e. mainstream) and the bottom-up securitization. As discussed in detail in the next section, the frequency and standardized manner with which 'normal' top-down securitization takes place has a spillover impact at the bottom where individuals within the several sets of audiences also engage in securitization activities (i.e. in a horizontal manner) aiming to influence their peers. These horizontal processes gain more importance when they are in line with the top-down securitization discourses. This means that the mainstream securitizing actor's (e.g. elite, media, etc.) acts will be echoed and re-securitized on a micro-level on a horizontal level within the audience. When the two are combined (top-down and horizontal) the chances for successful top-down securitization increase significantly not least because the negotiation is no longer limited between the actors at the top and the audience at the

bottom; parts of the audience that need to be convinced are not only ready to accept the act but also ‘fight’ to convince the other parts of the audience that are not yet convinced. In sum, such horizontal activities influence the top-down process by empowering the actors’ securitizing acts. The reverse is also true. If there are horizontal processes that are not in line or even oppose the actors’ positions then these activities weaken the latter’s position; indeed they could even apply so much pressure at the ‘top’ that they influence what and how something is securitized. This is usually the case when there are multiple securitization activities for the same or similar issues, albeit each activity has a different goal.²³ Lastly, the more intense the horizontal processes are, the deeper the institutionalization will be, as the perpetuation of the securitized environment is not limited to ongoing top-down speech acts but also takes place at the ‘bottom’ even without the interference of elites.

The last important issue to note is the distinction between the pre-institutionalization and post-institutionalization role of securitizing actors. Arguing that the bottom’s views could influence the top in the securitization process creates another ‘chicken and egg’ question, as an argument could be made that the audiences’ (i.e. bottom) views are the outcome of the top’s actions, meaning there is really no real distinction between the mainstream top-down ad hoc securitization and what is suggested here. I do not discount the elite’s role in influencing the audiences; nor do I say that they do not have a role to play in the perpetuation and routinization of a securitized environment. What is argued is that they may or may not have a big role to play in the development of the institutionalization process at the early stages; however, once securitization becomes institutionalized their options, and subsequently their role, are diminished. In the institutionalization process therefore the elite’s role becomes a question of ‘when’; that is when they can influence the most rather than if, that is whether they can have an influence.

Specifically, there are two possibilities when it comes to elite’s role in the early stages of institutionalization. The first has to do with the possibility of having a small role to play,

²³ For instance, during the Annan Plan in Cyprus there were multiple securitization processes some of which aimed at securitizing the acceptance of the Plan, while others aimed to securitize the rejection.

because, as explained earlier, a pivotal event is so powerful that it may eliminate any need for securitizing actors' interventions (e.g. 1974 invasion). The second possibility requires greater involvement on a top level. In these cases the events are still pivotal, but the potential threats are not as lucid and there is therefore a need for a more active involvement on behalf of the securitization actors. An indicative example of the latter case is the Annan Plan, which was a pivotal event but the perceived threats became more lucid only after constant securitization. In both cases some positions and issues are subject to routinized and eventually institutionalized securitization and the perpetuation (and internalization) of specific threats is either the outcome of a powerful pivotal event (i.e. first case) or of heavy securitization (second case). In the latter case the actors had a bigger role to play than in the former.

What is argued here is that regardless of how the process started, once it becomes institutionalized the elite can no longer control it easily. As shown in the figure above once institutionalized some securitization routines are 'self-empowered' and their disruption is not easy as it could create ontological insecurity and thus public reactions. Whether or not a constantly securitized environment is beneficial for the elite and would like thus to contribute to its perpetuation is a different question that revolves around the actors' incentives and not their ability to perpetuate or disrupt them. Therefore, what is of interest here is what happens *after* the securitization is routinized and even institutionalized; the argument is that the elite's abilities to influence the process diminish while that of the audiences increase.

Overall institutionalized securitization is likely to be beneficial for the 'mainstream' actors. The Copenhagen School, as discussed in chapter 2, argues that actors benefit from successful securitization because they gain access to extraordinary measures or enjoy tolerance for certain actions. If securitization is institutionalized then these actors are likely to constantly enjoy the benefits of successful securitization. This is, therefore, a question of short-term versus long-term securitization, a distinction which is not examined in the mainstream reading of the theory. According to Wæver (1996: 104), threats must be dealt immediately otherwise everything else will become irrelevant. This

view of securitization connotes ‘immediateness’ in the sense that the actor must be granted the rights he requests before the situation becomes non-reversible. This approach neglects the possibility that an actor may securitize issues not only for access to immediate measures to deal with the threat per se, but also for long-term ones aiming among other to achieve indirect benefits such as the creation of an image for himself and his organization as the most suitable agent to deal with a specific security issue. This is especially beneficial if that that issue is estimated to dominate the environment for a long time and be part of the audiences’ psycho-cultural predispositions. It is precisely these kinds of benefits that create incentives for institutionalizing the process. Given that it is unlikely to acquire long-term benefits without constant re-securitization, it becomes imperative for some actors to engage in routinized securitization in order to successfully perpetuate specific threats and subsequently their image as ‘saviors’ or ‘most appropriate’ leaders. As demonstrated in chapter 6 political parties and specific individuals attempt to institutionalize securitization precisely for this reason.

Elites thus contribute to the perpetuation of institutionalized securitization either because it directly benefits them or because the alternative is too costly or risky for them. Either way there is a lack of incentives on an elite level to interrupt securitization routines. When this is coupled with the audiences’ needs for conflict-perpetuating routines (to maintain their ontological security), it becomes evident that once securitization is institutionalized it becomes very difficult to reverse the situation.

3.3.1. Horizontal securitization in institutionalized environments

Horizontal securitization is essentially a peer-to-peer process where members of the audience become securitizing actors with the aim to influence other members of the same audience. In these cases therefore individuals are both actors and part of the audience. This mode of securitization could thus be termed as ‘horizontal’ as it is neither top-down nor bottom-up. This form of securitization takes place on a micro-level as the aim of each potential actor is not to influence the population or large audiences but rather its peers and immediate periphery (e.g. colleagues, friends, family, etc.). In this setting there are no specific securitizing actors (e.g. political elite), while the ‘absolute value’ of each

actor's social capital is not as important; what is important is the social capital one has relative to its immediate audience, namely his or her peers. In other words, a teacher or a parent for example may have more relative social capital vis-à-vis his students or family than a political elite. The teacher or parent – even though he has less social capital in absolute terms than a political elite – may be more successful in securitizing a specific issue. The actors on a horizontal level do not necessarily benefit personally and they do not request access to emergency measures. Their aim is rather to transfer their own security perceptions to their peers. As mentioned, if these views echo the ones that are articulated by mainstream actors such as political elite, then the horizontal process influences the mainstream top-down securitization process by supporting other actors' positions and acts. Thus, on a horizontal level, parts of the audiences that become actors themselves could potentially and inadvertently become 'ambassadors' of the mainstream securitization actors.

Horizontal processes are probable and possible in some contexts such as protracted conflicts where securitization is routinized as it leads to the development (for the audiences) of unambiguous threat perceptions that are usually internalized. This in turn means that the audiences could become very opinionated about certain issues and have very specific expectations on what is or should be a security threat. Horizontal securitization is empowered further when the perceived threats are linked unofficial narratives, personal historical experiences, myths and anecdotal stories about the enemy-other as they all contribute to the internalization of the 'enemy other' perceptions. Therefore, once securitization becomes part of the people's routines and part of their way of living may create a need for individuals to engage in securitizing acts themselves in order to protect their identity that is sustained through those routines. As a result, horizontal securitization may continue on an audience level even if the elites at the top stop the securitizing process. This is especially the case if members of the audience feel that the elite are not securitizing sufficiently a specific referent object. If a significant part of the audience engages in such acts it is likely to see the diminished top-down securitization become reinvigorated and more frequent.

The fact that in the horizontal processes the actors are not necessarily individuals with particularly high social capital allows for the use of mechanisms that normal actors may not be allowed or may not wish to use. Specifically, securitizing acts could be more successful with the use of arguments that are powerful albeit politically incorrect or sensitive for some audiences. For instance, arguments could revolve around religion and ethnic identities – e.g. ‘the increase of Muslim settlers from Turkey destroy our Greek Orthodox identity’; the invocation of the Turkish settlers’ religion (for example) creates additional anxiety to the Greek Cypriot public as the religious aspect (not just the ethnic) of their identity is also endangered. These are arguments that some mainstream actors such as political elite or media agents frequently choose not to use as they do not want to jeopardize their social capital (e.g. by being accused for racism, nationalistic views, etc.). Therefore, political elite or even media may be very hesitant to talk about some issues such as religion as that could have a very negative impact on them personally but also on the Greek Cypriot position vis-à-vis the conflict in general. These restrictions are not applicable in peer-to-peer securitization however, as non-elite individuals can express their opinions more freely not least because they do not represent an official agency or organization and the personal cost they may occur is much less than that of an elite.

Horizontal securitization also allows for the use of ‘convincing’ tools that may not be available in the top-down process. Specifically, it is much easier for a peer than for an elite to exert social pressure on another peer when the latter deviates from the ‘accepted’ and established positions of the community. The pressure could come in the form of name-calling (e.g. ‘traitor’ if you accept or not oppose ‘X’ development) or guilt and responsibility (e.g. if you accept ‘X’ development “you” (i.e. personally) are endorsing the permanent division of the country). As demonstrated in chapter 6 these mechanisms are frequently used among peers of all ages, social class and education levels. As also examined later, in more extreme cases the pressure is much more direct and is manifested in the form of threats (e.g. at the working environment) or even ostracism (complete exclusion from peer activities). Once again, these are mechanisms that cannot be easily used by mainstream securitizing actors.

Horizontal pressures could eventually lead to an environment where frequent securitizing acts are accepted through the audiences' silence, which might be either voluntary or coerced. Hansen (2000), using the gender problems that exist in Pakistan, points towards this direction arguing that there is a possibility of either coercion or silence and not 'voluntary acceptance' of securitizing acts. Non-opposing behavior therefore acts as a tacit agreement of the institutionalized securitization process. More importantly however it makes change difficult and unlikely given that neither the actors nor the audiences are eager to engage in change-efforts due to the high costs associated with such attempts. This fear of cost leads to 'involuntary' securitization, which is discussed in the next section.

3.3.2. Bottom-up and involuntary securitization

Once the securitization process is institutionalized and becomes part of the audiences' and actors' routines there is inevitably a change in the forces leading to the development of new securitization acts as well as the perpetuation of old ones. These forces take place at elite and audience level and are the outcome of the existing social context, which incorporates previous securitizing acts and ongoing horizontal pressures. As mentioned, bottom-up securitization occurs when parts of the audiences engage in securitizing acts aiming at influencing those that traditionally have the securitizing actors role.

As depicted in Figure 3.2. above, bottom-up securitization is bi-directional going from top to bottom and back to the top, creating thus a self-sustaining loop. Specifically, there are two ways bottom-up securitization could take place. The first is direct, meaning that an audience attempts to act as a single actor and securitize a referent object. In this case there is a 'role reversal', where the audience becomes the securitizing actor and the audience is either other parts of the audience community or the traditional securitizing actors. Securitization in this case is either entirely bottom-up or horizontal. The second way is indirect as the audience does not attempt to become an actor, but rather to exert enough pressure on the traditional securitizing actors (e.g. elite, media, etc.) so that they securitize a specific issue. If successful, securitization will thus take place in a top-down

manner as the process will be initiated at the top, albeit the driving force behind such initiatives is the audience at the bottom.

Given that an audience is not, by definition, a unitary actor there are the questions of who performs the speech act – i.e. who is the securitizing actor – and how securitization takes place. The audience-actor role reversal could develop into a formal or an informal structure. Formal structures take place when parts of the audience form groups with representatives who are in charge of expressing in a single voice the specific audience's positions on how security issues should be perceived and handled. A union that represents a specific set of audience (e.g. academics, teachers, etc.) is an indicative example. Informal structures refer to ad hoc situations where people who share the same views and have similar demands on the handling of a particular issue express their opinions in a coordinated manner albeit without representatives. This takes place, for instance, during mass demonstrations, petitions, or even coordinated individual efforts such as direct contact with elite or media demanding specific actions. The latter form of bottom-up action takes place when the public, or one particular audience, disagrees with the way the elite handles a security issue. Reactions are more intense when internalized security perceptions do not receive the attention the public demands and expects, or in other words, perceived threats are not securitized sufficiently.

Both approaches to bottom-up securitization have to do with audience pressure. The end result is that these pressures, when combined with the horizontal pressures mentioned above, may lead to involuntary securitization (as defined earlier). An integral part of involuntary securitization is the social context that creates the environment that allows for such upward and horizontal pressures to exist. As discussed in detail in chapter 5, protracted ethnic conflicts have social contexts that are built on identities and conflict-perpetuating routines that allow for such pressures to thrive. The argument therefore is that the social environment not only allows for bottom-up pressures but also creates securitization expectations, especially if what is perceived to be at threat is the audiences identity. The concept of 'expected securitization' provides us with an alternative view of

the audience-actor relationship; one where the audience does not just ‘validate’ the actors’ acts, but rather leads to the creation of them.

A key challenge in attempting to clarify these complex dynamics concerns identifying the securitizing actor(s). When the direction of the process is reversed it becomes difficult to identify the actors not least because an audience cannot easily have one voice or act as a single actor who represents his peers or his institution.²⁴ This drawback could be mitigated if we accept the existence of multiple audiences. The argument is that if the audience is not perceived as a single entity but is rather broken down into multiple smaller ones, then it becomes possible for these sub-audiences to engage in securitizing acts in an attempt to convince their respective elites (i.e. ‘top-level’ actors) that an issue must be handled with a sense of urgency. This is possible because each audience is directly linked, and has direct access, to its respective decision-makers, making it thus possible to influence them. In addition, precisely because specific audiences are small in size they could more easily act with one voice. Academics for instance could act as audience and actors at the same time. When they aim to influence other audiences through their work they wear the ‘actor’ hat; however, they could also be audience themselves in cases where the actors are technocrats and politicians from the ministry of education or the top administration in their universities who may want to securitize specific issues such as collaboration with the ‘enemy other’. In such contexts however the reverse could also be true: a group of academics in a university could act with a single voice to securitize issues making thus the mainstream actors such as the Minister of Education the target audience. Securitizing acts in this case therefore aim to place issues on the agenda for others, with the necessary social capital, to securitize.²⁵

The context in which bottom-up and horizontal securitization takes place is such that may create an environment where actors’ choices are limited to two options: securitization or desecuritization. This means that elites may have to choose on how to respond to an issue

²⁴ As opposed to, for instance, an immigration officer whose decisions represent an institution (e.g. ministry of interior or the equivalent border-control agency) as well as his peers (i.e. other immigration officers).

²⁵ This is one of Vuori’s (2008) argument, which was discussed in chapter 2.

or a development they may not have created and their choices might be limited to treating it as a threat or as a non-threat. In such environments – where a community has internalized beliefs regarding threats – the choice of non-securitization may not be available, either because it is not recognized as an option or because it is irrational due to the high associated costs. Thus, the only available option therefore might be securitization or re-securitization. This lack of choice is often seen in conflicts. As Kelman (1997) argues, parties are unwilling to engage in negotiations, or make any concessions, because they believe that once they do so they may fall into a ‘slippery slope’ that might jeopardize their own existence. Such existential fears (e.g. loss of identity) create resistance towards negotiations and subsequently resolution (ibid). This unwillingness and fear of uncertainty may be based either on the personal belief systems of the negotiators who might be conditioned not to see the desecuritization (resolution negotiations) alternatives or they might be the outcome of severe bottom-up and horizontal pressures that request re-securitization and not the reverse.

In the first case, the socially constructed reality for the securitizing actors and audiences limits their ability to see such alternative options. Securitization therefore in these cases is still a conscious choice, albeit in the actors’ and audiences’ minds it is also the *only* choice, making thus the act again ‘involuntary’ given the lack of alternative choices (for the specific individuals). In other words, in the social context in which securitization takes place, individuals – actors and audiences alike – may be conditioned to see only specific options, namely those that lead to the perpetuation of a specific security discourse and subsequently specific threats. Those individuals who may be able to ‘escape’ from the limitations posed by their habitus and are able and willing to explore alternative options (e.g. desecuritization) face other forms of pressure as discussed above. In these cases, the rational choice may be to go with the least costly option, namely the perpetuation of a threat discourse.

The degree of this involuntary process depends on how rigid and how connected the identities are to the existing perceived threats. In protracted ethnic conflicts identities tend to be particularly rigid and maintain strong connection to the conflict and the

associate threats, as the conflict and more specifically the ‘enemy other’ is essential for the perpetuation of each side’s ontological security (Campbel 1992; Mitzen 2006; Wendt 1999). These antagonistic and zero-sum identities are strengthened by official (e.g. schooling) and unofficial (e.g. family) narratives, which frequently develop into myths, are passed on from generation to generation and eventually become the uncontested ‘official’ truth and part of the social context and the people’s identities. The more internalized these ‘truths’ are the more rigid the identities will be vis-à-vis perceived threats, meaning that people would be more skeptical towards any desecuritization activities. On the contrary it is more likely to expect and demand activities that will support the existing ‘truths’ and subsequently leave unchanged their identity.

3.3.3. Speech Acts: a new role in an institutionalized environment

Having discussed the different possible forms of securitization once the process becomes institutionalized, it is worth revisiting one of the integral parts of the theory – the speech acts – to examine how they are affected. Bigo (2002) points out that if security issues are around for a long time they could develop into threats ‘by themselves’. This is also the case in environments where threats are internalized and the process of securitization institutionalized, meaning that there is not necessarily a need for ‘real’ threats (e.g. violence) to be present for a long time (as Bigo suggests), as long as the perception of threats is. This raises an interesting question: if threats can develop without interventions, what is the role of speech acts if security issues are already internalized and accepted as threats and if the audiences may be ‘unable’ or unwilling to reject any acts?

The main role of speech acts is to convince a significant audience that a specific referent object is under existential threat. In institutionalized environments however there is no need to convince an audience as it is already convinced; the threats are already internalized and perceived as existential, which means that the role and importance of speech acts is somewhat downgraded. What is argued here is that speech acts could still play a very important role in the process for two reasons:

- i) They are necessary to perpetuate the securitized environment (not necessarily to create it) and to 'remind' the audience of who the best agent is to handle a threat.
- ii) They are necessary in creating a sense of imminence or urgency.

Even if threats self-develop they cannot be perpetuated without frequent securitization interventions, especially if those threats exist only in principle and in past experiences and are thus not 'felt' on a regular basis. For instance, if there is violence – as is the case in many Middle East – the threats are 'real' and people 'feel' them frequently. In Cyprus for instance, many threats were real at some point in time but are now less 'real' and more 'theoretical'. In the latter case speech acts acquire a new role, namely that of perpetuating existing security issues or 'upgrading' new but tangential issues into the realm of existential threat. What is argued therefore is that speech acts are used primarily as reminders, not only of the threats, but also of the agents who are more equipped to handle these threats. Speech acts in environments where threats are deeply internalized are also placed into specific social and historical context that is convenient and beneficial for a securitizing actor who wishes to perpetuate a specific threat and emphasize why he or she is best suited for the situation. Each actor therefore attempts to remind how others, as opposed to him, handled or failed to handle similar threats in the past and what the consequences were of their actions. Speech acts therefore do not focus on the threats per se only, but also on other actors' ability to deal with them, meaning that frequently it is the actors themselves that are securitized.

The second role speech acts have is that of creating a sense of imminence. Even in environments where the process of securitization is institutionalized it does not necessarily mean that threats are always perceived as imminent, even if they are perceived as existential. This could be the case precisely because the threats may have been lingering for decades which means, by definition, they cannot always be imminent. In these cases, speech acts will not aim to convince the audience about the threat per se but rather about its imminence. An indicative example of a threat that could be perceived as existential but not imminent is the Turkish settlers, who are constantly perceived as an existential threat for the Greek Cypriot identity, but not an imminent one. They become

more imminent only when there are prospects for settlement (perceived as adverse), as was the case with the Annan Plan in 2004. This is an issue that is explored further in chapter 6.

3.3.4. Spillover securitization

Buzan et al. argue that actors think of their security concerns in an ‘across the board’ manner (1998: 169). Security perceptions in one sector influence the interpretation of what is a security problem in another sector (ibid: 170). The Copenhagen School focus on how security perceptions in some sectors are distorted because of securitized referent objects in another indicates that securitization in each sector is not an independent process but rather an interconnected one; it is essentially connoted that the influenced security perceptions ‘across the board’ could make securitization in other sectors easier. They do not however profoundly examine how and why there could be spillover securitization from one sector to another.

What is argued here is that in environments where securitization is institutionalized it is much easier to see spillover practices from sector to sector. This could take place primarily for two interconnected reasons. The first reason is what Buzan et al. argue that the audience is already biased about the existence of security threats. The second reason, which leads to a great extent to the first, is that the source of threat for many different referent objects across different sectors is the same. An indicative example in the case of Cyprus is again the Turkish settlers, which is a source of threat for Greek Cypriots for a number of different referent objects, such as the identity, political sovereignty and the economy. The same source of threat, in this case the settlers, could be used to securitize three different referent objects (identity, political power and economy) in three different sectors. In such environments, if an actor (e.g. state, community, specific population group, etc.) is perceived as a threat for one object, it is almost automatically assumed to be a threat for other objects in other sectors as well.

A more interesting question than the ‘why’ is the ‘how’; how securitization could ‘spill over’ from sector to sector. The easiest way this can occur is to securitize the source of threat (that is applicable to multiple sectors – e.g. the settlers) rather than the actual referent objects in each sector. This is possible in cases where the process is institutionalized to the degree that the source of threats is so routinely used for one sector that the audience internalizes the arguments and unquestionably accepts the acts and the source of threat as a real source of danger. Thus when the same source of threat is used for another sector, no long-term negotiation between actors and audience is needed as the latter would easily accept the possibility of an existential threat in yet another sector. Indeed, spillover securitization could even take place in other sectors without the intervention of securitizing actors. In the case of Cyprus for instance the audience may automatically assume that there is an existential threat if the source of threats, e.g. settlers, is in any way involved.

One of the major issues with securitization when it becomes institutionalized is that securitization is almost never ‘contained’ to one sector; spillover in other words is inevitable. This makes desecuritization a much more difficult task, even if it were the actors’ goal to desecuritize specific issues. More specifically, there are difficulties because the source of threat in some social contexts cannot easily be de-linked from *all* referent objects. For instance, even if there was genuine incentive to desecuritize the economy from the threat of settlers, this goal may be unattainable because the settlers as a source of threat cannot be delinked from other referent objects such as the identity. This problem creates an ‘all or nothing’ environment where unless the source of threat can be universally eliminated from all sectors, actors will be unwilling to engage in any desecuritizing attempts for the reasons mentioned earlier, namely bottom-up and horizontal pressures.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter elaborated and built upon the criticisms and gaps identified in the previous chapter and proposes a framework that explains why the social context and the presence of multiple audiences, especially in protracted ethnic conflict environments, are indeed so

important that they could influence the entire process of securitization, turning the latter from ad hoc to institutionalized. It is also proposed that institutionalization in its turn leads to two different modes of securitization, horizontal and bottom-up, which in their turn lead to a third one, namely that of ‘involuntary’ securitization.

This chapter also explained how institutionalization could develop and examined the conditions under which the different modes of securitization become possible and the impact the latter have on the theory. The aforementioned theoretical propositions also add value to how applicable securitization theory is in explaining real life cases. More specifically the proposed framework does not deal with how issues become security threats (i.e. what the mainstream reading of the theory does), but also explain why some issues cannot be desecuritized.

By linking protracted ethnic conflicts with the proposed framework, and especially the idea of involuntary securitization, this thesis also makes a contribution to the literature on conflicts as it produces additional explanations on why conflict-perpetuating routines are maintained and why the protracted conflicts remain unresolved. While the thesis tests the framework using only one case study, that of the Cyprus conflict, the theoretical arguments are potentially applicable to other cases where the context is such that allows for institutionalized securitization. The link between protracted conflicts and institutionalized securitization is discussed further in the last chapter. The next chapter introduces the methodological approach of the thesis and of how this framework could be tested.

Chapter 4: Methodological Framework

4.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the methodological approaches of the thesis, presents the different sources used to empirically test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapters and explains the reasoning behind the choice of the specific case study.

The thesis examines only one case study, meaning there is no comparative analysis. There is little doubt that a comparative approach using other similar case studies, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would provide more examples of securitizing processes in conflict environments and would also help demonstrate that the proposed theoretical arguments are not applicable only to Cyprus. It is acknowledged that a single case study could potentially lead to methodological concerns with the most important one being a potential problem of ‘selection bias’ – i.e. choosing a case study that would provide the necessary results that would validate a theoretical model. This however is not a valid concern in this case. As already discussed in chapter 3 and as examined in greater detail in the next two chapters the variables needed for the development of institutionalized and other modes of securitization are not Cyprus-specific, but are found in many similar protracted ethnic conflicts. Chapter 5 examines these variables found in such environments and demonstrates why Cyprus is an indicative, but not unique, example of environments in which institutionalized, bottom-up and horizontal securitization can take place.

Therefore, and without arguing that all protracted ethnic conflicts are identical, the theoretical premise of the thesis is applicable to other protracted conflicts that share similar characteristics as Cyprus. Indeed, the theoretical premises could also be applied to non-conflict environments as well if the necessary conditions are present; it is however beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze in detail this possibility. Given the absence of

comparative analysis, it is worth noting that the chosen case study is used as an ‘instrumental case study’, meaning that it has a ‘supportive role’ and is used to provide insights on a specific issue and to refine a theoretical explanation (Stake 1995; Berg 2004). Thus, while the case study analysis also contributes to the conflict and Cyprus conflict literature, the primary aim is to explain and empirically support the theoretical arguments of the thesis as outlined in chapter 3.

In terms of research design, the thesis uses a mixed methods approach combining both qualitative and quantitative methods of measurement. From a qualitative standpoint the data will be collected from i) twenty-five semi-structured interviews with key actors and indicative audience members using an open-ended interview protocol, ii) five bi-communal focus groups with different sets of audiences and iii) newspapers. All the data is collected from the Greek Cypriot community only, with the exception of the focus groups, which were bi-communal.

From a quantitative standpoint the research approaches include i) the use of numerous opinion polls created and conducted by NGOs and television stations, ii) the design and implementation of a survey targeted for a specific audience group, namely the Greek Cypriot academic community and iii) a press analysis of the three most widely-circulated Greek Cypriot newspapers’ front page for the period 2003-2009. Before examining how these approaches could empirically test the theoretical arguments made in chapter 3, it is worth visiting first the Copenhagen School’s proposition for empirical observations for securitization. As argued below the School’s approach does not provide adequate mechanisms to fully capture the securitization processes, especially in some environments characterized by frequent securitization.

The Copenhagen School limits any empirical examination of securitization to the observation of speech acts through the analysis of texts that formulate political discourse. The evidence of securitization exists if the audience accepts a specific move as well as the proposed emergency measures. Securitization therefore could be studied ‘directly’ and without the use of ‘indicators’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 25) such as opinion polls. Buzan et

al.'s choice to limit their empirical examination to speech act observations is not surprising given that the level of analysis they use is limited to: i) referent objects; ii) securitizing actors; and iii) functional actors (ibid: 36). Indeed, from a critical perspective securitization theory is often seen as being somewhat pedestrian from a theoretical point of view because it imposes blinkers upon what the fieldworker looks at when examining a case study, and this may result in pre-determined findings or the neglect of other interesting dynamics. This problem could be resolved if one follows Balzacq (2011: 35) recommendation by adding two important elements, the audience and context, which are not integrated in the level of analysis. What Balzacq recommends is that the level of analysis should be in three different levels, namely agents (that include all of the three mentioned above), acts and context (e.g. social and historical factors) (ibid). This would subsequently require broader methodological approaches that cannot be limited to speech acts observations.

As discussed in chapter 3, audiences and social context are of utmost importance for a more comprehensive view of securitization; subsequently, this thesis is in line with Balzacq's argument that more approaches are required to empirically test the theory. Specifically there is a need to utilize methodological approaches that measure the role of audiences and social context and not just that of actors and their political discourse, without however at any time discounting the latter's importance. For this reason approaches other than speech act observations must be utilized; it is argued here that interviews, focus groups, surveys and content analysis are useful tools for incorporating the audience and context in the analysis and for explaining and evaluating their role in the securitization processes.

Speech acts observations are still an integral part of the methodology, albeit they are done in a wider manner of discourse analysis which includes, inter alia, the observation of images and symbols. The latter two variables are part of the 'text' especially when examined within a specific social context. As Balzacq notes, 'text' in the discourse analysis 'does not mean written text or spoken words only. [...] The notion of text points, indeed, to a variety of signs, including written and spoken utterances, symbols, pictures,

music' (2011b: 39). Similarly (Neumann 2008) points out that in order to grasp the depth of the securitization process there is a need to focus on more than one kind (genre) of texts, at different points in time and social contexts.

Overall there is a need for broader intertextual observation mechanisms that would also deal with the social context and the audiences' perceptions and behavior. Intertextualism creates what Hajer (1995: 56) calls 'storylines', which are narratives 'that allow actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena'. A 'storyline' plays an integral role in the process of securitization since it holds three functions: 'it establishes a link among signifying characteristics that point toward the threatening phenomenon. Second, when reified, a storyline acquires its own momentum by contributing to a cognitive routinization. Third, a storyline creates contending coalitions around contrasting sets of common understandings' (Balzacq 2011b: 43). These three functions essentially refer to the role of social context, as the latter creates specific perceptions that influence the peoples' views on what is or should be a security threat. As argued in this thesis, these perceptions once internalized could become cognitive shortcuts that lead to routinized behavior, which in the case of securitization is translated into 'automatic' acceptance of specific securitizing acts (i.e. those acts that are supported by the story lines). With this in mind it becomes evident that a simple observation of speech acts – as the Copenhagen School suggests – cannot capture the importance of social context and audiences. Similarly, it can capture the frequency of securitizing acts – in cases for instance where there is routinized/institutionalized securitization – but it cannot explain why there may be such repetition.

Observing securitizing moves through key texts (speeches, documents, etc.) is indeed possible and relatively easy, especially in cases where securitization is part of the political routines. The securitizing move, however, is just the first step of the process. The empirical study of the securitization process in its entirety, which goes beyond the initial speech act and includes the intersubjective process between the actors and the audiences, cannot be examined through speech acts observations only. Even the most

detailed examination of key texts that form the political discourse cannot capture the intersubjective process, or determine whether or not an act is successful, and more importantly why certain moves are more successful than others. Similarly, the observation of securitizing does not explain why certain actors repeat specific acts or why audiences may unquestionably accept them. For this reason other qualitative and quantitative methods are necessary. Process tracing and content analysis, for instance, allows us to explore the context and the conditions under which securitization takes place and whether or not securitization has indeed occurred and in what form (Balzacq 2011b: 47). What is argued in this thesis is that quantitative approaches, such as surveys and opinion polls, allow us to explore internalized perceptions and link them to each case's social contexts and more easily identify the potential horizontal and bottom-up forces for accepting or rejecting an act.

The proposed mixed method approach clearly goes beyond the Copenhagen School's suggestion for speech act observation, without however discounting the importance of the that approach. On the contrary, speech acts are closely examined in the political and media discourse. Five different approaches are utilized to examine the speech acts and the intersubjective process that follows, paying particular attention to the audiences' role in this process and not just that of the securitizing actors. The proposed five approaches are listed below and are examined vis-à-vis the thesis' theoretical claims in the next section.

1. Content analysis: newspapers headlines
2. Public Opinion polls
3. Academic survey
4. Interviews
5. Focus groups

It must be noted that the analysis for the quantitative approaches, namely the opinion polls, the academic survey and the press analysis, is limited to descriptive statistics as the aim is to describe the perceptions dominating the specific social context and acquire sufficient quantifiable evidence that will help us understand the impact institutionalized

securitization has on the different audiences. The data therefore is not used for regression or other statistical analyses beyond what was described above.

Similarly, the thesis does not make use of any special qualitative software package (e.g. Nvivo, ATLAS, etc.) to analyze the content of either the newspapers or the data from the interviews and focus groups. All qualitative data is analyzed in an open coding way, where the researcher can ‘identify and even extract themes, topics, or issues in a systematic manner’ (Berg 2004: 180). More specifically, the open coding follows Straus’ suggestions (1987: 30), which allows the researcher to: i) remain open to indirect indicators that may support or refute a hypothesis; ii) insert theoretical notes during coding that help link the data with the theoretical hypothesis; iii) work without assumptions regarding the analytical relevance of any traditional variable such as age, sex, social class, etc. until the data shows its relevant. This is a particularly useful advice when studying securitizing acts, not least because it is almost taken for granted that it is the elite who perform the securitizing acts and that the impact on the public is universal, given the absence of multiple audiences in the mainstream reading of the theory. Provided that the thesis takes into account the existence of multiple audiences and the role of social contexts, it is imperative that it follows an open coding approach for the analysis of the qualitative data to determine, inter alia, who the actors and audiences are.

4.1.1. Time frame of the field research

The empirical part of the thesis examines the specific environment of the Cyprus conflict aiming to provide evidence of institutionalized and other forms of securitization. These observations however need not rely on historical data stretching from the commencement of the conflict. Indeed, more contemporary evidence makes the argument of institutionalization stronger, not least because constant and multi-directional securitization (i.e. horizontal, bottom-up and top-down) cannot be attributed to the immediate effect of the pivotal events – as those could have taken place years ago – but rather to the securitization routines on an elite and audience level that maintain a specific

conflictual social context. With this in mind the empirical observations are limited to the period 2003-2010, a period wide enough to provide the required evidence.

The period 2003 – 2010 starts approximately three decades after the most important Greek Cypriot pivotal event (the 1974 Turkish intervention) and extends into a period where the conflict has become particularly ‘comfortable’ (for both sides but even more so for Greek Cypriots). Examining the securitization processes in such a ‘comfortable conflict’ environment and after a long period since the most major pivotal event helps us identify institutionalized securitization processes and specific political and social routines. The chosen period is important for the empirical analysis of the thesis for a number of other reasons that are not related to the 1974 pivotal event or indeed the duration of the conflict. Specifically, during the 2003-2010 period a series of significant events occurred, including leadership changes on both sides of the Green Line, the opening of the crossing points for the first time in almost 30 years, and the Republic of Cyprus accession to the EU. All of the above are to one degree or another small pivotal events that could have potentially changed the securitization processes; the fact that they did not lead to desecuritization or even the interruption of securitization is an indication of how institutionalized securitization can be. Outlined below are the most significant events that illustrate why this period important and adequate to test the thesis’ theoretical research questions.²⁶

2003: In 2003 the first two crossing points opened allowing for the first time in almost 30 years Greek and Turkish Cypriots to meet in either side of the Buffer Zone. The unilateral Turkish Cypriot decision to open the crossing points was the outcome of massive Turkish Cypriot demonstrations and public pressure regarding primarily the poor economic situation in the northern part of the island, but also because Greek Cypriots would join the EU without the Turkish Cypriots – i.e. the *acqui communitaire* would only apply to the government-controlled areas. During the same year Tassos Papadopoulos, considered

²⁶ A much more detailed ‘time-line’ analysis of the contemporary Cypriot history is presented in chapter 5.

by many to be a hardliner, was elected as President of the RoC replacing the more moderate Glafcos Clerides.²⁷

2004: A year later, on May 1st 2004, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the European Union without having first reached a settlement. A week prior to the official EU accession the two sides had the opportunity for the first time since the division to agree to a settlement in the simultaneous referenda that took place in both sides of the Green Line; 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted the UN-sponsored Plan (known as the Annan Plan), while 76% of Greek Cypriots rejected it.

2005: In 2005, the Turkish Cypriot leadership changed for the first since 1974. The more moderate Mehmet Ali Talat replaced the hardliner Rauf Denktaş.

2008: Three years later (2008) there was yet another change in the Greek Cypriot leadership with the leftist and more moderate Demetris Christofias coming to power. The Christofias-Talat period was perceived as a golden opportunity for a settlement, given that both leaders are leftists and personal friends. Despite the numerous meetings the two leaders were unable to even come close to an agreement.

2010: To make things even more difficult for a settlement, in the 2010 Turkish Cypriot elections Talat lost to Dervis Eroglou who, according to most foreign analysts, has nationalistic beliefs.²⁸

In sum, the chosen time frame includes: i) two leadership changes on each side, allowing an examination of how important the leadership style (e.g. pragmatist or crusader style) is

²⁷ The Guardian for instance describes Papadopoulos as a ‘69-year-old conservative [...] hardliner who has rejected all previous UN attempts to reunify Cyprus.

(<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/17/eu.cyprus> [accessed May 23 2008].

²⁸ Indicatively, the first BBC and Guardian online news titles after the election results were “Nationalist Dervis Eroglu wins northern Cyprus elections” (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8627826.stm>) and “Hardliner wins Turkish Cypriot leadership election” (<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/18/hardliner-wins-turkish-cypriot-election>) respectively. Similarly, CNN’s first reaction to the results was that it the outcome is a “Blow to peace as nationalist wins Cyprus vote” (http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-19/world/cyprus.election_1_mehmet-ali-talat-cyprus-dervis-eroglu?_s=PM:WORLD).

for securitization and how much individuals, regardless of their ideologies, are limited by the context in which they operate; ii) the RoC accession to the EU, which demonstrates that even developments that unquestionably decrease insecurity are incapable of significantly influencing securitization processes if the latter are institutionalized; and iii) the referenda on the Annan Plan, which gives us direct access to the people's perceptions on why they did not want the specific settlement. The latter also allows us to examine whether these concerns are part of the institutionalized securitization framework.

4.2. Methodological approaches

4.2.1 Content Analysis – newspapers

Part of the empirical observations takes place without any deviation from the Copenhagen School recommendations, namely the observation of speech acts. The first form of observation is through content analysis. The attention is primarily on Greek-Cypriot newspapers, albeit other printed and online material that may be distributed to the public (e.g. flyers, booklets, etc.) or posted on 'official' government or political party websites, are also taken into consideration. The method followed is a mixed approach that includes both manifest and latent content analysis, with the former being the elements in the text that are countable (e.g. specific words, phrases, etc.) and the latter 'an interpretive reading of the symbolism underlying the physical data' (Berg 2004: 269). There is thus both a quantifiable and a qualitative part in this analysis.

The press analysis will focus on the front page of the three most widely-circulated Greek Cypriot papers, namely *Phileleftheros*, *Politis* and *Simerini*, examining the conflict-related headlines. The goal is to identify, count and 'register' the relevant news.²⁹ The aim of this quantifiable exercise is to acquire evidence of centrality and frequency for specific issues. The quantification of the frequency of specific references on conflict-relevant issues acts as an indication of routine discourse and subsequently institutionalization of securitization, provided the references are part of the actors' speech

²⁹ What qualifies as 'relevant' news is examined in detail below.

acts. The same analysis also aims to interpret any potential ‘sub-texts’ and underlying meanings or messages related to specific threats. The non-explicit references (i.e. sub-texts) may not qualify as speech acts in the mainstream reading of the theory, as they may not follow the ‘security grammar’. However, they contribute towards the internalization of threats by connoting the existence of threats, or by creating an environment where speech acts can more easily have an impact when they are articulated using the proper security grammar. For instance, creating a context where external actors – such as the UK or the US for example – are perceived as untrustworthy, allows for easier securitization of current and future British and American proposals. In addition, in an environment where threats are already internalized, a connotation (i.e. sub-text) as opposed to an explicit reference to a potential threat may be sufficient to securitize a referent object or a development. The frequency of explicit references and the analysis of sub-texts offer a quantifiable measurement of ‘centrality’ of the conflict. Centrality refers to how ‘central’, how important, specific conflict-related issues and the Problem in its entirety are for the Greek Cypriot population. Centrality is an important variable that influences the process of horizontal, bottom-up and subsequently involuntary securitization; the more central an issue is the more ‘active’ these modes of securitization will be.

The content quantification therefore is split into two parts: the first part is a measurement of the frequency in which conflict-related news appears as headlines or receive particular attention in the first page of the chosen newspapers. The second is the grouping of those headlines into fourteen different categories. This exercise demonstrates how central the conflict is for Greek Cypriots even 30-40 years after the pivotal event of 1974 and importantly it identifies which issues are repeatedly portrayed as threats, examining at the same time how securitization takes place in the media – e.g. how specific ‘loaded’ phrases are used and what kind of pressure mechanisms the media utilizes to influence elite and public alike. The quantification and measurement of conflict-related issues in the press also allows for the identification of institutionalization mechanisms and more specifically how ongoing and potential threats are connected to the social context; how, for instance, perceived threats are tailored to the Cypriot society to make them appear

more threatening than they could potentially be and how they are formulated in a way that allows for continuity and repetition of that discourse.

The examination of routine references also tests the hypothesis that once securitization becomes institutionalized and threats internalized, media agents (as securitizing actors) may need to engage in involuntary acts. This could be the case because, as Vultee (2011: 79) notes, ‘media learn from audiences even as audiences learn from media’. For our case this means that it is not just audiences that are influenced by the media, but also the reverse: when audiences consider something to be of utmost importance – e.g. an existential threat (irrespective of why this is the case) – they expect that the media will pay attention to it. Thus, in environments where securitization is institutionalized and the audiences constantly perceive certain issues to be a threat, the media inevitably has to deal with these perceived threats.

4.2.1.1. Choice of newspapers

All Greek Cypriot newspapers deal with the Cyprus problem on a daily basis, dedicating a minimum of three pages to report the developments on the negotiation process or to host relevant interviews by local and foreign actors. The articles related to the Cyprus conflict for the period under study is literally in the tens of thousands making it essentially impossible and rather meaningless to examine all the papers and articles for an eight-year period. The focus therefore is on only the three most circulated daily Greek Cypriot newspapers, namely *Phileleftheros*, *Politis*, and *Simerini* and more specifically on their headline news as they appear in the front page. That said, some articles of particular importance from the inner pages are also examined, albeit not in a systematic quantitative manner.³⁰ Focusing on the front page has several advantages with the most important being the ability to quantify the importance of conflict-related news in a meaningful way, given that the alternative – examining the entire paper – would not provide meaningful results. This is because each paper dedicates a section on the Cyprus

³⁰ Articles of particular importance could be, for instance, interviews of political elites and/or other key local and foreign players in the conflict, such as the President of the Republic, the UN Special Envoy in Cyprus, the US Secretary of State, etc.

problem on a daily basis making it thus extremely difficult to identify the important from the less important issues. Similarly, such an analysis would have no statistical value given that Cyprus Problem related news appear in the paper every single day. Issues that appear as headline news, however, by definition are considered to be (for the paper and potentially for the audience at least) of particular importance and thus deserve more attention.

The papers were chosen based on their circulation (i.e. they are the three most popular papers) and on the fact that they frequently have different perspectives on the development of the conflict negotiations and on which elite is more capable to negotiate a settlement. More specifically, *Phileleftheros*, the largest paper in circulation, traditionally presents and supports the government positions, even though the latest Christofias government is an exception. The paper was also very much against the Annan Plan during the critical period of the referenda. *Politis*, the second paper in circulation, was the only major newspaper in favor of the Annan Plan and has been very critical of the former President Tassos Papadopoulos and all the elite who did not support the Plan. In the post-2004 period the paper criticizes the elite with the so-called hardline positions. On exactly the opposite side is *Simerini*, the third largest paper in circulation, which is considered by many to hold a nationalistic position and criticizes any elite who is not negotiating 'hard enough'. These three papers when combined cover, essentially, all the different views in the Greek Cypriot side and over 70% of the circulation.³¹ Of the three, *Simerini* is the only paper owned by a local 'media giant', Mr. Hadjicostis, who also owns, inter alia, a television station (Sigma) and a radio station (Radio Proto). It must be noted that none of the three papers, or their owners, openly support a specific party or politician, and vice versa; no political party owns or openly supports any of the three papers.

The fact that the three papers combined cover the vast majority of the media positions on the Problem and because these papers are situated in ideologically opposing camps vis-à-vis the conflict, allows for a rather holistic examination of the impact institutionalized

³¹ Data provided by Mr. Michalakis Adamides, Director of the Kronos Press Agency, the agency in charge of 80% of the distribution of the local press in Cyprus.

securitization has on the Greek Cypriot media and the reverse; the impact the printed media has on securitization processes. Specifically, the argument is that regardless of ideological differences the primary variable determining the securitization processes is the social context, which dictates what should be securitized. In other words, if papers with opposing positions on the (handling of the) Problem still securitize the same issues and in a similar manner we have a clear indication that once the process becomes institutionalized, desecuritization of specific issues is particularly difficult, even decades after the pivotal event. Similarly, an argument could be made that the bottom-up forces and audiences' expectations to see specific issues dominate the media is too powerful for any newspaper (regardless of ideology) to ignore, leading thus again to 'involuntary' securitization.

4.2.1.2. Headline categories

The data from the three papers was taken for the period July 1st 2003 to December 31st 2009, a period of 78 months or the equivalent of 2,356 days.³² To avoid seasonal biases these 78 months were equally divided among the three papers, meaning that each of the three papers was examined for a total of 26 months. Table 4.1 below shows the distribution of the 78 months among the three papers indicating the even distribution in terms of quantity (i.e. same number of months), as well as in terms of time (i.e. year of examination). Specifically, I did not examine the same month (e.g. January) for the same paper (e.g. *Phileleftheros*), for two consecutive years. Similarly, each paper was examined at least two times for the same month (e.g. January) during the 78 months. For instance, there were a total of 6 'Aprils' during the examination period. Each paper received two 'Aprils', but never in consecutive years: *Phileleftheros* was examined for the April of 2006 and 2008; *Politis* for 2005 and 2007 and *Simerini* for 2004 and 2009. This way I eliminated any seasonal biases such as the Turkish invasion that is 'remembered' every July or the Annan Plan every April.

³² This part of the research took place at the Press and Information Office (PIO) of the RoC, which digitized in microfilms the papers for the period under examination. The digital forms of the papers were available from July 1 2003 onwards. This is the reason why the examination did not start from January 1st 2003; the papers from January 1st to June 30th were not digitized.

Table 4. 1: Newspapers distribution for the 78-month period

Month / Paper	Phileleftheros	Politis	Simerini
January	2004; 2007	2006; 2009	2005; 2008
February	2004; 2007	2006; 2008	2005; 2009
March	2006; 2009	2005; 2007	2004; 2008
April	2006; 2008	2005; 2007	2004; 2009
May	2005; 2008	2004; 2006	2007; 2009
June	2005; 2009	2006; 2008	2004; 2007
July	2003; 2006	2005; 2007; 2009	2004; 2008
August	2003; 2006; 2009	2005; 2008	2004; 2007
September	2004; 2007	2003; 2008	2005; 2006; 2009
October	2004; 2007; 2009	2003; 2006	2005; 2008
November	2005; 2008	2004; 2006;	2003; 2007; 2009
December	2005; 2008	2004; 2006; 2009	2003; 2007

Once the distribution was determined, I examined the first page for each of the assigned papers and quantified the headline news that were relevant to the Cyprus conflict. To qualify as ‘relevant’ two conditions had to be met: i) the actual headline of the first page had to be related to the Problem, or ii) the first page had to include least two minor references. The first case refers to the main headline, including the main title that usually appears in bold and bigger letters and makes reference to the most important issue for that day. The latter case refers to *two or more* minor references with at least a few lines of analysis, meaning it occupied some significant space in the front page, enough for the reader to make sense of the news. In that case the day ‘qualified’ and was thus coded as a ‘day that had conflict-related headlines’. Any reference to related issues without any elaboration – meaning a few lines of analysis – did *not* qualify as minor headline news. The codification was binary, ‘1’ for the ‘relevant days’ and ‘0’ for the ‘non-relevant’ ones.

The reason why the second condition needed two or more minor references to qualify as a ‘relevant day’, as opposed to just one, was to give value to the quantification of the news. Given that some minor reference on the Cyprus problem appears on the front page almost every day, there was a need to create a distinction between the daily and ‘expected reference’ to the Problem and the days that paid particular attention to the Problem – i.e.

the days the paper considered the Problem-related news to be the most important news for that day.

Figure 4.1. and 4.2. are indicative front pages of Politis newspaper (January 2012) that demonstrate the test for ‘qualification’ mentioned above. Example-Figure 4.1. did *not* qualify as a ‘relevant day’, whereas example-Figure 4.2. is indicative of a day that ‘qualified’.

Figure 4. 1. Indicative front page of an ‘unqualified’ day



Source: www.politis.com.cy

In this case the headline reference (i.e. the bold and capital letters at the very top of the page) is ‘ΣΕ ΑΝΑΖΗΤΗΣΗ ενεργειακού μοντέλου’ (translated ‘IN QUEST for an

energy model’). Minor references are the three other items of news in the “boxes” below the headline news. Only one of these boxes refers to the Cyprus conflict: “Φεύγει η «ΤΔΒΚ», έρχεται το «τ/κ κράτος»” (translated as “‘TRNC’ is leaving, ‘T/C state’ is coming’). In this case for instance this front page would *not* qualify as ‘relevant’ because the headline is not in regards to the Cyprus conflict and there is only one ‘minor reference’.

Figure 4. 2. Indicative front page of a ‘qualified’ day



Source: www.politis.com.cy

In the example above the main title says ‘ΡΕΚΒΙΕΜ ΣΤΟ ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΟ’ (translated ‘REQUIEM FOR THE CYPRUS PROBLEM’) and continues with a sub-title indicating that it is up to the UN whether the negotiation process will end or continue. It then presents Dervis’ Eroglou position on rotating presidency, Demetris Christofias’ position

on land redistribution and a view that Turkey is indifferent (to the Problem) as the EU accession prospects vanished. This front page would qualify as a ‘relevant day’ since the main title is relevant to the Problem. This paper would also qualify even if the main title was not in regards to the Problem because it has three minor relevant references.

The quantification was a two-step process: first, as mentioned, all ‘relevant’ days received a code of ‘1’ and those that did not qualify received a ‘0’; the second step was to categorize all the news from the days that received a ‘1’. The first step aimed to quantify on one hand the frequency of references to the Cyprus problem in the first page of the three most popular papers, so as to indicate how central the Problem still is for the Greek Cypriot community. Indeed, there was reference (as defined above) to the Problem in two out of every three days (65% or 1,506 out of 2,323 ‘valid’ days), indicating that the Problem is still extremely central for the media and evidently for the people as well.³³ The second step was to analyze the 1,506 ‘qualified’ days and examine the reference(s) for each day, grouping them into several categories.³⁴ The number of categories was not pre-determined as it was unknown how many categories would emerge from the analysis. At the end of the analysis it became obvious that there is significant repetition on the issues that appear as headline news, allowing thus the categorization of a total of 1,907 references into only 14 different categories. These categories are examined in detail in chapter 6.

The categorization and the fact that all references could be categorized in just 14 different groups is of particular importance for the thesis as it solidly demonstrates that the conflict and the related threats are treated in a routinized manner. As argued in chapter 6, this routinized behavior is both the cause of institutionalized securitization as well as the outcome of it. These issues are also the ones that essentially define the social context in which securitization takes place. It is also worth noting that this analysis indicates that the

³³ Chapter 6 provides a detailed statistical analysis of the references and the different categories. The term ‘valid’ days refers to the days there were newspapers. Three times a year there are no newspapers (January 2nd, Easter Monday and May 2nd). Those days were not taken into consideration.

³⁴ Given that each ‘relevant day’ could have more than one reference to the Problem, and all references were recorded, for the 1,506 ‘qualified’ days there were 1,907 references.

same issues are being re-securitized in the media irrespective of the paper's orientation towards the problem. Moreover, these same issues are also the ones that are discussed in political discourses and are the ones appearing as important in public opinions, indicating again how they are part of the overall social context of the community.

The press analysis therefore provides quantifiable as well as qualitative data that supports the thesis hypotheses regarding the prospects for institutionalized securitization. It also emphasizes the importance of social context and helps explain why horizontal and bottom-up pressures are likely to occur in environments that are dominated by conflict-perpetuating discourses and routines.

4.2.2. Opinion Polls

Opinion polls are not usually used as a securitization analysis tool. Balzacq (2011b: 42), in line with the Buzan et al (1998), points out that public polls act more as indicators rather than evidence of the prominence of an issue. Be that as it may, polls could still become part of the process if securitizing actors use them for their acts (ibid). What is argued here is that opinion polls could also be used in another way, namely as a measurement of the audience demand for specific issues to be treated as threats. This, in turn, could act as an indication of how much bottom-up pressure elites would expect to face should they deviate from the public perceptions on important (for them) security issues.

4.2.2.1. Public opinion polls

The thesis uses numerous opinions polls conducted by several third parties, such as television stations, NGOs, newspapers, etc., over the years under examination. These polls provide a vital source of information regarding the public view on what constitutes a threat for each community; information that is important for at least two reasons. The first reason concerns the 'persistence' of threats – i.e. different opinion polls in different years yield the same results. This is an indication that some threats are indeed internalized and remain unchanged regardless of the developments. As discussed in

chapter 6, this is indeed the case in Cyprus and this raises the question on whether this persistence is the outcome of routine securitization that allows for the perpetuation of specific threats even though those threats may seem ‘outdated’ given the developments (e.g. EU accession) since the pivotal events.

The second reason why these polls are important is because they allow us to examine whether actors securitize the same issues that the public already considers as a threat or under threat. In other words, it examines whether actors securitize issues that do not really need to be securitized, as the audience already accepts them as existential threats. This is done by juxtaposing specific securitizing acts from the press with the public views as portrayed in the opinion polls. As discussed in chapter 6, actors do indeed securitize issues that are already considered to be existential threats, raising the question of why elites need to do that. What is claimed here is that they do not really have an option either because they fail to see the alternatives or they are unwilling to suffer significant political costs.

There are several opinion polls for the desired period from a number of different sources. The focus is on opinion polls that took place over the period 2009-2011:

1. Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS): “A People’s Peace in Cyprus” (March – April 2009)
2. Cyprus2015: “Examining the Future”, (December 2009)
3. Cyprus2015 (in cooperation with CEPS and PRIO): “Public Opinion and the Property Issue: Quantitative Findings”, (2009)
4. ANT1: “Cyprus Barometer” (every three months from January 2009 to April 2011)

All the chosen opinion polls have been conducted by reputable organizations and the output of these polls are uncontested both within and across each community. Half of them, and more specifically the ones conducted by Cyprus2015 and CEPS, are bi-communal and were carried out by the two most prominent Cypriot statisticians,

Alexandros Lordos (Greek Cypriot) and Mete Hattay (Turkish Cypriot), eliminating thus potential biases.³⁵

As discussed also in detail in chapter 6, the issues covered in almost all surveys are the same: 1) security; 2) property; 3) governance; 4) rights and freedom of movement; 5) economy; 6) territory and settlers; and 7) issues of trust (e.g. which institutions/parties/people the public trusts the most). These are also most of the issues that appear in the press as front-page news indicating thus a correlation between the public and press perceptions on important issues vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem.

4.2.2.2. Academic survey

Despite the usefulness of the aforementioned opinion polls, their design was not tailored to answer securitization related questions. For the purposes of this thesis therefore there was a need to get more ‘targeted information’ through a customized survey. Provided it was financially unfeasible to carry out a survey on the entire population, a survey was designed and carried out for one specific audience, namely the Greek Cypriot academia.³⁶ The survey was distributed electronically to almost the entire academic community in the Republic of Cyprus controlled areas.³⁷

The survey was designed to examine the prospects and degree of institutionalized, horizontal and involuntary securitization. Without using the words ‘threat’, ‘securitization’ or other similar ‘loaded’ terms, the goal was to understand on one hand the reasons why Greek Cypriots accept, many times unquestionably, the perpetuation of specific threats and on the other whether they themselves engage in (horizontal or bottom-up) securitization. The questions were also designed in a way that would provide

³⁵ Opinion polls that were conducted by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot researchers are more likely to be less biased both in terms of the phrasing of the questions and in terms of statistical ‘manipulations’.

³⁶ The survey was designed using kwiksurvey online software, available at www.kwiksurvey.com.

³⁷ The term academic community refers to the six universities (3 public and 3 private) operating in the government-controlled areas and numerous research centers, seeking (anonymous) input from teaching and research faculty (not students). The goal was to reach all research centers in the government controlled areas. Given that the vast majority of research centers operate within or cooperate with universities, it is safe to assume that the survey has reached the vast majority of academics in the Greek Cypriot community.

information on whether or not there are institutionalized threats and horizontal pressures that influence the specific audience's behavior.

Specifically, a set of questions focused on the reasons why some academics chose not to cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, identifying thus the perceived threats revolving around bi-communal cooperation. These threats would then be juxtaposed to the routinely securitized issues as observed in the political and social discourses to determine whether and how the institutionalized securitization processes influence the perceptions of this particular audience regarding specific issues and threats. Another set of questions aimed to identify the kinds of actual and expected pressure academics faced or thought they would face from their colleagues and/or family and friends if they cooperated with Turkish Cypriots. This would provide indications of actual horizontal and top-down securitization, as well as evidence of 'expected' securitization. Lastly, another set of questions examined directly whether academics themselves would apply pressure to colleagues who have cooperated with Turkish Cypriots, or would like to do so, measuring thus the degree of horizontal securitization within the specific audience. Discounting therefore the demographic questions, all others were designed to explicitly measure whether or not there is institutionalized and other forms of securitization and the impact they have on this audience's behavior.

The choice of academics as an audience was not random. On one hand, it is one of the few audiences that are relatively easily accessible, as opposed to for instance business people, civil servants, etc. On the other hand, it is an audience that traditionally cooperates with Turkish Cypriots, which subsequently means they are more directly affected by (and potentially affect) securitization routines – as opposed to other audiences that may never have, or needed to, cooperate with the 'other'. In addition, it would be particularly interesting to see how routine securitization could potentially influence the most highly educated audience in any society (i.e. the academic community).

The survey was entitled 'cooperation across the divide' and was comprised of 35 questions. The structure of the survey was 'dynamic' in the sense that it had

‘dichotomous’ questions and depending on the answer the participant would be directed to a specific set of questions, skipping at the same time another set of questions; thus no participant would actually answer all 35 questions. The main dichotomous question was whether he or she cooperated with academics from the Turkish Cypriot community. Those who answered ‘yes’ would answer one set of questions and those who answered ‘no’ a different one. Other questions, including the demographics ones, were common for all participants. The entire survey can be found in Appendix III.

It is estimated that the total academic population under examination does not exceed 1000 individuals. Approximately 15% of them completed the survey, providing thus a sample size of 148 academics. This means that the data gathered offers a statistically significant outcome for the given population, providing thus additional quantifiable evidence on the institutionalization of securitization and significant evidence of the existence of horizontal and involuntary processes. These outcomes corroborate the findings from the qualitative data gathered from the interviews and focus groups.

4.2.3. Interviews

The examination of securitization is essentially an examination of political processes. However, such processes are not always accompanied by documentation making therefore their study difficult. The lack of documentation, as Tansey points out, could be either because people ‘feel their actions are not important enough to merit recording them, or instead feel they are too sensitive to document in written form’ (2007: 767). The use of interviews could bypass the problem of insufficient documentation, by acquiring knowledge that is not available in written form, and thus contribute to our understanding of the incentives and reasoning behind political processes. For securitization processes, especially the routinized ones, the use of interviews seem to be even more essential given that elite may not re-iterate in written form positions that are already documented and accepted within a society. Similarly, interviews can help identify the incentives behind elites’ and audiences’ actions as well as the impact a social context has on their perceptions and subsequently on securitization.

Interviews thus are useful in corroborating the quantitative findings of the other approaches used in this thesis. Provided therefore that interviews are used primarily to corroborate the other empirical findings, they are only a small part of the empirical analysis tools used for this thesis, especially when compared to other more elaborate approaches such as the press analysis and the survey.

Interview structure: All interviews are semi-structured or semi-standardized. Following Berg's definition the semi-standardized interviews are: i) more or less structured; ii) the wording of the questions is flexible; iii) the level of language is adjustable; and iv) the interviewer may answer questions for clarification purposes (Berg 2004: 79). Most questions are open-ended so as to allow for the interviewee to fully articulate his/her response and maximize the response validity. As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 674) note, open-ended questions allow the 'respondents to organize their answers within their own framework. This increases the validity of the responses'. It must be noted that given that the aim of these interviews was to corroborate data from other sources and to register in a broad manner the incentives behind elite and other individuals actions, coupled with the fact that only a few interviews were conducted, the transcriptions were not used in a quantifiable way. There was no effort, in other words, to determine how many times a specific word or phrase was used, as the small number of interviews would not yield any statistically significant results.

Interview Venue: It was up to the interviewees to decide the venue the interview would take place. All of them took place at the premises where the interviewee works (e.g. political party offices, government office, universities, etc.) or at a 'neutral' place such as coffee shops. The ones with Greek Cypriots were conducted in Greek and the ones with Turkish Cypriots in English. All interviews were recorded – with the permission of the interviewees – with one exception, the Chief of Fire Service who asked not to be recorded. A list of interviews is provided in Appendix I.

4.2.4. Focus groups

Complementing the qualitative data from the interviews, a series of bi-communal focus groups were organized that brought together Greek and Turkish Cypriots from five different sectors of the society, namely, i) artists, ii) NGOs, iii) academics, iv) high-school students, v) civil servants. The overall goal was to examine whether and how perceptions regarding threats are different among different sets of audiences within the same community. The specific aim was to determine whether routinized securitization influences different sets of audiences the same way and more specifically whether horizontal and ‘involuntary’ securitization is universal across the society.

Focus groups have one main advantage over interviews, namely that they allow the observer to examine individual behavior and his/her responses, albeit not in a private setting but in one with peers. It was thus interesting to observe whether individuals would feel constrained or pressured not to deviate from the ‘accepted’ mainstream positions dominating the society. These observations contribute to our understanding on how effective peer-to-peer securitization could be and they provided corroborating evidence for the academic survey findings.

The focus group discussions were conducted in English, as there were both Greek and Turkish Cypriot participants. As with the interviews, the focus groups had a semi-structured form with some fixed questions for each group and some that developed ad hoc based on issues raised by the participants. I coordinated and chaired the focus groups workshops. As a moderator I controlled the discussions in the sense that I changed the direction and even interrupted the debates when necessary so as not to deviate far from the goal.

The five focus group meetings took place from the June 2009 to January 2010 and were hosted at the University of Nicosia. Each session lasted for approximately two hours and all of them were recorded with the consent of *all* participants. What must be noted is that these focus groups were part of an EU-sponsored program for which I personally drafted the proposal and coordinated the project for that entire year. The Host Organization for

the program was the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs - University of Nicosia. The results of the program could be used for the dissertation as part of the dissemination activities of the project.

Appendix II has a list of the focus groups along with the details regarding the number and ‘nature’ of participants (e.g. artists, academics, etc.).

4.3. Use of non-verbal data

As Williams (2003) argues, the study of securitization through speech acts alone is insufficient, not least because a big part of the political communication is conducted through televisual media and images. As the argument goes, the use of images may be particularly important in the dramatization of issues and thus in the process of securitization.

In this thesis an argument is made that images are not only used for additional dramatization of a speech act, but also could act as substitutes for speech acts. Images, I argue, are capable under certain conditions to securitize an issue without the ‘support’ of speech acts. This is especially the case when securitization is institutionalized and perceived threats are well-internalized among the audiences. Under such conditions visual images could be used to remind the audience that something is a specific threat and not to convince them; hence there is no need to follow the security grammar of speech acts. In addition, the fact that actors choose to use visual images without engaging at the same time in the regular speech-act securitization, is also an indication of how institutionalized and routine the process could become and more importantly how ‘conditioned’ the audiences could be to accept securitizing acts (again without the use of a specific security grammar).

The study of visual images, therefore, has a lot to offer to our understanding of institutionalized securitization. With this in mind the thesis examines images from:

- i. Billboards (especially during election periods)
- ii. Flyers handed out to the public (either directly or as part of a package with newspapers and/or other printed material)
- iii. Images used during political advertisements in televised spots
- iv. Images from newspapers
- v. Images used in the printed media (newspapers and magazines)

What must be noted is that, unlike the press analysis, the aim is not to quantify this data and produce any form of statistical analysis. While there is an abundance of data (a data set of over 300 pictures is gathered for the purpose of the thesis), the aim is not to focus exclusively on how images are used in the securitization process, but rather simply to provide additional evidence of how the process changes once institutionalized.

4.4. Ethical Issues

The ethical concerns of the thesis revolve around one issue, namely that of anonymity and the right not to be recorded. Particular attention is given to the wish of some interviewees to maintain their anonymity. As they noted, this was particularly important to them in order to speak freely. The names of the individuals who wished to maintain their anonymity appear in the thesis as a single letter, which represents the first letter of their first name. For instance, Constantinos Adamides would appear as “C”.

Only one interviewer preferred that our meeting would not be recorded, which obviously was not. All others (interviewees and focus group participants) consented to being recorded. Lastly, all of the participants in the focus groups and all the interviewees were informed in written that the data they provided will be used for this dissertation, either with or without their names, depending on their preference.

Chapter 5: Ethnic Conflicts and the Cyprus Problem

The absence of social context and the importance it could have on the securitization processes were examined in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. What has been argued is that there are environments in which the social context creates fertile ground for institutionalized, bottom-up and horizontal securitization as they allow for the creation of conflict-perpetuating routines that support and are supported by routinized and eventually institutionalized securitization processes. This chapter examines one specific kind of such environments, namely that of ‘protracted ethnic conflicts’ and explores the reasons why they create the most suitable conditions for the development of institutionalized and other forms of securitization. The chapter then presents a historical overview of the case study – the Cyprus conflict – which as argued is an indicative protracted ethnic conflict. At the same time it provides the necessary background information for the next chapter, which tests empirically the theoretical hypotheses as set out earlier in chapter 3.

5.1. Ethnic Conflicts

Fisher defines conflict as ‘a social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more parties, attempts by the parties to control each other, and antagonistic feelings by parties towards each other’ (1990: 6). An ‘ethnic’ conflict is one where the incompatible goals are defined by at least one side in ‘ethnic’ terms and the confrontation is due to ethnic distinctions (Cordell and Wolff 2009: 4-5; Kaufmann 1996: 138).³⁸

The term ethnic conflict, and subsequently the aforementioned definition, is contested and its usefulness is questioned. Gilley (2004: 1158) for instance cautions that the

³⁸ It is worth noting that there is not a single ‘category’ of ethnic conflicts. Indeed, there seems to be an over-categorization of ethnic conflicts with multiple terms such as ‘ethnopolitical conflicts’ (e.g. Gurr 1994), ‘communal conflicts’ (e.g. Gurr et al. 2000), ‘protracted social conflicts’ (e.g. Azar 1983; 1990), ‘deep rooted conflicts’ (e.g. Burton 1987) and ‘identity-based conflicts’ (e.g. Rothman 2001; Gartzke 2006). Many of the characteristics of these conflicts are the same, or very similar, and they all incorporate, to some degree, the variable of ethnicity in their definitions.

existence of 'ethnic markers' in a political conflict are not sufficient to label such conflicts as 'ethnic'. He then argues that the term 'ethnic conflict' is not particularly useful, unless ethnicity is actually the cause of a conflict (ibid). While the challenge is acknowledged, the abovementioned definition is particularly useful for identifying specific kinds of conflicts where new or ongoing areas of contention are analyzed vis-à-vis the ethnic identity of the opposing parties.³⁹ In such cases, and while it may not always be clear if ethnicity is the sole cause of a conflict, the term 'ethnic conflict' is useful for describing the framework in which the two sides (and other actors) identify the conflict.

The specific definition is also particularly useful when examining how ethnic conflicts could create a securitization-fertile context. The abovementioned definition views the conflict in relative terms, meaning that it is examined as part of a context with constructed perceptions of enemies, incompatible positions and hostile attempts, and not in 'absolute' terms that require the presence of 'fixed' variables such as violence. Viewed this way, conflicts – and especially ethnic ones – may develop or remain unresolved because of new or ongoing perceptions regarding threats deriving from an 'enemy other' and not necessarily because there is violence, as it is frequently assumed (Kriesberg 1998).⁴⁰ The presence of exclusive identities of 'us' and 'enemy-them' – frequently found in conflicts that are defined along ethnic lines – could be a particularly useful tool for actors wishing to generate and perpetuate a conflict. Specifically, actors who can manipulate identities into exclusive positions (Crawford and Lipschutz 1997: 168) can then use these identities as a 'mobilizing force', as is evident from a number of cases such as Tibet, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia (Buzan 1991: 72). Lake and Rothchild (1996:41) hold a similar position arguing that intense ethnic conflict is the outcome of collective fears of the future, which is used or developed by political entrepreneurs and others groups to polarize society. Polarization and the presence of exclusive identities –

³⁹ For instance, in the case of Cyprus all the issues of contention – including those of economic, environmental and social nature – are identified in terms of ethnicity, namely Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

⁴⁰ As Fearon and Laitin point out in their seminal work, violence is the exception in most ongoing conflicts rather than the rule (1996: 716).

which lead inter alia to zero sum mentalities – can more easily lead to the emergence or perpetuation of conflict.

The presence of exclusive identities is part of social contexts with exclusive social groups in which some individuals may be denied access (Tajfel 1978, 1981). In such contexts the value one attributes to being a ‘member’ influences one’s behavior towards the ‘outsiders’, meaning that it is essentially the group’s identity that dictates how the ‘other’ and the ‘self’ are perceived, namely as friends or foes (Horowitz 1985). These perceptions revolve around the relative worth and legitimacy of one group vis-à-vis another, and could lead to struggles for group domination with the use of instrumental and symbolic power (ibid). As Horowitz notes, power in ethnically divided societies is not only used as a ‘means to an end’, but also as an ‘end in itself’, and this is done for two reasons: to confirm a group’s worth and to safeguard a group’s survival (ibid). The need to confirm a group’s worth is also unavoidably linked to the need for recognition, which, according to Lindemann (2010), is needed for emotional reasons, namely to increase one’s self esteem and avoid shame, and for cognitive reasons, namely to reinforce one’s identity through the confirmation of significant others.

The presence of exclusive identities therefore could lead to the development and the perpetuation of conflicts by perpetuating a struggle of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. More importantly for this thesis is that such exclusive identities with the equally exclusive perceptions regarding ‘enemy-others’ and specific threats are part of the environment in which securitization takes place. These perceptions and the constant need to maintain the distinction of ‘our’ identity from that of the ‘others’ can lead to institutionalized, bottom-up and horizontal securitization, which in turn contribute to the perpetuation and internalization of these perceptions, creating thus a vicious cycle.

The struggle for actual or symbolic domination in ethnically pluralist societies often leads to long-term and persistent ethnic hatreds. In ethnic conflicts these antipathies are so strong that they can ‘survive even the powerful solvent of modernization’ and contribute to the perpetuation of ethnic antagonisms (Horowitz 1985: 97-98). The importance of

these ongoing ethnic antagonisms is that they allow for the development of mass hostilities (Kaufman 1996) and the opportunistic revival of memories of century-old conflicts and fears to 'fit contemporary conditions' (Horowitz 1985). Indeed, as demonstrated in the next chapter, historical fears and animosities are frequently used opportunistically as tools to securitize contemporary issues. In intra-state conflicts historical experiences are used to determine the intentions of the 'other' and thus evaluate the security status of each side (i.e. how much of a threat is the 'other') in contemporary times (Posen 1993: 30); consequently, if past experiences have been negative they are likely to increase the security dilemma between the two sides.⁴¹ The impact of past experiences on elite and audiences decision-making mechanisms becomes greater if those experiences are part of an ethnic myth-symbol complex as they become part of the people's identities (Kaufman 2001) and as such can be more easily used by political entrepreneurs or securitizing actors. This is also the 'problem' with the use of historical experiences as they may often be 'misleading', 'inaccurate' and subject to exaggeration and manipulation (Posen 1993: 31). That said, and regardless of the accuracy of historical experiences, what matters for cases of securitization is that actors use these 'real' or 'constructed' experiences as tools to securitize contemporary issues.

An ethnic conflict environment becomes even more important for securitization if it is also intractable. The longer a conflict remains intractable the more likely it is for perceived threats – related to the 'enemy-other' – to become internalized and part of the people's identities, making at the same time the already exclusive identities even more rigid. Long-term conflicts also allow for development of political and social routines that focus on the conflict that lead to the creation of a suitable social context for institutionalized securitization.⁴²

Intractable conflicts are often considered to be deep conflicts which, as opposed to disputes and arguments found in tractable conflicts, they are based on the actual or

⁴¹ For a review on the role of structure on security dilemmas see Roe (1999).

⁴² While intractability is a very 'useful' variable it not 'necessary' for the development of institutionalized securitization. The latter could take place even in non-conflict environments where there are persistent (perceived) threats, such as uncontrolled or unwanted immigration.

perceived identity incompatibilities of the disputants (Rothman 2001: 295). These deep incompatibilities contribute to the intractability of the conflict and create a number of distinguishable characteristics, which are listed below in brief. According to Bar-Tal (1998, 2000), intractable conflicts are:

- (a) Protracted, which means that they have remained unresolved for at least for a generation.
- (b) Irreconcilable, meaning that each side's goals are diametrically opposite.
- (c) Violent (or at least could be / or have been), even though the presence of violence need not be continuous.
- (d) Of a zero-sum nature, which creates the perception that any gain of one side must automatically be a loss for the other.
- (e) Total, meaning that what is (perceived to be) at stake is the existence of one or both sides.
- (f) Central, meaning that members of society, elite and public alike, are constantly preoccupied by it.
- (g) Characterized by the fact that some, or all, parties involved in the conflict have an interest in its continuation. This could be because of the economic, military or psychological investments that have already been made due to the conflict.

The last point and more specifically the psychological investment is of particular importance for the thesis and is worth some more attention. The psychological aspect of the parties' involvement in the conflict is central when analyzing the reasons why some conflicts are perpetuated despite the absence of violence. Bar Tal's argument is in line with what has been discussed in chapter 3 regarding the need for ontological security and the development of conflict-perpetuating routines (Mitzen 2006). This characteristic of intractable conflicts should not be treated independently from all others but rather as their outcome. Specifically, the 'investment' in the perpetuation of the conflict is more likely to take place if the conflict is protracted and central for each side, given that in such environments the conflict becomes part of the people's daily lives. Similarly, the zero-

sum mentalities, the irreconcilable positions and past and or potential acts of violence only contribute to making the conflict ‘central’ and ‘total’ for the people.

What is even more important for this thesis is that the characteristics of intractable conflicts, and especially the psychological investments, create an almost obstacle-free path for actors on an elite and audience level to engage in successful and routinized securitizing acts. The internalized perceptions regarding the ‘other’ coupled with the psychological need to maintain the conflict in the population’s routines allow for ‘easy’ acceptance of any securitizing acts as long as the proposed threats are linked to the ‘enemy-other’. More interestingly, as argued in this thesis, in such environments there are expectations that anything related to the ‘other’ should be securitized and treated as a potential threat, creating therefore a ‘demand’ for constant securitization. For the same reasons, as demonstrated in the next chapter, some individuals and groups are also willing to engage in the process of threat-creation or threat-perpetuation themselves through horizontal and bottom-up securitization.

The next sections examine the case study of this thesis, the Cyprus conflict, and demonstrate that it is a protracted ethnic conflict as defined in the section above sharing the characteristics of such conflicts.

5.2. The Cyprus conflict: a historical overview

In Cyprus, just like in almost every conflict case, there are always at least two different sets of views claiming ownership of the truth, meaning that there is no agreed objective ‘truth’ for either contemporary conflict-related events or entire historical periods. There is some consensus between the two sides that certain events – violent or non-violent – did indeed take place, but each side interprets them very differently, using inevitably a very different discourse and phrasing to describe and understand them.⁴³ This is especially the

⁴³ For instance both sides accept that in 1974 there was a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. However, the interpretation and phrasing is completely different; while the Greek Cypriot discourse describes it as a brutal illegal invasion, the Turkish Cypriot discourse portrays it as justified and necessary peace operation. More ‘neutral’ terms describe it as ‘intervention’ (i.e. neither invasion nor peace operation).

case with the official narratives, such as government and political elites' positions as well as with most education material. It is worth noting that while the majority of the public on each side shares these views and reiterates the established discourse, there are individuals and groups on both sides that acknowledge that their side's views do not represent the 'absolute truth' and are sympathetic to (some of) the positions of the 'other'.

In addition to the official discourses there are also constructed myths, which are so internalized in each community that carry almost the same weight as the 'objective truths' and are frequently repeated and used as if they are undeniable facts. The lack of a universally accepted objective truth opens the door for multiple interpretations for the causes that led to the development and perpetuation of the conflict; interpretations that are subject to a number of different variables, with the primary one being ethnicity (Greek, Turkish, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish-Cypriot). Secondary factors include whether one is more or less sympathetic to the Turkish or Greek positions as well as on one's ideological background (e.g. leftist, Hellenocentric, etc.).

This chapter does not attempt to promote yet another version of the truth. Instead, and in line with the constructivist nature of securitization, the aim is to present these discourses and how the conflict-related threats are constructed across the dividing line. This goal will contribute to our understanding on how specific social contexts can lead to different processes of securitization as outlined earlier. The need of this chapter arises from the fact that it would be particularly difficult to understand the mechanisms and processes of bottom-up and horizontal securitization in the specific context of Cyprus without a relatively lucid picture on how the conflict has developed over the decades and how the parties involved perceive it.

What makes the Cyprus case particularly interesting and relevant for the study of securitization is the fact that essentially every aspect of the conflict, ranging from historical 'facts' to contemporary issues under negotiation, is highly contested between the two sides and is opportunistically used by elite to promote specific positions. As argued in detail in the next chapter, it is precisely this contestation that opens the door for

frequent and constant securitization, leading eventually to the institutionalization of the process.

The rest of the chapter is separated into four broad sections. The first part provides a timeline of the problem, stretching from the pre-1950 period to 2010, focusing on the specific pivotal events of each decade during that period. Following that is a section dealing specifically with the different understandings of the conflict as portrayed in the literature over the past four decades. The next section focuses on the areas of contention between the two sides and the different perspectives on the causes for the development and perpetuation of the conflict. The last section focuses specifically on the impact the European Union has had on the conflict and the reasons behind the latter's failure to contribute to a settlement.

5.3. A time line of key events

The brief description of the contemporary history of the conflict aims to elucidate how and why Greek and Turkish Cypriots developed hostile and zero-sum identities.⁴⁴ Similarly, it demonstrates how historical animosities and fear for the future developed over time. Lastly, it aims to demonstrate that a series of pivotal events have contributed to the creation of a protracted ethnic conflict and to the development of a deeply securitized environment. While there is a brief reference to the pre-1950's period, the focus is on contemporary historical events and more specifically the period 1950 to 2010.

5.3.1. Pre-1950s and 1950s

Cyprus was under the control of the Ottoman Empire for over three hundred years (1571-1878). In 1821, with the commencement of the Greek revolution, the Greeks of the island joined Greece's efforts for independence with the Greek Orthodox Church having an

⁴⁴ The term 'key events' concerns events that are 'key' (i.e. very important) for one *or* the other side, but not necessarily both, even though some events were key for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

important role to play.⁴⁵ For contemporary Greek Cypriots therefore the historical animosities and negative perceptions towards the enemy/oppressor ‘other’ are centuries old.⁴⁶ Greeks on the other hand did not become the oppressors in the eyes of Turkish Cypriots until the middle of the 20th century.

With the demise of the Ottoman Empire and with the increasing need for allies, the Ottomans passed on the administrative control of Cyprus to the British who needed Cyprus in order to control more efficiently the Suez Canal and the seas to India. The British rule lasted until 1959 and in 1960 Cyprus became for the first time an independent state, albeit with a lot of ‘exceptions’. Indeed, Cyprus has been a state of exception since its conception in 1960 on a number of grounds including the country’s sovereignty, the withdrawal of colonial influence (territorially and otherwise) and the direct influence third countries have in the new Republic’s local affairs (Constantinou 2008). At a later stage and after the 1974 Greek coup and the Turkish invasion the exceptionalities of Cyprus grew with the *de facto* division of the island and the self-proclaimed Turkish Cypriot ‘state’, the TRNC (in 1983), which remains unrecognized by all other states with the exception of Turkey.

The most turbulent period of the British rule was the 1950’s with the rise of Greek Cypriot EOKA⁴⁷ on one side and the Turkish Cypriot TMT⁴⁸ on the other. That was the period that the contemporary Cyprus problem began along with the development of the antagonistic ethnic identities. In 1955 the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA, having as a goal the union of the island with Greece (*enosis*) commenced the armed struggle against the British in Cyprus. EOKA focused primarily on British targets, but also attacked Greek or Turkish Cypriots who were not in line with the goal of *enosis* and in favor of bi-communal cooperation (Souter 1984). Reacting to the creation of EOKA and to prevent it

⁴⁵ It was not surprising therefore that decades later, during the British colonial period (1878-1959), the Church became a symbol of political and ethnic unity (Joseph 2006). Similarly it is not surprising that the first President of Cyprus was the religious leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Archbishop Makarios III.

⁴⁶ It is worth noting that at the time the identity of the ‘other’ was not based on ethnicity but based on religion; the identity dichotomy therefore was between Christians and Muslims.

⁴⁷ National Organization of Cypriot Fighters [Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών].

⁴⁸ Turkish Resistance Organization [Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı].

from achieving *enosis*, the Turkish Cypriots, with the support of Turkey, formed in 1955 *Volkan*, transformed in 1958 into TMT, which aimed to partition the island (*taksim*). TMT also engaged in violent activities against Greek and Turkish Cypriots who were not in line with TMT's goals (ibid). The two 'motherlands', Greece and Turkey, were inevitably involved in this struggle by supporting the local Cypriots with weapons and military personnel. It is worth noting that the Greek Cypriot discourse maintains that the British followed a divide and conquer rule to control Cyprus and promoted the Turkish positions and subsequently the division of the island.

Figure 5. 1 Training the British



Source: Taxidromos October 1st, 1955

Figure 5.1. above depicts the newly appointed Governor John Harding sending the British commandos for training into a Turkish-run school. The sign says: 'Tutorial School: Wiping out Greeks, slaughters, prosecutions, vandalisms. Headmaster: A. Menterez (former Turkish Prime Minister).' The connotation is that the British in Cyprus served Turkey's interests at the expense of the Greek and Greek Cypriot interests.

Figure 5. 2. McMillan: The Peacemaker



Source: Vima October 1, 1958

Figure 5.2. above depicts Harold McMillan, the former British Prime Minister splitting Cyprus in two, saying ‘Don’t act like this, woman. It is...temporary!’⁴⁹, connoting again that Britain served Turkey’s interests, namely to dichotomize the island into Greek and Turkish parts.

The figures above are indicative of the Greek Cypriot perceptions regarding the British role in the conflict, the pro-Turkish positions and the anti-Hellenic ones. It is not surprisingly therefore that the suggested British proposition (so-called McMillan Plan in 1957) was perceived by Greek Cypriots as a machination to divide Cyprus. As demonstrated with the press analysis (chapter 6), these perceptions, decades later, remain unchanged albeit they are manifested in a different way.

⁴⁹ It is interesting to note that Cyprus in the Greek Cypriot discourse is always presented as a young woman or a little girl, connoting its helpless nature that is always ‘violated’ by the much stronger enemies, be it Turkey, the UK or the US.

The struggles for *enosis* and *taksim* finally ended with the 1960 Cypriot independence, which made their pursuit unconstitutional (Article 185). While the struggle for *enosis* and *taksim* (officially) ended in 1960,⁵⁰ the damage was already done, as the distrustful environment and the antagonistic identities created during this period would never be reversed, influencing to this day the way the two sides perceive each other.

Before proceeding to the more contemporary history, it is worth clarifying a view that is many times misused by both communities, namely that in the years pre-dating the invasion, or even the 1960's, Greek and Turkish Cypriots always lived peacefully and happily together. While there are several accounts that Greek and Turkish Cypriots did peacefully co-exist together in mixed villages in the past this was not the case for the entire population. Indeed, because of the problems and the distrust the two communities started growing apart much earlier than 1974 or even 1963; the perception about the potential 'enemy other' therefore was not as contemporary as it is frequently claimed. It is indicative that in 1859 the Muslim population was spread out in 59% of the settlements (villages and cities) and by 1960 the percentage decreased to 38.3% (Demographic Report 2009). Similarly, according to a population census in 1960 out of the 619 villages of Cyprus 64% were homogeneously Greek Cypriot, 19% Turkish Cypriot and only 17% were mixed (PIO 2008). Thus, the ethnic-based separations started taking place even before the birth of the Republic in 1960.

5.3.2. 1960's – The creation of an 'unwanted child' and the first inter-communal problems

In 1960 Cyprus became for the first time in its contemporary history an independent state.⁵¹ The way independence came about, especially when coupled with the preceding

⁵⁰ Unofficially the efforts continued for another 14 years. It was not until the 1974 Turkish invasion that Greek Cypriots stopped their efforts for *enosis* and Turkish Cypriots for *taksim* – which was achieved, at least de facto, with the separation of the island.

⁵¹ In 1960 the population of Cyprus was approximately 574,000. The Greek Cypriot community comprised 78% of the total population, the Turkish Cypriot 18% and the other 2% were Armenians, Latinos and Maronites. By 1973 (i.e. the year before the division of the island), the population increased to 632,000 but the (percentage) distribution remained unchanged. In 1975, the year after the invasion, the population

conflict-ridden decade, was a development that was not whole-heartedly supported by either community. There was a need to keep a balance between the two sides to meet the complexities generated by the recent stormy history. Under these circumstances Cyprus ended up with a highly complex and unworkable constitution (Adams 1966) that created an independent state, albeit only in principle as it was a partially sovereign state full of exceptions (Constantinou 2008). Under this new state of affairs, three other states – Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom – were guarantor powers with the constitutional right to militarily intervene unilaterally in Cyprus should the need arise, while Britain also maintained sovereign British bases on the island.⁵² The end result was perceived as a ‘given’ or ‘received’ and dysfunctional constitution (Joseph 2006).⁵³ Similarly, the outcome – namely the newly formed state – was described as a ‘reluctant republic’ (Xydis 1973), a quasi-state (Constantinou 2006) and an ‘unwanted child’ (Kizilyurek).⁵⁴

Figure 5. 3. The 1960 Constitution and the British Machinations



Source: Vima, December 11, 1960

decreased dramatically 498,000, (RoC Statistical Service 2009) primarily because of mass emigrations of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

⁵² For an elaborate analysis on how the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) influence the Cyprus-Britain relations and the Cyprus Problem see Theophanous and Tirkides (2008).

⁵³ The constitution is considered by many to be imposed or ‘given’ since what the Cypriot leaders had to sign in London in 1959 was a pre-arranged constitution that they never really negotiated.

⁵⁴ It was the former president of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides who said that an independent government in Cyprus was similar to the birth of an unwanted child.

Figure 5.3. above shows the (Greek Cypriot) President (Archbishop Makarios III) and the (Turkish Cypriot) Vice President (Dr. Kutchuk) holding the 1960 London-Zurich agreements in front of a building with a sign that reads 'Independent Cyprus'. On the side is Selwyn Lloyd, the former British Foreign Minister, entering the house (i.e. Cyprus) with a briefcase saying 'Bases'. The connotation is that the constitution did not really create a truly independent state and allowed (through the 'back door') the UK to maintain some control.

A lot of weight was placed on the good will of the two sides to resolve any problems deriving from the constitution's complexities. The good will however was never there and the first inter-communal problems eventually emerged. Leaving aside the everyday administration problems (e.g. decision-making deadlocks), the constitution also created much more profound problems for Cypriots. As Theophylactou (1995) points out, the constitution did not aim to create a new Cypriot identity but rather maintain the existing ones. It failed to create a new Cypriot identity that would help bridge communal differences; rather it contributed to the perpetuation of the old ethnically distinct ones that maintained and even solidified further the zero-sum mentalities, creating thus an environment full of perceived enemies and potential threats for both sides.⁵⁵

Within the first three years the first problems emerged and were intensified after Makarios' proposals to amend the 1960 Constitution.⁵⁶ The emergence of inter-communal violence followed soon after. The first acts of violence occurred in 1963 and impacted primarily the Turkish Cypriots. After the clashes many Turkish Cypriots withdrew or were forced to flee, depending on the discourse one follows, into enclaves.

⁵⁵ For a brief summary on how the constitution divided powers between the two sides see Ker-Lindsay (2011 - especially pp. 25-26) and De Smith (1964 – especially pp. 282-296).

⁵⁶ The disputes were mainly over the issues of separate municipalities, public service, army (ratio between Greek and Turkish Cypriots), and taxes. By 1962 no agreement was reached on the sensitive issue of the separate municipalities, while the Turkish Cypriots vetoed the proposed taxes amendments. In 1963 the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, after two years of disputes wanted to amend the constitution claiming it was not functional. On November 29, 1963 Makarios submitted to the three guarantor power thirteen points for constitutional reforms, which included, *inter alia*, the abandonment of the president's and vice-president's veto powers. The proposal was first rejected by Turkey and then vetoed by the Turkish Cypriots, since it was perceived as a Greek Cypriot manoeuvre to obtain more control over Turkish Cypriots (Necatigil 1993). For a summary of the thirteen points see Vrachas (1993) p.38-9. Also, for more on the chronology of those events see <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/chronology.htm>.

The reason for the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal is yet another area of contention and is used opportunistically decades later to highlight potential threats. Turkish Cypriots argue that they had no other choice but to withdraw into enclaves to defend themselves; they fled thus out of ‘sheer fear’ (Dodd 1999). Greek Cypriots on the other hand called this withdrawal ‘Τουρκο-ανταρσία’ (‘Turkish-Mutiny’) arguing that the withdrawal took place in order to facilitate the eventual division of the island – i.e. withdrawing into enclaves was just the first step for more concrete bi-communal division. These two diametrically opposite arguments are not just academic positions, but are also re-iterated on elite and public level. According to former President Glafcos Clerides’ deposition, in the post-1963 incidents documents were found in Dr. Kutchuk’s office with plans for specific and pre-determined actions, including the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot MPs and other public servants from the parliament and other government positions (Vrachas 1993: 40). The Turkish Cypriot official position for this period is that Turkish Cypriots ‘were confined to small enclaves, and subjected to gross violations of human rights including being rendered refugees over and over again living under open-air prison conditions’ (TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs).⁵⁷

The 1963-68 period was particularly volatile with inter-communal violence and the first foreign military interventions. In August of 1964 after armed struggles between the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot TMT, the Turkish Air Force bombarded the north-western tip of Cyprus with significant collateral damage. It was that same year that the UN force (UNFICYP) came to Cyprus and still maintains its presence on the island ever since.⁵⁸ In 1967 there were clashes again between the (Greek Cypriot) National Guard and Turkish Cypriots, leading not only to loss of lives (mostly Turkish Cypriots), but also to Turkish threats for an invasion and the latter’s request for the withdrawal of the Greek troops and General Grivas from the island; a request which was granted.

⁵⁷ <http://www.trncinfo.com> [accessed November 23, 2011].

⁵⁸ For a history on the UN in Cyprus see James 2002. For the role of the UN after 2004 see Ker-Lindsay (2006). For how the two sides perceive the UN mediating efforts see Richmond (1998).

The discourse as well as the two sides' internalized beliefs about this period is substantially different. While there seems to be an agreement on the 'facts' (i.e. inter-communal fighting and Turkish bombings), there are disagreements as to why they were necessary. Turkish Cypriots, as mentioned, argue that they were helpless and subject to attacks from the Greek Cypriots and thus needed Turkish support. Greek Cypriots on the other hand argue that Turkey was secretly arming TMT in Cyprus, encouraging it to engage in violent acts so as to provoke Greek Cypriot reactions and thus provide an excuse for Turkey to intervene.

The events of the 1950's and 1960's set the foundations for the development of zero-sum identities, mistrust and overall hostile feelings towards the 'other'. More importantly however all potential threats and problems were defined in ethnic terms.

5.5.3. The path-changing decade of the 1970's

The finale of the turbulent 1960's came on July 15th 1974, when at first the Athens Junta attempted to overthrow the elected president Makarios and five days later Turkey invaded the island, placing under its control 37% of the island.

The dividing line that separates the two sides is known as the Green Line (Figure 6.1.). The Greek Cypriots do not consider this to be an external (or internal) border, since that would connote the existence of two states; they rather see it as the cease-fire line, a view that is shared by the UN (Demetriou 2005). The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand consider the Green Line to be 'a territorial border that defines the limits of an independent state, the statehood of which is protected and maintained by the Turkish army (ibid: 12).

Figure 5.4 Map of Cyprus⁵⁹



(Source: <http://www.thecyprusguide.net/>)

Since 1974, there have been approximately 35,000 Turkish soldiers in the areas not controlled by the Republic, making Cyprus one of the most militarized areas in the world. The invasion led to a significant number of missing people and the displacement of approximately 190,000 Greek Cypriots from the northern part of the island and 40,000 Turkish Cypriots from the south.⁶⁰ Following the military intervention, the United Nations requested the withdrawal of any foreign troops from Cyprus (UNSC resolution 353). While the Resolution was never implemented, it remains the foundation of the Greek Cypriot discourse that revolves around the illegality of the intervention and the perpetuation of the status quo.

⁵⁹ The Green Line (blue lines on the map) and the Buffer Zone (the area between the two blue lines).

⁶⁰ The number of displaced people is not contested. Indeed, local and international sources (see e.g. [internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org) which uses UNFICYP figures) place the total figure at 210,000 figures [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpPages\)/22FB1D4E2B196DAA802570BB005E787C?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpPages)/22FB1D4E2B196DAA802570BB005E787C?OpenDocument). The official Greek Cypriot figure of missing persons following the 1974 invasion is 1,619. The Turkish Cypriot number from the period 1963-1967 was estimated at 500. According to the bi-communal Committee of Missing People (CMP) in Cyprus, the figures are 1,493 and 494 respectively (http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1343&tt=graphic&lang=11).

The Turkish Cypriot discourse maintains that the coup aimed to annex Cyprus with Greece and thus Turkey had the obligation to intervene. More importantly however, Turkish Cypriots perceived the coup as the ultimate proof that they were in grave danger, arguing that both their physical and societal security were under threat, requiring thus Turkey's military support. In the Turkish discourse therefore the military intervention is described as the 'Cyprus Peace Operation', and the official Turkish Cypriot position is that 'the presence of the Turkish Peace Forces in Cyprus is a vital security requirement for the Turkish Cypriot people as it serves as a deterrent against the repetition of the Greek/Greek Cypriot atrocities'.⁶¹ Greek Cypriot discourse on the other hand does not question the Junta coup, but questions the danger in which Turkish Cypriots were in, arguing that the coup was the excuse Turkey needed to intervene and implement its long-standing plans.⁶² More importantly however they argue that the violence was disproportionate to the events at the time, while the continuous occupation is unjustifiable given that the Turkish Cypriots are not in any danger from Greek Cypriots after the collapse of the Junta in Greece.

To this day numerous Greek Cypriots believe that the Turkish invasion should not have focused only on Turkey's aggression but also to the Greek Junta and other foreign powers and more specifically Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State. As is the case with the British mentioned earlier, these perceptions have not changed significantly and elites use them opportunistically to securitize contemporary issues.

⁶¹ <http://www.trncinfo.com> [accessed November 23, 2011].

⁶² One of the most frequently arguments is that the invasion and the territory Turkey would occupy was already decided. As Brewin points out, the Turkish army eventually stopped at a point they 'had proposed ten years earlier to the UN mediator, Galo Plaza' (Brewin 2000: 44) connoting that the military actions were to a significant degree pre-decided long before the coup of 1974.

Figure 5.5. Junta, CIA and Turkey



Source: Satiriki July 19, 1975

Figure 5.6. Kissinger the Butcher of Cyprus



Source: Satiriki December 14, 1975

Figure 5.5. shows Greek dictator Ioannides, along with Kissinger (wearing a CIA sign) and an Attila figure with the face of the former Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit, together persecuting Cyprus. Figure 5.6. depicts Kissinger as a butcher dichotomizing Cyprus as per Turkey's request.

The rest of the decade was the golden age of 'cypriotism', which developed at the expense of Greek Cypriot nationalism – i.e. hellenocentrism (Mavratsas 1999). There was in other words an attempt to change the orientation of the Greek Cypriot identity from Hellenic to Cypriot. Mavratsas argues that the reason behind this move was the need for Greek Cypriots to convince Turkish Cypriots that they were ready to find a solution. While I agree with the assessment of the rise of cypriotism, the reasons for its grow are a matter for debate. It is unlikely that so early after the invasion Greek Cypriots would forgo their fears and seek a trustful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots. A more rational reason I argue is 'guilt'. Specifically, because the Turkish invasion took place after the

Greek Junta's coup, many hellenocentric groups and individuals were much more reluctant to openly admit and promote their allegiance to Greece that was still blamed for giving Turkey the pretext to invade.

As discussed in detail in the next chapter, 1974 was by far the most important pivotal event for Greek Cypriots. Its importance was such that decades later it still dominates and influences the context in which political and many times social discourses take place in Cyprus. More important however is the fact that it is opportunistically used to securitize contemporary issues.

5.3.4. 1980's and 1990's: The peaceful but politically turbulent decades

The most pivotal event of the 1980's came in 1983 when the Turkish Cypriots self-declared the area north of the Green Line an independent state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). TRNC, however, was declared invalid by Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) and, as mentioned, does not enjoy international recognition with the exception of Turkey.

The exception to the otherwise very static conflict was the 'European' turn that the Cyprus conflict took in the 1990's when EU accession for the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) became a realistic goal. The Turkish side was clearly against the prospects of Cyprus entering the EU prior to a settlement, arguing that the RoC could not (legally) apply for membership (Kabaalioglou 2006) and that the EU's decision to accept the RoC's application promoted more integration between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, thus solidifying the division (Oguzlu 2002).⁶³

The 1980's and 1990's developments indicate that even during non-violent periods the zero-sum mentalities dominated the Cypriot environment. Ethnic distinction and more physical and political security vis-à-vis the other (as opposed to domination) became the

⁶³ Bahcheli and Noel (2010) have a different opinion arguing that the identity chasm between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey is growing not shrinking as Oguzlu argued.

goal for both sides. It became evident that the lack of violence did not contribute to the development of a trustful environment and it did not mitigate the fear for the future.

“As Richmond (1998: 166) notes, by that time the deadlock had become a form of a solution. Groom (1986: 140) explains how the unilateral declaration of independence of the TRNC was a victory for Turkish Cypriots, although it came at a price, namely their international isolation and heavy dependency on Turkey.”

5.3.5. The ‘European’ decade of the new millennium and the Annan Plan

The poor economic conditions in the TRNC,⁶⁴ coupled with the upcoming EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus led to mass Turkish Cypriot demonstrations and the demand for change in the areas north of the Green Line. The mass demonstrations forced the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş to engage in measures that would defuse the growing pressure. In 2003 the Turkish Cypriot leadership decided to open some crossing points that would allow for the first time since 1974 direct interaction with the ‘other’.

The opening of the crossing points and the upcoming RoC’s EU accession created the need for legal changes in regards to the movement of goods and people from the Green Line. Thus, on April 29 2004 the European Council adopted the Green Line Regulation (866/2004), which would facilitate the movement of goods and people across the ceasefire line. The transfer of goods through the Green Line may have been rather insignificant for Turkish Cypriot economy – as trade over the divide amounted to only 4% of their total exports (Watson 2007) – but the opening of the crossing points gave an important boost to the Turkish Cypriot tourism (Arslan 2006).

The most pivotal event of this decade was the 2004 so-called Annan Plan (after the former UN’s SG Kofi Annan), the most comprehensive settlement proposal since the

⁶⁴ The TRNC was (and still is) economically and politically dependent on Turkey, (Guven-Lisaniler 2002; Nugent 2000). This means that any Turkish economic and monetary problems could easily be transferred to TRNC, as was the case in 2000-2001 during the Turkish economic crisis (Theophanous 2006: 64).

beginning of the conflict.⁶⁵ After a series of negotiations between the two communities and the two motherlands, and after five different versions of the plan, the fifth and final one was put to simultaneous referenda in the northern and southern part of Cyprus for the people to decide whether they wanted the particular solution or not. On April 24 2004 the majority in the northern part (Turkish Cypriots as well as settlers) overwhelmingly accepted the plan (65%), but an even bigger Greek Cypriot majority (76%) rejected it to the disappointment of the UN and EU officials.

Thousands of pages have been written to explain the outcome of the referenda, reaching many times diametrically opposite conclusions. The Turkish Cypriot ‘yes’ for example has been explained as evidence of true goodwill for settlement on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community (e.g. Sözen and Özersay 2007), but also as an ‘easy’ choice since the Plan (according to the authors) was positively biased towards Turkish Cypriots and satisfied all the Turkish political expectations (e.g. Theophanous 2004, Venizelos et. al. 2004). The ‘yes’ vote is also explained as the outcome of a ‘rational’ win-win choice for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots given that the Greek Cypriot ‘no’ became inevitable days before the referenda (Loizides and Keskiner 2004).

The Greek Cypriot ‘no’ also has numerous and diverging explanations. Some observers argue that Greek Cypriots had no real incentives to accept the Plan and the settlement even though they did not have much to lose had they accepted it (e.g. Dodd 2004; Azgin 2006). On the opposite side there are those who argue that Greek Cypriots had too much to lose and Turkey a lot to gain. The latter group of people argued among other things that the Plan was extremely problematic, ‘un-European’ and the outcome of anglo-american machinations (Constantakopoulos 2005; Theophanous 2004, Venizelos 2004 et al.; Stavrínides). The Plan was also considered to be ‘excessively conditioned by the factor of timing’, meaning that while the timing of the Plan was in the beginning good for a comprehensive solution, as time progressed and the RoC was one step closer to becoming a ‘European State’, the Plan was becoming more obsolete and outmoded,

⁶⁵ For a very interesting and comprehensive analysis of the development of the Plan and the negotiations that led to its formation see Claire Palley (2005).

especially in regards to certain issues that were perpetuating issues of the past – e.g. treaty of guarantees (Tassopoulos 2006). Others argued that the ‘no’ had less to do with the Plan per se and so the outcome should be primarily attributed to the nationalist leaders and specifically the former President Tassos Papadopoulos who securitized the debate, convincing Greek Cypriots that it was an existential threat (Anastasiou 2007).

The next turning point took place on May 1st 2004 when the RoC became an EU member. The two things worth noting from the EU accession is the 1999 Helsinki Summit when i) the EU announced that a solution to the Cyprus problem was no longer a precondition for accession (European Council 1999, par. 9b), and ii) it confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership (ibid, par. 12). This was a milestone for the process as for the first time Greek foreign policy linked the accession negotiations with the RoC with the lifting of Greek objections for the implementation of Turkey-EC customs Unions (Attalides 2010). The second issue is the Protocol 10 of the 2003 Accession Treaty which states that the *acquis communautaire* does not apply to the areas not controlled by the RoC.⁶⁶

It is important to emphasize how neither the lack of violence after the opening of the crossing points (as many expected), nor the prospective or actual accession of the Republic to the EU were sufficient to promote a settlement. Why this is the case is discussed further below. Suffice to say for now that the settlement that was sought – namely a bi-communal federation – is the second best option for both sides (Bahcheli 2000; Nicolaides 1998).⁶⁷ It is also quite unclear whether either side wants indeed to reach such a settlement. The ‘comfortable conflict’ in Cyprus, especially on the Greek Cypriot side, makes the potential compromises necessary to reach such a solution quite

⁶⁶ The complete EU proposal is as follows for the Protocol 10 is as follows: ‘*Adopted by the Commission on 2 March.* The Commission set out the terms under which provisions of EU law apply to the demarcation line [Green Line] between the zones in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control and those in which it does not. As the application of the *acquis* in the northern part of Cyprus will be suspended pending a settlement of the Cypriot problem, in accordance with Article 1 of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession, and as the demarcation line does not constitute an external border, special rules concerning the crossing of the line by persons, goods and services need to be established. The draft, taking account of the particularity of the situation and political sensitivities on the island, covers such issues as the prevention of illegal immigration, customs, food safety, taxation and travel facilities (Commission 2004/145).’ Protocol 10 can be found at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12003T/PRO/10:EN:NOT> [accessed April 10, 2010]

⁶⁷ This is also documented by the several opinion polls (see e.g. Cyprus2015 2009).

risky and thus unlikely (Adamides and Constantinou 2012).⁶⁸ As opinion polls show, a unitary state still remains the optimal solution for Greek Cypriots (Cyprus2015 2009), and even the *status quo* might be a more preferred options than some forms of federal solutions, as seen from the outcome of the referenda in 2004. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the other hand seem to aim for an international ‘upgrade’ of the TRNC rather than a federal solution (Cyprus2015 2009).

5.4. The Cyprus conflict – what kind of a conflict is it?

The early sections of this chapter examined some of the conflict characteristics and how they contribute to the institutionalization of securitization. This section examines how Cyprus shares many of these characteristics and thus fits the ‘profile’ of protracted ethnic conflicts.

As seen from the ‘key events’ section above Cyprus is an intractable conflict. Specifically, it is intractable as it is unresolved since the 1950’s; irreconcilable and of zero sum nature, as the two sides’ goals are perceived to be diametrically opposite; it has been at some point violent; it is also ‘total’ and ‘central’, meaning that both sides believe that their existence is at stake, while elite and the public are constantly pre-occupied with the conflict. The most important variable, however, is the interest of the two communities in the continuation of the conflict. The last two points are examined with empirical evidence in much greater detail in the next chapter, along with how they contributed to the institutionalization of securitization in the island. What is worth noting is that the intractable nature of the conflict seems to make local and international actors focus on how to manage the conflict rather on how to resolve it (Richmond 1998).

⁶⁸ It is worth noting that the apparent reluctance to achieve a settlement has been a recurring theme in Cyprus. Indeed, as Groom notes (1993: 2) the lack of sense of urgency (for a solution) was evident on both sides; as a result, the UN forces in Cyprus were relatively successful in peacekeeping and conflict settlement but not in peacemaking and conflict resolution.

At the core of the conflict are the two sides' opposing interests, which are further exacerbated by the 'double minority' environment, or as Milne (2003) calls it 'double bi-communalism',⁶⁹ making thus the small island state vulnerable to external influences (Richmond 2002: 122). This environment also creates and sustains a threatening and securitized environment for both communities since both feel they are, or could be, the endangered community (Ker-Lindsay 2008). These perceptions inevitably create strong security dilemmas on both sides of the Green Line (Tassopoulos 2006).

In the vast literature on Cyprus, the problem has been examined in numerous ways: as an identity or ethno-national conflict (Papadakis et al. 2006) where Greek and Turkish Cypriots are unable to live together, either because of conflict of interests or because of conflict of identities (Theophylactou 1995; Loizou 1995); as a conflict which is formed and perpetuated because of the incompatibility of subject positions between the two sides (Diez 2002); as the outcome of regional and superpower interests and machinations (Hitchens 1984), or as a combination of the any of the above. However, attempting to explain the Cyprus case as a single-issue conflict is problematic. As Loizos (1995: 105) argues, in Cyprus there has never been a single problem, but rather a multiple sets of problems determined by a number of ways and actors. The incompatibility of positions in all areas – e.g. economics, property, governance, etc. – could be understood as a derivative of the conflicting identities and socio-psychological factors dominating each side. Similarly, the negative perceptions about the international powers' actions and the subsequent bitter feelings of both sides (Herzfeld 2006) could also be seen within the framework of an identity conflict. At the heart of the identities of the two sides are internalized perceptions regarding the intentions international actors; as demonstrated in the next chapter both sides perceive international actions as biased for 'them' and favorable to the 'other'.

The incompatibility of identities of the two sides is solidified by the deep inter-communal distrust and vice versa: the distrust feeds the incompatibility. Distrust is not only

⁶⁹ Turkish Cypriots are a minority in Cyprus, but the Greek Cypriots are also a minority if the two motherlands, Turkey and Greece, are brought into the picture.

important because it contributes to the development of conflicts (Hannes 2005), but also because it could create severe problems of communication. Indeed, in Cyprus the internalized distrust coupled with the vivid memories of pain on both sides of the Green Line has created severe problems of communication and inevitably to information failures. As Anastassiou (2002: 583) argues, 'over the decades, the conflict dynamic has led to a form of alienation that has institutionalized the interaction between the two sides psychologically, intellectually and culturally into what may be called dialectical process of non-communication'. All of the above led to what Papadakis (2006) calls 'ethnic autism', where any argument presented by the 'other' is immediately dismissed as propaganda. Both sides are thus strong believers that there is only 'our' truth and only 'their' propaganda (ibid).

Given the importance of identities in the Cyprus conflict, it is worth examining them in detail. While there is a clear distinction between Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities, there are also intra-community 'identity conflicts': On one side of the divide there is a distinction between those who 'feel' Greek and those who 'feel' Cypriot and on the other side between those who identify themselves as 'Turkish' and as 'Cypriot'. What must be noted is that the 'Cypriot' identity on each side is not necessarily the same. In other words, the people who feel 'Cypriots' on the Greek Cypriot side do not necessarily feel that they share the same identity as the Turkish Cypriots who feel just 'Cypriots'.

Within the Greek Cypriot community, the dilemma of Greek and Cypriot identity exists since the 1950's and was exacerbated in the 1960's and 1970's due to the developments mentioned earlier. The Greek Cypriot, or rather Greek and/or Cypriot, identity was never constant; on the contrary it has been changing depending on the developments (Mavratsas 1999). This evolution could be described as follows: Phase 1: hellenocentrism, which focused on the 'Greekness' of Cyprus (Attalides 1979; Salih 1968; Loizides 2007; Kitromilides 1994); phase 2: cypriotcentrism, which focused on the common identity of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and is primarily supported by the leftists (Spyrou 2001; Papadakis et. al. 2006); and phase 3: Hellenocypriocentrism, which emerged after 1974 and is an 'in-between' or 'hybrid' identity (Psaltis 2008) that inevitably has elements of

both Greek and Cypriot identity (Attalides 1979).⁷⁰ Greek Cypriots have one of these three identities and political elite ‘use’ them opportunistically when the need arises, usually by playing one identity against the other to promote specific security discourses.

On the other side of the Buffer Zone a similar situation exists. Some, including the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, argue that there are no such thing as Cypriots on the island, but just two peoples with different nationalities: Greek and Turkish. In general, the Turkish nationalist discourse claims that Turkish Cypriots are Turks; they are part of the same ethnic group (Navaro-Yashin 2006). Others argue that the past few years the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot identities are no longer in line and are drifting apart (Bahcheli and Noel 2010; Lacher and Kaymak 2005).

5.5. Issues of contention

Asking the average Greek Cypriot to tell you why the conflict has not been resolved, the answer one will get is that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are intransigent, inflexible and their requests are unjust and unreasonable. In response to the same question any Turkish Cypriot will say that Greek Cypriots have no incentive to resolve the conflict, given that they are economically well off and members of the EU, while they also fail to acknowledge the Turkish Cypriot needs and fears. This is expected, given i) the zero-sum mentalities, ii) the internalized (on both sides) perceptions of who is to be blamed and who is a source of threat for ‘us’, iii) the historical animosities and iv) the lack of sufficient communication between the two sides, at least on a public level.

The socio-psychological pre-dispositions of the people do not leave much room for convergence. As Papadakis (2006: 68) notes, ‘obsessive ethnic nationalism, one sided constructions of history focusing solely on periods or incidents of conflict, and the inability to see certain commonalities of history’ are factors of utmost importance for the

⁷⁰ For a very good analysis of the historical moments in terms of national identity construction for the Greek Cypriot community see Philippou and Klerides (2010).

perpetuation of the conflict. These are socio-psychological issues that derive primarily from the very distinct and internalized identities of the two sides, meaning that they cannot easily change; at least not without transforming the current identities. These factors also create, *inter alia*, problematic mentalities that maintain the view that one side is *always* ‘maximalist’ and ‘rejectionist’, while the other is *always* the victim and the ‘flexible’ that makes concessions aiming at the resolution of the conflict. These mentalities in turn can be easily manipulated and incorporated into routinized securitization practices on an elite and audience level.

Below is an examination of the most important conflict-perpetuating factors and areas of contention, all of which are understood and negotiated within the aforementioned ‘mental’ framework of distinct perceptions of ‘enemies’ and ‘victims’.

5.5.1. Sovereignty

The most salient issue of contention is that of sovereignty and recognition (Brewin 2000; Diez et al. 2002; Tocci 2004b; Papadakis et al. 2006). Since 1963, but much more after 1974 and even more so after 1983, the struggles for recognition and the internationalization of the problem indicate how important the notion of statehood, sovereignty and need for ethnic recognition is for the two communities. The issue of recognition is twofold: state and identity recognition. The latter usually revolves around the issue of political equality, which is the struggle to confirm each group’s worth relative to the significant other (Lindemann 2010) and in the case of Cyprus is always negotiated on the basis of ethnic identities.

The struggle for the former is more straightforward than that of identity: Turkish Cypriots are striving to receive international recognition for TRNC, or at least an upgrade similar to the one Taiwan enjoys, whereas Greek Cypriots are struggling to make such recognition, in any form, impossible and instead try to legitimize even more their international status as the only legitimate government on the island. Indicative of the

Greek Cypriot fears is that the (1960) independence was not commemorated at the beginning, but rather only after 1974 as part of the general effort to emphasize the presence of the RoC and the threats it faces from the 'other' side, the non-recognized TRNC and Turkey (Papadakis 2010).

A good starting point to understand this issue of statehood is by examining how each side perceives borders in Cyprus and more specifically the Green Line. International law considers the Green Line to be a cease-fire line, a view shared by all Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand consider the Green Line to be 'a territorial border that defines the limits of an independent state, the statehood of which is protected and maintained by the Turkish army' (Demetriou 2005: 12; see also Navaro-Yashin 2005: 109 for a similar argument). The process of crossing to the 'other' side also indicates how each side understands the concept of borders. Turkish Cypriot authorities set up premises that resemble those at any international border and require an identity card or a passport and a visa to allow anyone to cross over, creating thus the impression of entering another state.⁷¹ Greek Cypriots on the other hand have a much more 'loose' behaviour, with much less control and without asking for any proof of identity on the 'way out'. This sometimes occurs even when entering back to the government controlled areas, creating thus the impression that these are not borders but simple 'check points'.

The issue of borders and sovereignty has political spillover effects domestically as well as internationally. More specifically the Greek Cypriots (i.e. the RoC) use the international legitimacy they enjoy to point out their right for sovereignty over the whole island, which would include the areas not controlled by the Republic. It is no coincidence therefore that Greek Cypriots characterize the problem as one of 'invasion and occupation', (since the sovereignty of the country has been violated) (Stavrinides 1999: 60; Constantinou and Papadakis 2002: 86-7). As a result, a just solution for Greek Cypriots would be one that would reverse the consequences of the invasion and occupation (Stavrinides 1999: 60). Anything less constitutes unacceptable concessions.

⁷¹ The passports or identity cards are not stamped by any TRNC symbol. The 'visa' used is a piece of paper given on the spot to the person that crosses over (it is not attached to the passport or ID) and is returned to the Turkish Cypriot authorities on the way back.

Turkish Cypriots on the other hand claim sovereignty through secession over the northern part of the island and they tend to see the conflict as mainly a domestic problem of persistent 'ethnic persecution' (Constantinou and Papadakis 2002: 86-7). Consequently, a just solution for them appears to be one that would recognize the 'realities' of the post-1974 division. This argument is in line with the former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's view of the situation: that 'the Cyprus problem had been solved by him in 1974 and that nothing remained to be done except for the rest of us to come to terms with that'.⁷² These positions are also evident from bi-communal opinion polls indicating the two diametrically opposite positions on this issue: The preferred option of the Greek Cypriots is a unitary state (i.e. pre-1974 status), while Turkish Cypriots desire a two-state solution (see e.g. Cyprus2015 2009; 2010; 2011).

5.5.2. Security

The violent past, the loss of lives, the thousands of refugees from both sides, the presence of tens of thousands of troops and the perpetuation of the treaty of guarantees propel the issue of security to the top spot of the hierarchy of contention issues in Cyprus. Indeed, numerous opinion polls place the issue of security as the most important reason for accepting or rejecting a settlement (see example Lordos 2006, Cyprus2015 2009). The problem of security is exacerbated as it extends beyond the two communities; the island is also important for Turkey's geostrategic interests, while it is also considered to be important for its own security – i.e. Cyprus at Turkey's 'soft' underbelly (Kazan 2002; Birch 2003). As the former Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit stated, 'Cyprus is of indispensable strategic interest to Turkey and Ankara would not withdraw its troops from the island even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot living on it' (cited in Brey 1999). Whether such positions are expressed because Cyprus is indeed of military importance is questionable. Ker Lindsay (2008) for instance points out that Cyprus is no longer of any strategic importance for either Turkey or Greece. Similarly, Kaliber (2005) argues that such positions are mostly the outcome of ongoing securitization practices in

⁷² Bulent Ecevit was the Prime Minister of Turkey in 1974 (hence the argument that the problem was solved by him). Ecevit told this to Lord David Hanney, the UK Special Representative in Cyprus during a meeting they had in 1996 (cited in Hannay 2005).

Turkey rather than actual security concerns. Regardless, such statements are echoed constantly in the Greek Cypriot society, contributing to the perpetuation of the already distrustful environment and to the internalization of the perception that Turkey is a threat regardless of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot relationships.

5.5.3. Settlers, Refugees, Territorial Adjustments and Governance

Settlers

The number of Turkish settlers is another issue of great contention and one that creates anxiety to Greek Cypriots. It is also one of the most securitized issues in a cross-sectoral manner. Specifically, the increasing number of settlers creates (for Greek Cypriots): i) societal threats – i.e. there is the fear that the demography of the island will change putting at risk the Greek identity; ii) political threats – i.e. the settlers are expected to be much more influenced by Turkey and thus vote in (Turkish) Cypriot elections based on what is more beneficial for the latter, not necessarily for Cyprus or even the Turkish Cypriots; and iii) economic – i.e. the settlers are considered to be much poorer than both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and they could thus become a huge burden on the economy.

On an elite level the discourse on settlers focuses on the number of settlers who are to remain in Cyprus in case of a settlement. The number of settlers ranges from 50,000 to 180,000 depending on one's sources.⁷³ This issue however is not as straightforward as one would assume, as there are fundamental disagreements between the two sides on who is a settler. The Turkish Cypriot side considers the TRNC citizenship as the determining factor on who is or not Turkish Cypriot – i.e. any person, regardless of origin, could be Turkish Cypriot if he or she has a TRNC citizenship. Greek Cypriots on the other, who do not recognize the TRNC citizenship, do not accept this position arguing that Turkish Cypriots are the people who have Cypriot lineage. They do accept however some of the

⁷³ A discussion about the estimated number of settlers and an analysis on what would be reasonable estimation can be found in Appendix IV: 'Settler population calculations'. What is argued in this thesis is that the number of settlers is somewhere between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot figures, namely a little over 100,000.

realities deriving from the protracted conflict, such as the second or even third generation Turks who are not of Cypriot lineage but were born in Cyprus and lived in the island all their lives. Greek Cypriots accept that these individuals, along with others who married Turkish Cypriots, should stay in case of a settlement.

Refugees

The issue of refugees, and more specifically the number that could potentially return to the areas currently not under the control of the RoC is another thorny issue, not least because it is perceived in zero sum terms (Pfirter 2006). What is worth noting is that the issue is not only the number of people who will potentially return, but also how quickly they will return and more importantly what rights they will have when they return.

The two issues (settlers and refugees) are particularly interesting for the study of securitization and bottom-up pressures because after 1974 elite, educators and media adopted a discourse that reiterated the position that an unquestionable goal of a settlement is for all refugees to return to their homes, while all settlers would leave Cyprus. Indeed, the slogan ‘όλοι οι πρόσφυγες στα σπίτια τους και όλοι έποικοι έξω από την Κύπρο’ (all refugees to their homes and all the settlers out of Cyprus) was reiterated and internalized at all levels, elite and public alike. Subsequently, for Greek Cypriots any alternative is considered to be at best unacceptable and at worst a threat, which leads to the public demand that the issue of settlers and to a lesser degree the refugees’ return to be securitized and be treated as existential threats.

Territory and governance

Equally important are the issues of territory and governance. Both sides argue that they want a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution. As mentioned this is the second best option for both sides,⁷⁴ while their understanding and definition of bi-zonal federation is completely different (e.g. Bahcheli and Rizopoulos 1996/97; Zervakis 2006). Within the framework of bi-zonality the RoC wants a federal solution with a strong central

⁷⁴ Cyprus2015 (2009; 2010; 2011) bi-communal opinion polls.

government, while the Turkish Cypriots want essentially a confederation with equal status of both communities and a weak federal centre (Diez 2002). This difference in understanding influences significantly the negotiations on how a new federal state would be governed and specifically how much power each constituent state would have and how weak or strong the central federal government would be. Similarly, there is a very different understanding of what 'political equality' means and while both sides agree that there should be political equality, this is still one of the major issues of contention during the negotiations for governance issues. More importantly for this thesis is the fact that the lack of definitions allows for securitization of either the entire form of settlement, i.e. bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, or parts of it, e.g. the governing aspect of the settlement.

Lastly, the territorial adjustments, namely how much territory will be returned to Greek Cypriots, also receive particular attention in the negotiations. This is an issue that can be negotiated more easily not least because many Greek Cypriots came to terms that some areas are very unlikely to be returned. This not to say however that it is not an area of contention or that some Greek Cypriots still find it unacceptable that some areas will not be returned. Subsequently, the loss of territory also becomes subject of securitization.

5.6. EU-Cyprus conflict

Given the areas of contention mentioned earlier, as well as the socio-psychological factors dominating the conflict, it was not unreasonable to believe that the EU could indeed have a significant impact on the conflict. Hopes for a settlement were placed heavily on the EU and more specifically on the pre-accession period; indeed many believed that the conditions for a settlement were ripe and that period was a golden opportunity given the potential benefits of a settlement and the prospects for a unified island within the EU. This section examines the incentives for Cypriots to join the EU and the theoretical conflict resolution mechanisms of the latter. Finally it examines why the EU did not have the anticipated impact.

5.6.1. Incentives and conflict resolution mechanisms

The primary incentives behind the RoC's application were not economic, but rather political (Nugent 2006). The former Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, confirmed that 'the overall process [of accession] is subsumed under our *supreme* strategic objective, namely to end the division of the island' (Kasoulides 1999: 8, my emphasis). Greek Cypriots believed that the prospect of accession and eventual membership would change the Turkish side's incentive structure, 'forcing' it to become more flexible on the Cyprus problem, while it would also shift the balance of power in the island in favour of Greek Cypriots (Tocci 2004; 2004b; Christou 2004; Diez 2002). Membership would also provide Greek Cypriots with even more legal 'weapons' such as the liberalization of the freedom of movement, which would help tackle the Turkish demands for 'strict bi-zonality' and restrictions in the freedom of movement (Tocci 2007). But there were also other expectations related to the conflict. It would also allow Greek Cypriots to internationalize the problem even further by involving another global actor besides the UN (Christou 2004), while it would also provide additional security against any further Turkish military intervention (ibid; Tocci 2004).

The Turkish Cypriot expectations on the other hand are not as straightforward, not least because it is not them that applied for membership, but the RoC. Thus, unlike the Greek Cypriot elite, the Turkish Cypriot could not clearly articulate what benefits they could expect from the RoC's application since they considered it illegal to begin with. Regardless, it is still possible to estimate some of those expected benefits, especially after the opening of the crossing points in 2003.

The primary short and medium term incentive for Turkish Cypriot was economic. In 2000 the Greek Cypriots' GDP per capita was 2.8 times more than that of the Turkish Cypriots (Emerson and Tocci 2002). Accession for the Republic, therefore, would bring significant economic gains for the Turkish Cypriots, not only because they would receive funds from the EU, but also because there would be more investments and tourists (Nugent 2000). This would be particularly the case after 2003 with the opening of the crossing points and the relative free movement of people and capital across the Green

Line. In addition, Turkish Cypriots recognized that they would not become 'European citizens' with either a Turkish or TRNC citizenship; the only alternative would be through the RoC, since they have the right to acquire the Republic's (and thus EU) passports with all the benefits this entails.

It is relatively easy to see what the Greek and Turkish Cypriots expected to gain from accession. A more challenging question is what were the EU incentives to accept a conflict-ridden state into its family. First of all, it must be noted that there should be a distinction between the expectations of the EU *as a whole* and of those of specific member-states. On one hand, as Tocci (2007: 28) argues, the 'EU interests [as a single actor] in the Cyprus conflict are defined in relation to its wider concerns for peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean'. Similarly, Brewin (2000: 3) argues that 'after the end of the Berlin wall, the end of the Green Line would be a step towards a "frontier free" Europe'. The idea was that Cyprus would be an extension of the 'community method' to the resolution of conflicts (ibid: 4). A solution to the Cyprus conflict would also increase the chances for peace between Turkey and Greece (Tocci 2007), making thus the European neighbourhood even safer.

On the other hand there were specific member states that had a special interest in the Cyprus case. Above all was Greece's insistence to include Cyprus in the eastern enlargement wave, threatening to block the entire eastern enlargement process should the Cypriot application be rejected (Brewin 2000). The British also had a special interest in Cyprus mainly because of their colonial past and because of the two sovereign bases they still have on the island. They supported Cyprus' accession but were against any EU involvement in the conflict, as any EU involvement would complicate things and dilute their own power as a key player (Tocci 2007). Other member states that are generally negative towards Turkey's prospects for accession (such as France) had an interest in Cyprus' accession because they could use the lack of resolution as an excuse for rejecting or delaying Turkey's accession in the future. This is obviously just a hypothesis that can neither be easily proved nor openly uttered by either Cypriots or other Europeans. It is however emphasized frequently in the Greek Cypriot press and unofficial discourses.

The EU attempted to influence the conflict in more than the expected traditional direct way, namely by changing the incentive structure of parties involved. It also tried through what Diez et. al. (2006; 2008) call the ‘enabling pathway’, meaning that it provided the elite with reference points in order to legitimize conflict-diminishing policies without having significant domestic political costs (ibid). These reference points allow actors from both sides ‘to link their political agenda with the EU and through reference to integration, justify desecuritizing moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate’ (Diez et al. 2006), or according to Hill, ‘governments [are] able to resist their own nationalists by constraints of EU membership’ (2001: 315). This pathway was used frequently prior to 2004 but much less afterwards. As discussed in detail in chapter 6, the deeply securitized environment and the securitization routines did not allow for the enabling impact to have the wanted outcome, as horizontal and bottom-up forces were too strong for the elite to efficiently use the enabling pathway. Indeed, the failure of the EU to act as an ‘enabling agent’ is an indication on the impact institutionalized securitization processes could have on the perpetuation of such protracted conflict environments.

5.6.2. Why the EU did not have the expected impact

Obviously the EU was not successful since there is no settlement to the conflict. Some of the most obvious reasons relate to the zero sum mentality already discussed and more specifically to the exclusive positions of both sides, which blame the ‘other’ side of being unwilling to make any concessions. These factors revolve around the nature of the conflict. As Diez (2002) argues, the conflict has very modern characteristics, as opposed to the EU and its approaches that are rather postmodern. As the argument goes, if Cyprus is not ‘postmodernized’ (i.e. if the modern characteristics persist) there are no chances of coming to a sustainable resolution (ibid). According to Diez, it is the very nature of the Cyprus problem, i.e. the fact that is based on two exclusive identities more than anything else that makes it a ‘modern’ conflict (ibid). Along this line Diez and Tocci (2010) argue that Cyprus has only partially become Europeanized and the Cypriot identity can only be

postmodernized only if the Turkish Cypriots become (fully) part of the EU as well (ibid; Diez 2002b). Part of this conflict is an issue already discussed, namely the importance of Cyprus for Turkey. Whether or not Cyprus' importance for Turkey was indeed based on military considerations or was only symbolic and the outcome of securitization is not as important. Either way it was wrong for the EU to assume that Turkey would not be willing to 'sacrifice its perspective for membership for the sake of maintaining a "puppet regime" in northern Cyprus' (Rhein 2002).

Other factors revolve around the EU's structural limitations. Eralp and Beriker (2005: 188) for instance argue that the EU's 'structural prevention mechanisms correspond to a very rigid and limited set of foreign policy actions, whereas the nature of the dispute required a more sophisticated and complex approach to foreign policy'. In other words, the authors argue that there were insufficient conflict transformation activities, such as the creation of common values among parties. More specifically, even though the EU created a structural prevention mechanism using the enlargement process to change the incentive system in Cyprus, it neglected to tackle the conflict transformation aspect (ibid: 177), limiting its chances for becoming a successful resolution catalyst. Another structural problem was the way the EU chose to change the incentive structure. As Tocci argues, the EU did not, and maybe could not, change the incentive structure of the conflicting parties because it did not, or could not, act as a 'single and coherent actor' (Tocci 2004: 19). Despite what seemed to be a well thought-out policy towards Cyprus and Turkey, in reality the 'EU's decisions were the result of an aggregation of internal and external actors and factors', while the policy outcomes were influenced by both internal (Greek national interests) as well as external factors (e.g. US interests) (ibid: 141).

Other factors are the outcome of the two aforementioned arguments. The EU's limited understanding of the nature of the conflict coupled with the absence of structural mechanisms led to a series of faulty assumptions and mistakes on behalf of the EU. One of the EU's mistakes was that it did not realize that Turkish Cypriots considered the Union to be a biased 'non-third party' actor which according to them was working to

facilitate a Greek Cypriot solution (Diez 2002; Tocci 2004). This perception was especially strong prior to 2003, even though many still believe that this is still the case. Needless to say that Greek Cypriots do not accept this position, claiming that they had every right to become EU members and they should not be held hostages to Turkey's intransigency (Brewin 2000: 138; Tocci 2004: 139), a view that was shared at the time of negotiations by the Union.⁷⁵

A second mistake was the EU's miscalculation on how much accession could decrease significantly the opportunity cost of a solution, or what Tocci (2004) calls BATNA – Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. As the argument goes, EU membership reduced the cost of non-solution for the Greek Cypriots, since the alternative – i.e. the *status quo* – was not as bad as it used to be; there is in other words a comfortable conflict or a state of cold peace (Adamides and Constantinou 2012).⁷⁶ After 2003 and much more after 2004 the Turkish Cypriots' view of the *status quo* also changed significantly since they too became better off from the RoC accession. This was because they were still autonomous (i.e. under the TRNC administration), but they could still get most of the EU benefits as Cypriot citizens. Overall, the high BATNAs on both sides inevitably made concessions scarce and improbable.

The last faulty assumption concerns one of the EU's strongest 'cards', namely the economic incentives of both membership and settlement of the conflict. The EU assumed that the political and security issues were of secondary importance compared to better economic conditions (Diez 2002). The assumption was that economic security would undermine all other security concerns for Turkish Cypriots (i.e. societal and political), but as Diez argues this assumption was problematic, not least because the Turkish Cypriots' conditions, as harsh as they may be, are acceptable to them and they would still prefer direct trade and international recognition to any EU financial assistance (ibid). Christou,

⁷⁵ The European Council's decision was to proceed with the RoC's accession regardless of a settlement. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm [accessed May 2, 2009].

⁷⁶ This is not a position that any political elite would be willing to admit as in theory they are all committed to a settlement, and any other view would have political costs. This is an issue that is examined in greater detail in chapter 6.

who partly agrees with Diez, also concluded that ‘for the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite the issue was predominantly about societal security and identity’ and not so much about economics (2004: 175). But Christou also concluded that the public was more convinced by the prospective economic benefits from EU accession – even though they did not see the issues of identity and security as less important – and thus disagreed with their own leadership (ibid: 176); this is what led to the 2003 mass demonstrations.

What could be argued with certainty is that the prospects for a stronger economy in case of a settlement, as many have argued (e.g. Watson 2007; Cilsal, Antoniadou-Kyriakou and Mullen 2008; 2009; 2010) did not influence Greek Cypriots into voting in favour of the Annan Plan. This can be explained in part by the already comfortable conditions that most Greek Cypriots live in and the fact that other security concerns (societal, political and military) are of much greater importance than the economy. The most important reason however for disregarding the potential economic benefits concerns the perceived threats deriving from the specific settlement. These threats were, as argued in detail in chapter 6, the outcome of institutionalized securitization.

5.7. Conclusion

The contemporary history of the island helps elucidate how and why the conflict has always revolved around the two distinct ethnic identities and why there is such an internalized zero-sum environment that limits the prospects for resolution. Similarly, the summary of the opposing views on what caused and maintains the conflict sheds light on why threats are so deeply internalized and subsequently why they can relatively easily be part of a routinized securitization discourse. Chapter 6 builds on this chapter and elucidates, using specific examples, why these perceptions have become part of the routinized securitization discourse and how they open the door for horizontal and bottom-up securitization.

Understanding the EU resolution mechanisms and the failure of the former to have a significant impact on the conflict acts as a base to understand how a securitized

environment, when coupled with identity-related grievances and the conflict routines that are maintained for ontological security purposes, could limit the ability of local, international and regional organizations to influence the development of the conflict. Indeed, in Cyprus, as is the case in other conflict cases, ‘heavy footprint’ international interventions could and do create more local resistance and much more securitizing acts than anticipated.⁷⁷ As the argument goes, the more institutionalized the securitization process is, the more resistance international actors will face.

⁷⁷ For an analysis on heavy and light footprint interventions and their link to local resistance see Newman 2009.

Chapter 6: Institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization in the Cyprus conflict framework

This chapter connects the previous chapters by linking the literature on ethnic conflicts and the case study (chapter 5) with that of securitization (chapter 2) and provides empirical support for the conceptual framework and hypotheses as outlined in chapter 3. It is worth reiterating that while the evidence is limited to one case study the findings are to some extent generalizable and could therefore have relevance to other similar environments. As demonstrated in chapter 5, the Cyprus Problem is a ‘typical’ protracted ethnic conflict meaning that the findings can be extrapolated into more generalizable arguments that link specific social contexts and the development of institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization.⁷⁸

The chapter is separated into two broad parts. The first section tackles the first hypothesis and provides empirical support for the three-step institutionalization process. The second part deals with the other two hypotheses and provides evidence on how and why horizontal, bottom-up and ‘involuntary’ securitization take place.

6.1. Institutionalization process

The first hypothesis argues that it is possible, under some conditions, for the process of securitization to become institutionalized. As explained in chapter 3, the term ‘institutionalization’ in this thesis refers to the process through which securitization becomes part of the community’s political and social routines to the degree that they are ‘formalized’ and ‘automated’. Thus, securitizing acts become part of the actors’ routines leading to continuous and rarely interrupted securitization attempts. In turn, this

⁷⁸ It must be noted that I do not make the argument that all ethnic conflicts are identical. Indeed, it is acknowledged that each protracted ethnic conflict has distinct variables (e.g. specific relationships between opposing parties). However, the social context and characteristics in such environments are very similar, and subsequently so is their impact on the securitization processes.

routinized process is incorporated into the audience's daily lives leading to an environment where securitizing acts are both expected and many times demanded and where they are often accepted without significant negotiation between actors and audiences.

As discussed in chapter 3, the three steps through which securitization could change from an ad hoc process to an institutionalized one are: i) the birth stage, ii) the unchallenged period and iii) the institutionalization phase. Each of these stages is examined below using Cyprus, and more specifically the Greek Cypriot side, as a case study.

Stage 1: Birth

The first stage refers to pivotal events that generate an environment in which no doubt exists, within the entire or significant part of the society, of what constitutes a threat. Such a pivotal event for Greek Cypriots was the Turkish invasion in 1974, which led to an unchallenged and unquestionable perception of what constitutes the biggest Greek Cypriot threat, namely Turkey and more specifically the Turkish military.⁷⁹ There have been also other pivotal events that did not involve violence but were still significant enough to generate strong perceptions regarding potential threats. Such pivotal events were the 1960 constitution with the related political deadlocks and bi-communal fighting and more recently the 'Annan Plan'.

A pivotal event could be either a one-time incidence (e.g. Turkish invasion), or an entire period of political discourse with or without a 'tangible' outcome (e.g. Annan Plan period). Regardless, the outcome is the same: the emergence of an unchallenged period for what constitutes a threat for the entire population, as was the case with invasion, or significant parts of it, as was the case with the Annan Plan. These events are so pivotal that they form the foundation for future political and social agendas when it comes to potential threats. This is evident from the fact that for all post-event elections, presidential, parliamentary or for MEPs, the focal point remains the Cyprus problem and

⁷⁹ For Turkish Cypriots the equivalent would be a series of events during the 1963-67 period as discussed in chapter 5.

since 2004 the Annan Plan. An indicative example is a 2013 Presidential campaign event – with invited speakers including the President of the Parliament, Yiannakis Omirou, the former Foreign Minister (and 2013 Presidential candidate) Yiorgos Lillikas and the well-known academic Van Koufoudakis – entitled ‘From Annan 5 to Annan 6: Is there another way?’.⁸⁰ Despite the fact that the Annan Plan failed and it is no longer (officially at least) on the negotiations table, the event was so pivotal that it is part of all elite discourses, while it has also become the ‘standard’ with which all other potential settlement efforts are compared with.

Pivotal events vary in magnitude and subsequently on how they are securitized. In the case of the 1974 intervention for instance, the severity of the Turkish military actions (i.e. loss of Greek Cypriot control of 37% of the territory, displacement of one third of the population and the death of several thousand people) was so significant that eliminated the need for any actor or political entrepreneur to securitize it. There was no need for ‘negotiation’ between actors and audiences to establish which referent objects were under threat or what the source of threat was. That does not mean that there is no securitization; indeed there is constant securitization, albeit there is no negotiation as there is no need to ‘convince’ an audience. Any form of negotiation that takes place is to remind audiences of the threats and of the agents able to handle them.

In the other cases however, when the event is pivotal but also unclear on why it constitutes a threat, securitizing actors have a more active role to play. The Annan Plan for example was indeed pivotal and thus central for the society as a whole but, unlike the invasion, there was no consensus either among the elite or the audiences on why this was the case. During that period (2003-2004) the audiences and securitizing actors were divided as to what constitutes a threat; it was not clear in other words whether accepting or rejecting the Plan would create more existential threats for Greek Cypriots.⁸¹ Precisely

⁸⁰ ‘Από το Ανάν 5 στο Ανάν 6: Υπάρχει άλλος δρόμος;’ Details for the event can be found at <http://www.yiorgoslillikas.com/> [accessed April 2, 2012].

⁸¹ Indicatively of the opposing opinions, President Papadopoulos and other elite claimed that the implementation of the Plan would lead to the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, the President of DISY (and 2013 Presidential candidate) and Yiannakis Kasoulides, an MEP, argued that a

because of this ambiguity some parts of the population (elite and audiences) had very strong and unchanging perceptions of what constituted a threat, while others did not. In such cases, given the importance of the event and the possibility for ‘convincing’, there is significant negotiation between actors and audiences, as well as between audiences (i.e. horizontal securitization).

Inevitably the ‘birth stage’ is a period of ‘hyper-securitization’: this is a period when an entire society and subsequently the securitizing actors and audiences are constantly pre-occupied with the pivotal event related threats. During the period leading to the Annan Plan referenda for instance the securitizing actors increased significantly and included journalists in major newspapers, academics, literally all political elites, the President of the Republic, and more importantly each individual, regardless of social capital, who became a securitizing actor aiming to influence his/her immediate periphery. Similarly, references to the pivotal event (e.g. Annan Plan) dominated political, media and public discussions. Indicatively, in the month leading to the referenda all newspapers had, on a daily basis, Plan-related issues as headline news. The audience inevitably also engaged in a mode of ‘hyper-securitization’ in the sense that it was constantly ‘bombarded’ with potential threats and thus became particularly passionate and opinionated about threats deriving from the specific event. This passion is often manifested as an echo of the elite and media positions and frequently develops into horizontal securitization among peers.

These kinds of events are also pivotal because they remain in the political and social discourses for a long period as seen from the example above for the Lillikas presidential campaign. This means that they shape to a degree the social context in which future securitization will take place. Pivotal events therefore create a form of ‘path dependency’ as securitizing actors link potential future threats to past events, while they are also themselves linked to the way they handle or position themselves vis-à-vis that event.

rejection of the Plan would be a ‘second Asia Minor destruction’ for Greek Cypriots (see e.g. www.parliament.cy/parliamentgr/008_01/praktiko2005-12-14.doc)

Stage 2: Unchallenged Period.

The essence of the unchallenged period is that elite and audience are either unwilling to question the generally accepted perceptions regarding perceived pivotal event-related security threats, or they adamantly support specific positions related to the event. Its importance lies in the fact that it opens the door for un-negotiated securitization between actors and (some) audiences, while it also allows for horizontal processes among the audiences. These periods may be either short, albeit very intense (as was the case during the Annan Plan period), or long-term with diminishing intensity (as was the case with the 1974 invasion). Either way this period is sufficient to make certain issues so 'central' for securitizing actors and audiences that they incorporate them into their routines until they eventually become institutionalized. Thus stages 2 and 3 could run concurrently since the internalization of perceived threats and their incorporation into social routines is a slow and incremental process and the rate at which it takes place is not uniform throughout the population or for each pivotal event. What is worth noting is that these issues are self-reinforcing in the sense that the longer they remain unchallenged (or enjoy strong support), the more difficult it is to challenge them in the future or even remove them from the routines, making therefore desecuritization or less securitization particularly difficult.

The most indicative unchallenged period in Cyprus was the one following the invasion when no politician or media 'dares' to this day question i) whether Turkey is indeed a threat for Greek Cypriots, ii) the official discourse which dictates that the Problem is one of 'invasion and occupation' and iii) that the fault for the non-settlement is all on Turkey and its allies, namely the British and Americans. Decades later this position is still unchallenged by all Greek Cypriot political parties,⁸² indicating how central the specific

⁸² For the official positions on the Cyprus problem (re-iterating what was mentioned above) of the five Parliamentary Parties, almost four decades after the pivotal event, see: 'AKEL's position on the Cyprus Problem', National Council 15-17 February 2012 [available at www.akel.org.cy] (accessed February 20, 2012); 'Speech by Nicos Anastasiades' (President of DISY), Parliament, February 24, 2012 [available at www.disy.org.cy] (accessed February 28, 2012); 'DIKO - Pancyprian Tactical Conference: Principles Framework and Political Goals', March 14, 2009 [available at www.diko.org.cy] (accessed February 28, 2012); 'EDEK - 12th Pancyprian Tactical Conference: The Cyprus Problem; Strategy change now', May 5 and 6, 2012 [available at www.edek.org.cy] (accessed February 28, 2012); 'Green Party positions in

pivotal event and its subsequent consequences is for the elite and public alike. Indeed, the Cyprus Problem has been so central for Greek Cypriots that it became part of their identity; every development, be it political, economic or issues pertinent to natural resources (e.g. natural gas), revolves around the Problem. Loizos (2010: 11) offers an indication of this centrality when he points out that ‘if we were to carry out a simple numerical count of the vast literature of the last 75 years about Cyprus, it is a safe bet that at least 95% of it would be connected with “The Cyprus Problem” and would be about the actions of states and their leaders, policies and political programs’. Similarly, he also argues that the daily newspapers would, until the mid 1980’s, almost always have on their front page news related to the Cyprus problem. While this would not be surprising for the immediate period following any pivotal event of such nature, it is not expected to enjoy such centrality three or four decades later, especially when the conflict is a ‘comfortable one’ with economic and social prosperity and no concrete reasons for physical insecurity. The Cyprus Problem however remained the focus of all major media and political agents even after three decades indicating once again how a pivotal event could lead at the beginning to an unchallenged period and later to routinized behavior. As argued in detail later, for the period 2003-2009 (i.e. over three decades after the 1974 event) the front page of the most circulated newspapers in the Greek Cypriot side dealt with the Cyprus problem on average every two out of three days. This pre-occupation with the conflict cannot therefore be attributed solely to the direct impact of the conflict – given that the conflict does not have an impact on the population on a daily basis – but rather to the way the conflict has influenced the development of the society and the people’s identities that have incorporated the conflict.

This ‘conflict obsession’ creates a ‘chicken and egg’ question, namely whether people tend to desire constant briefing on the developments because the Cyprus problem is so important (central) to them, or whether it is important for them precisely because the papers and political elite pay so much attention to it. Regardless, the conflict remains so central, I argue, because of the constant and institutionalized securitization. The argument

National Council’ September 14, 2010 [www.available at www.greenpartycy.com] (accessed February 28, 2012).

therefore should not necessarily revolve around why institutionalization occurred but rather how the securitization processes are influenced once it has occurred.

The unchallenged period of other events, such as the Annan Plan, cannot be equated with the 1974 event. However – and even though the Plan did not even come into effect – the (perceived) potential threats deriving from the Plan rendered the April 2004 period a pivotal event. As already noted, eight years later it is still the focal point for future presidential elections. In addition and more importantly the outcome of any future negotiations or even the perpetuation of the status quo is almost always compared to the Annan Plan in order to emphasize how good or bad alternatives they are. Indicatively, one of the most influential Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Chrysostomos, in an attempt to emphasize the negative developments of the negotiations noted in an interview on May 2nd 2011 (i.e. 7 years after the referenda) that ‘if by chance anything comes out of these negotiations it will be three times worse than the Annan Plan’.⁸³ In this case the Archbishop argues that the Annan Plan was extremely negative for Greek Cypriots and developments would be even worse, using thus the Plan as a ‘negative reference point’ with which future options should be compared. Similarly, but with a positive spin is President’s Christofias main political advisor, Tomazos Tsielepis, who argued during the 2008 presidential race campaign that he does not believe ‘that it is possible for us [i.e. Greek Cypriots] to have in front of us a fundamentally better Plan’ [...].⁸⁴ In this case the connotation is that the best option for Greek Cypriots was the Annan Plan and thus any future negotiation outcomes should be accepted if they resemble those of the Plan. In both cases the Annan Plan set the bar for future negotiations; for some the bar was very low and must be raised significantly while for others it was already quite high. The Annan Plan example demonstrates that during the second stage events may not be unchallenged per se, but they could be supported or opposed fervently.

⁸³ ‘Και αν παρελπίδα βγει κάτι από τις συνομιλίες νομίζω ότι θα είναι τρισευχρότερο από το Σχέδιο Ανάν’ (Sky, 2011, my translation).

⁸⁴ ‘Δεν πιστεύω ότι είναι δυνατόν να έρθει ένα ουσιωδώς καλύτερο Σχέδιο μπροστά μας’ (Aropsi 2009, my translation)

Stage 3: Institutionalization

The third stage commences during the ‘unchallenged period’, when threats start becoming internalized and conflict-related routines are created. This is done primarily through constant securitization, which in turn leads back to the perpetuation of those routines, therefore creating a vicious cycle of constant securitization and the inability to eliminate specific perceived threats from the political and social environment. The two together contribute towards the continuation of the unchallenged period as the constant securitization makes any challenge an even more difficult task. The third stage, which institutionalizes those routines, leads to the perpetuation of the second stage as well (i.e. certain issues remain unchallenged or are fervently supported or opposed). Similarly, unless there is a change in stage 2 (i.e. a challenge on the existing perceptions), it is highly unlikely that there can be any change in the institutionalization stage.

Both communities, but especially the Greek Cypriot one, have been in the third phase for a number of decades. This is evident not only from the perpetuation of the official ‘national discourse’ regarding the Problem as noted above, but also from the attention conflict-related issues receive in the papers. The fact that over three decades after the invasion 65% of the headline news are related to the Cyprus Problem is indicative of how necessary the conflict remains for the public; it is in other words the issue that attracts most public attention.⁸⁵ For Greek Cypriots the most securitized issue is that of the Turkish guarantees; an issue that always occupies a top spot on the political elite agenda. The guarantees, as is evident from almost all opinion polls, is by far the most important reason for Greek Cypriots for rejecting or accepting a settlement, while it was also one of the primary factors for rejecting the Annan Plan.⁸⁶ There are the kind of issues that become so internalized as threats that the audience may actually expect its elite to keep securitizing them because constant securitization creates a sense that they are treated with the importance they deserve.

⁸⁵ Statistics regarding the frequency of specific issues as they appear in the press are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

⁸⁶ This issue is revisited in greater detail later in this chapter.

The internalization of issues such as the guarantees and potential TRNC recognition by the audience can be to a degree quantified as is evident from the opinion polls as well as from the academic survey conducted for this thesis. Opinion polls conducted by bi-communal NGOs and major television stations over the period of 2009-2011 demonstrate clearly that certain issues remain of utmost importance for Greek Cypriots. Table 6.1. below demonstrates this argument using a 3-grade ranking system to summarize the findings of these polls with the ‘grades’ ranging from ‘Very Important’ to ‘Important’ ‘Not Important’.⁸⁷ It is worth noting that by far the most important concern for Greek Cypriots is that of security, which was ranked first in all opinion polls.

Table 6.1. Opinion polls summary

Issues	Cyprus 2015 (2009)	CEPS 2009	Cyprus2015 (2009)	Cyprus 2015 (2010)	cyprus 2015 (2011)
Security issues	VI	VI	VI	VI	VI
Property	VI	I	I	I	I
Territory	I	I	I	I	I
Settlers	VI	VI	VI	VI	VI
Refugees to return	VI	VI	VI	I	I
Economy	NI	NI	NI	NI	NI
V.I.	Very Important				
I	Important				
N.I.	Not Important				

The summary above also demonstrates that the public diachronically perceives the same issues as more or less important. It is thus not a coincidence that the political and media elite constantly focus on them, making them part of their routinized securitization agenda.

⁸⁷ Given that each opinion poll did not ask identical question, I grouped the issues based on the overall context. For instance questions pertinent to Turkish intervention guarantees and the presence of the Turkish army were grouped into the ‘security category’. Questions in these groups could be: “how important do you consider the abolition of the Turkish guarantees?”; or “how unacceptable/acceptable do you find the perpetuation of the Turkish guarantees as part of a settlement?”; or in a question that asked “what are you incentives for voting in favor of a settlement” and the answers included “the abolition of Turkish guarantees” or “the withdrawal of the Turkish army”. I then ranked the issues from Very Important to Not Important depending on their ‘ranking’ in the opinion polls. Some questions were ranked in the survey (e.g. in cases where the questions asked for the most important incentives; these issues were ranked based on importance). In other cases, I ranked them myself based on the data. For instance, if 96% of the people found the perpetuation of Turkish guarantees entirely unacceptable, but only 70% found territorial related issues unacceptable, then the former would be ranked as ‘Very Important’, while the latter as ‘Important’.

Indeed, as shown later these are issues that constantly appear as headline news in the Press and are constantly discussed in political debates, while parties make a conscious effort to frequently emphasize how important they are for them.⁸⁸ The reverse argument could also be true, namely that the public is concerned with the same issues precisely because they are constantly securitized; this is a similar ‘chicken and egg’ question discussed earlier. The answer to this question remains unchanged: regardless of the ‘causality direction’ some issues are being presented as threats in an institutionalized manner and the public seems to routinely and unquestionably accept them and even expect them.

The argument of institutionalized securitization is corroborated by the academic survey conducted for the thesis that clearly indicates that many Greek Cypriot academics are unwilling to cooperate with Turkish Cypriot colleagues out of fear of recognizing the TRNC, while at the same time some of them even engage in horizontal securitization to stop other Greek Cypriot colleagues from cooperating with Turkish Cypriots.⁸⁹ This is particularly interesting and indicative of how influential institutionalized securitization is. While it is impossible for individuals to recognize an entity or state (e.g. TRNC) – an issue that was also brought up in the focus groups discussions with academics – the subject of recognition has been so routinely securitized that even the most highly educated part of the population has internalized the threat and thus accepts and reiterates the relevant securitizing acts. Even the academics that have cooperated with Turkish Cypriots were not comfortable with the issue of recognition. Only half of them (51%) cooperated in the areas *not* controlled by the Republic. Of the remaining half that did not engage in any cooperation activities in the areas north of the Buffer Zone, 53% of them said they would *not* do so in the future. This is an indication that even those academics who are willing to have a more open relationship with the ‘other’ are influenced by the routinized securitization of specific issues.

⁸⁸ Several examples are provided later in this chapter that demonstrate the conscious efforts of elite and parties to demonstrate their ‘focus’ on the important issues.

⁸⁹ Specifically, 65% of the academics who did *not* cooperate with Turkish Cypriots rated the option (out of 8 possible options on why they did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots) ‘I do not want to recognize the TRNC’ as very important. This was by far the most popular choice. It is worth noting that Greek Cypriots perceive recognition-related issues as part of the overall security issue.

In conclusion, once the process reaches the third stage the process of securitization becomes 'automatic' or heavily routinized in the sense that there is a repetitive behavior by the securitizing actors and audiences alike in an 'automated' manner. Furthermore, once issues are institutionalized they cannot easily be desecuritized. This is evident from the fact that even though the RoC became an EU member thereby strengthening its political power and security, Greek Cypriots are still deeply concerned about issues of security and recognition and 'demand' their securitization. Similarly, the change of leadership from so-called hardliner Papadopoulos to the pro-reconciliation leftist Christofias had no impact on the perpetuation of the dominating perceived threats. There was no change towards a desecuritized or less securitized environment; indeed, even Christofias and the ruling party AKEL securitize the same issues, which is an indication that they have adapted to the deeply securitized social context, despite their conciliatory and desecuritizing rhetoric.

Having demonstrated that pivotal events could lead to institutionalized securitization the following section, using again the Cyprus conflict, examines in greater detail the conditions under which institutionalization could take place and the impact the latter has on the process.

6.3. Institutionalization impact on the securitization process

This section examines the importance of social context – with the focus on ethnic conflicts – as an integral variable in the development of institutionalized and the subsequent different forms of securitization. It deals therefore with the other two hypotheses, namely that i) once institutionalized, securitization need not be always a top-down process but could also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal; and ii) that the institutionalization of securitization induces actors and audience alike to engage in 'involuntary' actions.

6.3.1. Ethnic conflict environments: providing the context for institutionalization

The mainstream reading of securitization is all about ‘who can “do” or “speak” security successfully, under what conditions and with what effect’ (Buzan et al. 1998). This section deals with the ‘under what conditions’ part of this definition and more specifically with the context found in protracted ethnic conflicts. The latter are of particular importance precisely because they provide the necessary conditions for institutionalization to take place. These conditions include, inter alia, competing ethnic identities, zero sum mentalities and internalized negative perceptions about the ‘other’ and as Kelman (1997) points out inter-societal processes of ethnic struggles, which are part of the people’s daily lives even when there is no violence.

Why intractable conflicts: As seen in chapter 5 three of the most important characteristics of intractable conflicts are: i) that they are ‘central’, meaning that members of society are constantly preoccupied by it; ii) that they are ‘total’, meaning that what is (perceived to be) at stake is the existence of one or both sides; and iii) that all parties involved have an interest in the conflict perpetuation (Bar-Tal 1998; 2000). All three are integral variables for the development of institutionalized securitization as they contribute to the emergence of a setting where actors such as political elite and media agents have a vested interest in perpetuating the securitized environment, contributing thus to the creation of conflict-perpetuating routines. The next section provides empirical evidence from Cyprus demonstrating the existence of the three aforementioned characteristics and how they influence the development of institutionalized securitization.

Centrality and constant pre-occupation of the conflict (characteristics i & ii): How ‘central’ is the Cyprus conflict and how pre-occupied are Cypriots with it? Evidence shows that the answer to both questions is ‘very much’. The degree of ‘centrality’ could be determined through qualitative approaches (e.g. focus groups, interviews, etc.), as well as through quantitative ones; the thesis uses both approaches with particular emphasis on the latter. The quantification of ‘centrality’ took place through a press analysis for the period 2003-2009 and specifically by measuring the frequency and focus of Problem-

related issues in the daily press and through an analysis of several public opinions. The quantitative findings are corroborated by data gathered from personal interviews and focus groups.

Indicative of the centrality of the Problem is the fact that that *all* Greek Cypriot newspapers have a daily ‘permanent’ section on politics that is dedicated solely to the developments of the Cyprus problem. This section is within the first seven pages of the newspapers, indicating how important the conflict is for the papers and evidently for the readers as well. It is also interesting that this section occupies at least three full pages regardless if there are any significant developments or not. These facts alone are indicative of the centrality of the Problem. However, to test the ‘centrality’ of the Problem more concretely I examined the front pages of the three most widely circulated Greek Cypriot newspapers to measure how many times Problem-related issues appear as headline news.⁹⁰

Table 6.2. Frequency of Cyprus-conflict related headlines

	Frequency (absolute numbers)	Frequency (Percentage)	Valid Percent
NO Reference	817	34.7%	35.1%
Reference	1,506	63.9%	64.7%
Total	2,326	98.7%	100.0%
No newspapers	30	1.3%	
Total	2,356	100.0%	

As summarized in Table 6.2.⁹¹ above the 2003-2009 examination period amounts to a total of 2,356 days, out of which 2,326 (or 99%) were ‘valid’ days, meaning there were

⁹⁰ For methodological details and the reasoning behind the choice of the three papers see chapter 4.

⁹¹ As noted in the methodology chapter the headlines analysis did not examine all three papers for each day. Each day the focus was on one of the three papers, rotating every two months - e.g. Phileleftheros January and February 2004; Simerini March and April 2004; Politis May and June 2004. The rotation then extended to the years - e.g. Simerini January and February 2005; Politis March and April 2005 and Phileleftheros

newspapers available for those days.⁹² Approximately 65% of the 2,326 days, the three major newspapers had Cyprus conflict related issues as *headline* news.⁹³ This is a particularly significant percentage, considering that the examination period is over three decades after the pivotal event of 1974, demonstrating clearly how central and total the Problem is for Greek Cypriots. The percentage would have been even higher if it were not for some ‘non-regular’ events that temporarily received a lot of front-page attention. Indicative examples of such irregular events were the Helios airline crash in 2005, which killed 121 Greek Cypriots and the elections in 2006 for a new Archbishop.⁹⁴ It must be noted that the argument made here is *not* that the newspapers focus on the 1974 invasion per se every day. The focus is instead on the consequences of that event, some of which are still very real today. That said, what is argued here is that those consequences and the negotiations developments receive disproportionate attention in the media compared to the impact they actually have on the people’s daily lives. This is an indication that the Problem is part of the people’s identity and that the constant focus on it is, more than anything else, the outcome of institutionalized routines.

Table 6.3. below shows a more detailed analysis of the frequency of conflict-related news for each paper. While all newspapers have regular referencing to the Problem in their first page Phileleftheros, the most popular paper, stands out.⁹⁵ Whether Phileleftheros is the most popular paper because it makes more reference to the Cyprus conflict cannot be determined from this analysis, but it is certainly an interesting outcome. However, the

May and June 2005. This way it was assured that each paper would be examined at least two times for each month during this period.

⁹² The days after major holidays such May 1st and January 1st there are no newspapers.

⁹³ For more details on the methodology, especially on what qualifies as ‘headlines’ and examples of ‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ days’ see chapter 4.

⁹⁴ The elections for a new Archbishop are ‘irregular’ events as they only take place when an Archbishop passes away. Indicative of how rare such elections are is the fact that since the Cyprus independence in 1960 there have been only two elections – the first in 1977 and the second in 2006.

⁹⁵ These percentages in a much bigger sample could have been somewhat different. For instance, the random selection of Politis for August 2005 (the month of the Helios airline crash) yielded many ‘negative’ results for that paper, reducing thus the Politis positive ‘reference percentage’ – specifically the Helios case reduced the percentage by approximately 2-3%. Had Phileleftheros or Simerini been selected for that year/month, they too would have yielded many negative results as such events were front-page news in all papers. However, the overall percentage for all three papers (65%) would not have been significantly different.

fact that it remains the most circulated paper is an indication that it offers what the majority wants, which evidently is a focus on the Cyprus problem.

Table 6.3. Cross-tabulation of newspapers and frequency⁹⁶

Newspaper	NO / YES		Total	Reference Frequency
	0	1		
Phileleftheros	182	587	769	76%
Politis	304	504	808	63%
Simerini	331	415	746	56%
Total	817	1,506	2,323	

Phileleftheros has been the newspaper that over the years supported the government positions on the Cyprus problem. The only exception has been the period during the Christofias Presidency (2008-2013) when this paper along with all the other ones harshly criticizes the President's handling of the negotiations.⁹⁷ The owner of the specific paper is not a member of and does not openly support a specific political party. Similarly, none of the major political journalists are members or have expressed openly any preference to any political party. That said, they were openly against the Annan Plan during that period and supported any elite who shared their views on the Plan. Politis newspaper is also not affiliated with any party and neither are its political journalists. However, unlike the ones in Phileleftheros, they were openly in favor of the Annan Plan and supported any elite who shared their views and harshly criticized the previous President, Tassos Papadopoulos – who was described as a hardliner and nationalist – and any other elites and non-elites who opposed the Plan. Simerini is very different than the other two. It clearly holds a much harder line on the Cyprus problem. The owner as well as the political journalists frequently and openly support specific candidates based on their

⁹⁶ Value “0” indicates that there was no reference in the first page (i.e. the particular day did not ‘qualify’) and value “1” that there was (i.e. that it ‘qualified’) as relevant front-page news as defined in chapter 4.

⁹⁷ The only paper that is clearly in favor of President Christofias and the governing party AKEL, is Haravgi, which is, however, ‘the organ expressing the views of the Central Committee of AKEL’ [το εκφραστικό όργανο της Κ.Ε του ΑΚΕΛ] (<http://www.haravgi.com.cy/>). AKEL is the political party that Christofias was leading for several years and the only Party that openly supports the specific President.

views on the Problem even though they are not associated with any specific party. They are clearly opposing the leftist Party AKEL and President Christofias.⁹⁸ The three papers together therefore cover to a significant degree the entire political spectrum.

The extensive focus on the Problem is not limited to the printed media. On the contrary, it enjoys a central position on television and radio news and debates. Specifically all national television stations dedicate *on a daily basis* significant time to cover the developments of the conflict in their main evening news shows.⁹⁹ The same applies for radio stations. As is the case with the newspapers, unless there are other major news such as a local or international tragedy – e.g. airline crash, tsunamis, earthquakes, etc. – the developments of the Cyprus problem are the headline news and political elite are frequently invited to participate and offer their assessments on the issues at hand. It is worth noting that the political coverage is not limited to factual developments (e.g. the President met with UN envoy in Cyprus and discussed “X” or “Y” issue), but also extends to the reactions and assessments from *all* political parties. This means that all elites are actually expected to be (and are) constantly ready to discuss and criticize the developments and the other elites’ handling of the issues. The constant focus of all media outlets with the Problem makes it essentially impossible for the audiences to remain uninfluenced. On the contrary, the continuous news ‘bombardment’ allows the conflict to maintain a central position among the public, making it at the same time part of people’s routines.

The latter argument, namely the centrality of the conflict among the public, is corroborated by several opinion polls which indicate that almost four decades years after 1974 the most central issue for Greek Cypriots remains the conflict. Specifically, the main deciding factor (57%) for voting any MP in parliamentary elections is ‘the political

⁹⁸ The fact that the most hardline paper has less front-page references has to do with the structure of its front page that presents many times only one issue. The internal pages of the paper pay particular attention to the Problem; indeed Simerini, unlike the other two major papers that offer a relatively wide-range of news, is ‘known’ only for its position on the Problem.

⁹⁹ In Cyprus there are no television channels dedicated to news (e.g. like CNN or BBC). However, the four major local channels (CYBC1, MEGA, SIGMA, ANT1) – which are also free and available in all the RoC-controlled areas – dedicate on a daily basis approximately 2 hours on covering the news.

party's position on the Cyprus Problem'; 19.1% find the party's position on the economy as more important; 10.5% said that their decision would be influenced by the party's candidate; 7.4% on the party's position on other governance issues and 4.7% did not respond or said they do not know (Ant1, January 2011). It is worth recalling that 2010 and 2011 has been a period of financial crisis with rising unemployment rates and decreasing investment activities; one would thus expect that Cypriots would pay particular attention to the country's economy. Yet the economic management of the state is not nearly as important as the management of the conflict, even if the vast majority (approximately 65%) does *not* expect that negotiations will lead to a positive outcome in the near future (Cyprus2015, December 2010; CEPS 2009). It is also worth noting that MPs do not directly deal with the conflict developments (e.g. negotiations); yet it is still the conflict that determines who will enter the Parliament.

The media analysis, coupled with the data from opinion polls, provide a clear indication of both the centrality and the totality of the conflict in Cyprus. The two together inevitably and perhaps inadvertently create an environment that fosters the promotion of institutionalized securitization, given that it is in the best interest of elite and media to promote the conflict in a way that is *constantly* interesting to the audiences. This is primarily achieved by persistently securitizing developments and potential threats.

(iii) *Interest in conflict-perpetuation*: The third major characteristic of intractable conflicts is that of personal and public interest in seeing the conflict continue. As discussed in chapter 5, when facing decision dilemmas people tend to overweigh possible losses relative to comparable gains and thus engage in risk-averse behavior (Levy 1992). In Cyprus the risk-averse choice is that of the status quo and subsequently the perpetuation of the conflict. This is an attractive option, especially for Greek Cypriots, because the conflict is non-violent and rather comfortable (Adamides and Constantinou 2012). A resolution, or even a proposed one (e.g. like the Annan Plan), has risks and given that a settlement of such protracted conflicts requires significant sacrifices on a political and social level. These sacrifices create uneasiness and a sense of dissatisfaction within the community, making thus a settlement an unpopular option for elite and public

alike. This is obviously a particularly difficult argument to prove empirically, not least because no elite would ever be willing to admit that they have an interest in perpetuating the conflict. On the contrary, they would argue that their ultimate aim is to find a settlement, as long as it safeguards the community from future threats. Even the former President Tassos Papadopoulos, considered by many to be a very hardline leader, repeatedly said that ‘by rejecting the Annan Plan we did not reject a “solution” [to the Problem]’ (Interview in Simerini, December 9 2007). He also clarified that he wants a settlement that would ‘save Cyprus’ [Η λύση που θέλω για να σώσω την Κύπρο]’ (ibid). The word ‘save’ connotes that other forms of settlement are a threat and could potentially lead to the loss of Cyprus (for Greek Cypriots). Equally importantly is that the phrase ‘*I want to save*’ Cyprus also connotes that it is up to him (as President) to save Cyprus. Accepting or rejecting any given settlement or a specific position on any particular issue (e.g. settlers) is a responsibility that is personalized and linked (in the eyes of elites and public) to the negotiator and his/her political party for decades. This personalized responsibility is not limited to the President. Political elites do not hesitate to opportunistically remind the media and analysts of their positions on particular issues. When asked about the ongoing negotiations political elites from DIKO, EDEK, EVROKO and DISY (the four parties that are not in the government) were keen to emphasize that they have personally ‘warned’ the President about the consequences deriving from his soft approach towards the issue of settlers and political equality and were keen to remind me what their ‘correct’ and more importantly safer positions are on the issues.¹⁰⁰ Elite and parties are particularly clearly very careful in not deviating from the ‘accepted discourse’ as the potential cost is not necessarily temporary, but one that could hurt themselves and their party for long periods. With the same token they also choose to express positions on which they can capitalize in the future.¹⁰¹ These positions however frequently lead to the perpetuation of the conflict as they inadvertently advocate for the perpetuation of the status quo and of a securitized environment.

¹⁰⁰ Personal interviews: DISY (May 4, 2011); DIKO (May 10, 2011), EVROKO (May 12, 2011) and EDEK (May 12, 2011). Such responses are also articulated on public settings as well since elites want the public to know what their positions are vis-à-vis specific conflict-related issues.

¹⁰¹ As demonstrated later in this chapter, the capitalization of specific positions also occurs with the use of visual images.

It is not just elites that cannot argue that they want the perpetuation of the conflict. Non-elites may also be skeptical to express such as positions as they could be perceived as unpatriotic. Despite such potential social costs, opinion polls show that only two thirds (approximately) of the population actually wants the negotiations to lead to a settlement, clearly indicating some preference for the continuation of the status quo.¹⁰² What must be noted is that the question in the opinion polls did not evaluate any particular settlement. The responses therefore were in regards to a general preference for any settlement (even a potentially favorable one). It is thus expected that this percentage would be much lower if it was in reference to a specific settlement (e.g. Annan Plan) and if the proposed resolution was portrayed as ‘costly’ for one or the other side; indeed this was the case with the Annan Plan referenda where 76% voted against it. Similarly, in a hypothetical question for a 2012 referendum (for a settlement), only 23% of Greek Cypriots would vote positively or leans towards a ‘yes’ vote, as opposed to 42% who would certainly or likely vote ‘no’ (Cyprus2015, Spring 2012). If these numbers are juxtaposed with those of 2009 we see that there is a decreasing desire for a settlement. Specifically the equivalent ‘yes’ and ‘no’ percentages for 2009 were 26% and 34% respectively (Cyprus2015, December 2009), which means that the potential ‘yes’ votes decreased by 3% and the potential ‘no’ increased by 8%.

Earlier opinion polls (Cyprus2015, December 2009) indicate that the age group was also a factor in the decision-making process.¹⁰³ In a question whether they would vote ‘no’, or lean towards voting ‘no’ in a future referendum the positive response percentage became bigger as the age group of the responders got smaller (see Table 6.4 below).¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² CEPS (2009) opinion poll indicate that only 64% and 65% of Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively have a ‘high desire’ for a settlement. Cyprus2015 (2010) poll estimates the percentages for Greek and Turkish Cypriots at 68% and 65% respectively.

¹⁰³ I specifically refer to a 2009 opinion polls as the more recent polls did not include age-related data.

¹⁰⁴ There is no available data for 2012.

Table 6.4. Voting preference for potential settlement by age group

Age group (Greek Cypriots)	Certainly or likely to vote "No"
18-24	42%
25-34	40%
35-44	35%
45-54	34%
55-65	28%
65+	29%

The fact that the younger generation is less keen to seek settlement is not surprising. The younger generations have no co-existence experiences or positive memories of the ‘other’; their perceptions are mostly shaped by the official (e.g. education) and unofficial narratives (e.g. family) which emphasize the invasion and other bi-communal violent acts and the subsequent negative consequences. As a result, the perceived risk (for the younger generation) to live with the ‘other’ is much higher, meaning that the incentive for a settlement is lower. The younger generation – as an audience – is also more likely to accept acts securitizing proposed settlements given that they do not have personal experiences that could help them question the validity of the threats when those are linked to the ‘enemy other’.

Leaving aside whether or not political elite and other actors would truly like to see a settlement, it is clear that the Cyprus problem ‘sells’ commercially (i.e. papers, television, radio) as well as politically (i.e. major issue for voters). Precisely because it is beneficial there is sufficient motivation for these securitizing actors to perpetuate the conflict and even become identified with specific positions vis-à-vis potential settlements.¹⁰⁵ As the argument goes, a resolution would make these securitizing actors less important for the public. That said, elites may also become less important even if there is no resolution. Specifically, this could happen if they choose to completely or partially detach themselves from the conflict and focus on other issues such as the economy. For as long as the Cyprus Problem is the primary concern for Cypriots (as demonstrated by polls),

¹⁰⁵ Specific positions could include, inter alia, issues related to the number of settlers, the treaty of guarantees, governance issues, terms of bi-zonality, etc.

any securitizing actors' detachment would lead political or financial costs. Subsequently, there is little incentive for any elite or media agents to voluntarily and unilaterally (i.e. without other actors doing the same) 'withdraw' their attention from the conflict. Simultaneous detachment by all actors, so as not one particular agent will suffer the costs, is not a feasible or realistic scenario. They all thus have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the conflict, which is essentially the only real option for them.

To demonstrate vested interest in the continuation of the conflict on a public level is even more difficult. As discussed in chapter 3, one of the possible incentives for people to want the perpetuation of the conflict is the need for ontological security (Mitzen 2006). Greek and Turkish Cypriots have, since 1974 (and in some areas after 1963), maintained their identities through routines that did not include the 'other'; indeed, the foundation of those routines was the exclusion of the 'other' from their daily lives. This is especially the case for the younger Greek Cypriots who never had the opportunity to live with Turkish Cypriots or in any way include them in their daily routines and thus their identities. A settlement that would bring Turkish Cypriots (and Turks) into their lives is an unknown experience and would unquestionably interrupt the Greek Cypriot routines, creating thus anxiety and fears for ontological insecurity. It is not surprising, therefore, that younger generations (as seen above) are more hesitant towards a settlement.

The argument of settlement-related fears is also supported from data indicating that Greek Cypriots are unwilling to accept a settlement despite the fact that reunification would improve the island's economy and the people's standard of living (see e.g. Ayres 2003; Watson 2007; Cilsal, Antoniadou and Mullen 2008, 2009). This indirect rejection of a settlement 'carrot' is witness to the fear of ontological insecurity and the subsequent preference for conflict perpetuation. The settlement 'stick' – namely the threat that any proposed settlement may be the last chance for a resolution – also seems to be ineffective. In a January 2012 (Ant1) opinion poll 86% of the Greek Cypriot respondents answered that they would not accept a settlement simply because it would be the last chance for a resolution, as opposed to only 4.7% who said they would (the rest said they do not know).

The need for ontological security seems to be a valid reason for the public to require the perpetuation of the conflict. However, it may not be the only one. What is argued here is that the lack of desire for a resolution is a combination of factors, namely the need for ontological security, collective fear of the future (i.e. uncertainty deriving from a settlement) and the deeply institutionalized securitization procedures that limit the options of both elite and public to make concessions that are necessary in order to reach a settlement or at least to desecuritize the environment. Indeed it is the last variable that leads to the first two. Routine securitization perpetuates the perceived threats and risks and maintains a low level of desire for resolution and a high level of fear for the future.

The fears and perceived threats and the ‘obsession’ of Cypriots with the conflict are part of the social context in which securitization occurs. The following section examines in detail the Greek Cypriot habitus and the subsequent psycho-cultural predispositions of the population and how the two together influence the process of securitization.

6.3.2. Greek Cypriot Habitus: Social context and psycho-cultural predispositions

Chapter 3 discussed how the social context in which securitization takes place could influence the process. Balzacq for instance argues that the success or failure of the securitizing actor to persuade an audience is based to a degree on the latter’s point of reference (i.e. what it [audience] knows about the world) (2005: 173). Furthermore, it was argued that the point of reference depends on the dominant belief systems and thus on the psycho-cultural pre-disposition of the audience which, in ethnic conflicts, are particularly strong and resistant to change. The Greek Cypriot habitus is no exception and the dominating psycho-cultural pre-dispositions contribute to the development of routinized behavior regarding the existence and handling of specific threats. With this in mind, the thesis is in line with Stritzel’s (2007) suggestion that the process should have a more externalist approach, as the success or failure of speech acts should be examined in the wider social context – which includes the people’s pre-dispositions – and not in isolation (i.e. in an internalist way) as the Copenhagen School does. The Cypriot social context provides solid evidence on how the social context could influence the

development of both ‘mainstream’ and other modes of securitization (i.e. horizontal, bottom-up and ‘involuntary’).

The Greek Cypriot habitus has been shaped primarily by the pivotal events of 1974 and by the several attempts to resolve the conflict, with the most prominent one being the Annan Plan in 2004. As mentioned, the events and the subsequent routines created very specific pre-dispositions vis-à-vis the conflict, most of which revolve primarily around the issue of security. Indicatively, in a December 2010 opinion poll, the principal motivating factors for Greek Cypriots to find a settlement are i) to bring Cyprus to a sustainable state of peace; ii) to recover control of the villages/towns lost in 1974; iii) to reduce the chance of armed conflict; iv) to achieve the termination of guarantees; v) to achieve the departure of foreign troops; and vi) the return of refugees (Cyprus2015, 2010). Out of the top six factors, four are directly related to security issues and the threat of Turkey and two are related to the loss of sovereignty, which also has to do with the presence of Turkish troops in the island. The fact that other factors such as the improvement of the economy, crime fighting, the reduction of defense expenditures, etc. are relatively unimportant (as indicated in those polls), is an indication how pre-disposed Greek Cypriots are when it comes to certain issues and to the ‘source of threat’ for these issues, namely Turkey.

One of the reasons the public focuses on the Problem to the degree and way it does could be attributed to the role of the media. As Vultee notes, ‘industrial routines of news tend to reinforce a bias toward the status quo’ and the existing social routines (2011: 83). Vultee explains this argument using the US as an example, by pointing out that even if news did not conflate the war on terror with the war in Iraq (which were two separate issues), it would still be hard to challenge the people’s views (who did conflate the two), if these people have loved ones ‘fighting the war on terror in Iraq’ (ibid). A similar case applies in ethnic conflicts such as in Cyprus. Even if issues pertinent to Turkey are not conflated with the loss of loved ones or property, it is still particularly difficult for Greek Cypriots to be convinced that they are not connected. Indeed, as Christophorou, Sahin and Pavlou (2010: 63) point out, the Greek Cypriot press always portrays Turkey in negative terms

and as a threat to Greek Cypriots not only in military terms, but also in societal. Among other things constant arguments are presented with Turkish plans for a separatist status quo in Cyprus by altering the demography of the island (ibid). To emphasize the potential threat of Turkey, the latter is also portrayed as negative even for Turkish Cypriots, as it does not allow (according to the media) the latter to decide their own fate (ibid).

Below is a more detailed analysis of the Press' focus, which allows for a more elaborate juxtaposition between media news, opinion polls and political discourses. The press analysis for the 2003-2009 period yielded 1,506 days with headline reference to the 'national problem' and a total of 1,907 conflict-related issues, meaning that occasionally some papers hosted more than one relevant headline news. The 1,907 references were categorized into 14 different groups as summarized in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5. Categories of newspapers headline news

Code	Relevant to (category):	Frequency	Percentage
1	Negotiations developments between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (or Turkey)	483	25%
2	Negotiations developments, but with foreign intervention	400	21%
3	Turkey and TRNC relations	26	1%
4	EU-Turkey relations (vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem)	100	5%
5	Annan Plan and Kofi Annan	125	7%
6	Recognition / Direct Trade / Division	167	9%
7	Settlers	26	1%
8	Property aspect of the Problem	107	6%
9	Area aspect of the Problem (i.e. how much area side should control)	14	1%
10	Security issues	138	7%
11	Economy (vis-à-vis the Problem)	25	1%
12	Societal issues (vis-à-vis the Problem)	163	9%
13	Refugees and missing people	64	3%
14	Other (e.g. interviews)	69	4%
		1,907	100%

What is worth noting is that all three major newspapers analyzed operate in a similar manner when it comes to their focus on the Problem. All papers deal with the same issues to some degree and regardless of the wording the sub-text is the same, namely that there

are specific threats and sources of threats (e.g. Turkey, US, UK, etc.). Table 6.6. below provides a summary of the headlines distribution across newspapers and categories. Table 6.7. presents each of the 14 categories as a percentage of the total references for that paper, indicating clearly that each category receives approximately the same attention in each of the three papers.¹⁰⁶ In other words newspapers do not ‘specialize’ on some issues, but rather examine everything across the board in a similar manner. This is a clear indication of universally accepted perceptions regarding the importance of the specific issues and more importantly of the fact that the same issues are securitized in an institutionalized manner by all media agents, and as discussed later, by all elite.

Table 6.6. Categories of headlines across newspapers

News Category (see Table 6.5. for corresponding categories)	Phileleftheros	Politis	Simerini	Total
1	39%	37%	24%	100%
2	44%	29%	28%	100%
3	65%	15%	19%	100%
4	41%	39%	20%	100%
5	35%	30%	35%	100%
6	47%	26%	28%	100%
7	27%	23%	50%	100%
8	32%	50%	19%	100%
9	29%	36%	36%	100%
10	47%	25%	28%	100%
11	48%	12%	40%	100%
12	24%	37%	39%	100%
13	33%	42%	25%	100%
14	39%	36%	25%	100%

¹⁰⁶ Taking category 1 as an example, we see that it appeared as front-page news 483 times, amounting to 25% of the total 1,907 references. This is not the outcome of constant reference of one paper. What Table 6.7. shows is that all three papers approximately focus on the same issues with approximately the same frequency. Phileleftheros’ focus on category 1 reached 25%, Politis 28% and Simerini 22%, indicating that all three papers focus on this issue (and all the others) relatively equally.

Table 6.7. Categories of headlines across newspapers as a percentage of their total

News Category (see Table 6.5. for corresponding categories)	Phileleftheros	Politis	Simerini
1	25%	28%	22%
2	23%	18%	21%
3	2%	1%	1%
4	5%	6%	4%
5	6%	6%	8%
6	10%	7%	9%
7	1%	1%	2%
8	5%	8%	4%
9	1%	1%	1%
10	9%	5%	7%
11	2%	0%	2%
12	5%	10%	12%
13	3%	4%	3%
14	4%	4%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%

As shown in Table 6.5. above, approximately 25% of the headlines were about the development of the conflict (i.e. category 1) and specifically the negotiations between the two sides; these references were essentially updates on the meetings between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators. These updates were frequently (but not always) presented in a securitized way as they were portrayed as potential threats. Indicative titles (from all three papers) that fall in this category are: ‘Falling in the trap of Denktas’,¹⁰⁷ ‘Turkish tricks: promoting an interim agreement with the goal of non-solution and the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus’;¹⁰⁸ ‘Turkish attempts to cancel the July 8 agreements’;¹⁰⁹ ‘Between a solution and partition’.¹¹⁰

The second category enjoyed 21% of the headline news and dealt with the developments again, albeit the focus was on foreign interventions and involved almost always the same actors, namely the UK, the US and the UN. As was the case above, these developments

¹⁰⁷ [Στην παγίδα του Ντεκτάς] (Phileleftheros, August 8, 2003).

¹⁰⁸ [Τουρκική τρικλοποδιά: Προσθούν ενδιάμεση συμφωνία με στόχο τη μη λύση και τη διάλυση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας] (Phileleftheros, January 28, 2004).

¹⁰⁹ [Τουρκική προσπάθεια να ακυρωθεί η 8^η Ιουλίου] (Simerini, July 20, 2006).

¹¹⁰ [Μεταξύ λύσης και διχοτόμησης] (Politis, December 17, 2006).

were often presented in terms of threats. Indicative titles are: ‘Warnings from Weston if Cyprus vetoes’¹¹¹ and ‘Suspicious games from internal and external circles’.¹¹² The negotiation developments, with or without foreign intervention, are rarely discussed in a positive spin in the press. Exceptions to this are ‘judicial victories’ at European institutions (e.g. ECJ and ECHR) and foreign diplomats’ comments that support the Greek Cypriot positions, especially on issues of recognition. Even those however receive less attention and for shorter periods than the perceived negative news.

An interesting observation is also how the news connote the presence of threats without however always clarifying what these threats are.¹¹³ There is in other words a deliberate vagueness in the reporting of the developments. The credibility of the news or the agencies that report them does not seem to be hurt from the lack of concrete evidence and the deliberate ambiguities because of the existing context and the internalized negative perceptions of the ‘other’. Specifically, the deeply securitized environment is such where vague potential threats are easily accepted as the ‘truth’ or at least as very ‘plausible’. What is even more interesting is the easiness with which the same issues are constantly re-securitized even if past evidence indicates that similar threats were never implemented. The most obvious example of such repetitive discourse is that of recognition, which appeared as headline news 167 times (or 9%). While the TRNC has not yet been recognized and all related threats proved to be ‘empty’, the issue continues to appear as an imminent threat and the public seems to accept it as such.

The rest of the headline categories, with the exception of the last one (number 14), include news with reference to specific issues. The category with recognition-related issues (category 6) almost always presented the news in terms of direct or indirect threats that derived from either the abovementioned foreign actors, or by Arab states and primarily Syria. References to ‘direct’ recognition include news related to alleged foreign attempts to recognize the TRNC, while ‘indirect’ ones primarily refer to attempts for

¹¹¹ [Απειλές από Γούεστον αν βάλει βέτο η Κύπρος] (Phileleftheros, October 30, 2004). This title refers to Thomas Weston, the US diplomat responsible for the Cyprus question.

¹¹² [Υποπτα παιχνίδια από κύκλους εντός και εκτός] (Simerini, February 15, 2005).

¹¹³ I discuss the issue of phrasing in the next section.

direct trade with (or direct flights to) the TRNC. The headlines frequently utilized ‘loaded’ terms (for Greek Cypriots) such as ‘partition’, ‘direct trade’, and ‘recognition’, linking thus automatically any such news to internalized threats.

Societal-related news (number 12) are also significant as they constitute 9% of the total references. This category is particularly interesting as the aim of these news is not so much to ‘terrify’ the Greek Cypriots of potential existential threats, but rather to emphasize the several tangential threats that derive from either the occupation or potential attempts for cooperation with the ‘other’ and thus apply pressure on individuals who are tempted to be more closely associated with the ‘enemy’.¹¹⁴ The other major category is that of security (number 10), which as the title suggests refers to news that dealt directly and explicitly with issues of security. Given the absence of violence, these news were mostly in relation with developments pertinent to issues of the Treaty of Guarantees, military troops in Cyprus and occasionally to military updates for either the Greek or the Turkish Cypriot side. It is particularly interesting that while security is of utmost importance for the people (as demonstrated by the opinion polls mentioned earlier), the media does not seem to pay a lot of direct attention to this issue. This could be attributed primarily to the lack of directly relevant news, which makes the opinion poll results all the more interesting, as they demonstrate further that security threats are deeply internalized.

What must be noted is that 88% of the 1,907 headlines could be categorized in just eight different groups, indicating clearly that there are very clear perceptions in the media, and inevitably among the public, of what is considered to be important and central. It is also clear that there is a form of institutionalized behavior in terms of focus – i.e. the focus is on the same or very similar issues – and in terms of presentation – i.e. the news are portrayed as a threat and essentially securitized.

As mentioned, the media influence and are influenced by securitization; specifically, securitization is both an effect in the media and an effect of the media (Vultee 2011: 78).

¹¹⁴ Social pressure through the media is discussed in detail later in this chapter.

There is therefore a bilateral relationship between the media and the audience as they learn from each other; they give and receive a series of cues with which they build an interpretation of their exchange (ibid: 78-9). Thus, media's routine behavior contributes to the institutionalization of securitization and the latter contribute to the repetition of the same issues in the news. This repetition in the media is therefore an indication of successful securitizing acts. In other words the reason there is so much repetition is precisely because those issues have been successfully securitized at some point in time, which subsequently means, by definition, they are deemed as extremely important. What is argued here is that when some successfully securitized issues become part of the media (and political) routines they could eventually become part of an institutionalized and 'fixed' securitization framework. Once institutionalized desecuritization or less securitization becomes more unlikely; instead the constant re-securitization of the same issues is the most likely scenario.

Part of this institutionalization is the repetitive discourse with the specific phrasing, which contributes to the incorporation of specific conflict-related threats into the Greek Cypriots' identity. Furthermore, and provided that the threats are always presented vis-à-vis the same enemy 'other', this repetition also contributes to the creation and perpetuation of strong zero-sum mentalities as is evident from opinion polls which indicate that only 6.4% of Greek Cypriots believe that their side gained more from negotiations, as opposed to 67.5% who believe that Turkish Cypriots gained more (Ant1, January 2010). This environment leads to the 'conditioning' of the audiences to accept routinized securitization unquestionably, while it also allows for the development of other modes of securitization, such as horizontal and bottom-up.

6.3.3. Conflict perpetuating routines and the phrasing of threats

Having discussed the repetition found in the press, this section deals with the phrasing of issues and how that too is the outcome of routinized and eventually institutionalized behavior.

In the post 1974 period several routines developed aiming to solidify the Greek Cypriot position on an international level, namely that they were the victims of a violent Turkish invasion and that the threat still exists, albeit not only in terms of military conflict. These routine efforts, while aiming at an international audience, had a domestic impact too as they solidified the Greek Cypriot perceptions and discourse regarding the potential threats to the community. This solidification took place with the frequent use of specific phrases and images, which were occasionally connected to past pivotal events such as the invasion and the Annan Plan. Specific discourses inevitably became part of the Greek Cypriot political and social routines and were institutionalized to the degree that they are constantly reiterated by elite, media and public in exactly the same manner and frequently with the exact same phrasing. The impact of this institutionalization, besides the internalization of specific threats, is the constraints individuals have in *not* using a specific discourse.

The following sections examine the phrasing used by the media in each of the news categories mentioned above to determine how the use of loaded terms within specific contexts is used to successfully securitize issues.

6.3.3.1 Domestic and foreign interventions (categories 1 and 2 in media headlines)

The first category, negotiation developments between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides, received most of the attention in the press and almost always in a securitized manner. Turkish Cypriot suggestions were usually perceived as ‘tricks’ or deliberately vague for the purpose of achieving the Turkish goals ‘through the back door’. For the issues on the area redistribution and property, for instance, the media perceived them as dangerous machinations – see e.g. ‘In Denktaş Trap’,¹¹⁵ ‘New Turkish tricks’,¹¹⁶ ‘Ankara’s trap with the agreement’,¹¹⁷ ‘Several interpretations for issues of substance’.¹¹⁸ The choice of the words ‘trap’, ‘tricks’ and ‘several interpretations’ connotes uncertainty

¹¹⁵ Phileleftheros, August 8, 2003

¹¹⁶ Politis, October 6, 2003

¹¹⁷ Phileleftheros, February 22, 2004

¹¹⁸ Simerini, July 2, 2008

and suspicion and promotes a perception of potential threats. The impact of such phrasing is exacerbated when repeated frequently as it creates a negative mental association that links specific issues (e.g. property, agreements, etc.) with threats rather than potential settlement. This link is possible because of the social context in which these acts take place. The zero sum mentalities dominating the environment makes ‘tricks’ and ‘machinations’ from the ‘other’ appear in the eyes of the population as possible and rather likely.

The frequent use of the same discourse linking specific issues (e.g. property) and proposals from the ‘other’ as threats lead to two interconnected problems that make desecuritization particularly difficult. The first is that the phrasing could become institutionalized limiting thus the options of elites and media in case they do *not* to use the same phrasing or following the same ‘connections’ between Problem-related issues and threats. This mild form of institutionalized securitization limits the options for, and increases the cost of, elites who might want to desecuritize an issue or leave it unsecuritized. It is for instance very ‘costly’ for any elite to argue that a Turkish / Turkish Cypriot suggestion is *not* a trap – and even costlier to argue that the Turkish proposition might be positive – when the media frequently portrays it as such and the public has internalized this belief (as is evident from opinion polls that shows great distrust towards the other side).

The second issue is that the routinized phrasing and the linking of the ‘other’ with threats creates cognitive shortcuts for the public who might perceive something as a threat even if the intention of the elite or media is not to securitize it. In other words, the issues/developments that are frequently securitized in an institutionalized manner could eventually become securitized even without the explicit intervention of an actor, meaning that even if the media simply reports a development (e.g. a Turkish proposition) the audience is likely to perceive it as dangerous and negative, even if journalists do not use ‘loaded’ terms such as those above.

The environment is similar for news on foreign interventions. It is worth noting again that there is an internalized Greek Cypriot belief that Cyprus is a victim of foreign powers, which is not surprising given how much external actors are being securitized. Almost all of the 400 references made to foreign interventions during the period 2003-2009 were linked to four key players: the UK, the US, the UN and the EU. Any reference to the first two (UK and US) was almost always couched negatively for Greek Cypriot interests and positive for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Routinely the US and the UK have been – and still are – portrayed as a source of threat of Greek Cypriots, but not in a direct way as is Turkey for instance.¹¹⁹ This is done indirectly by arguing that they hold a positive stance towards Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and a negative one towards Greek Cypriots. The media focus is on the efforts these two actors make towards helping the TRNC gain recognition, directly or indirectly, or on the help they give to Turkey in order to enter the EU without making the necessary concessions towards the RoC.¹²⁰

Any intervention by these actors is thus securitized with the repeated use of key words and phrases. Regarding US and UK interventions, the media speech acts focus on the element of ‘mystery’ and ‘uncertainty’, making thus the certainty that the status quo supplies an attractive option. Vagueness is a particularly useful tool in the absence of any concrete evidence that a development or an intervention is indeed a threat. British and US initiatives are thus frequently portrayed as ‘cunning’ and ‘tricky’ – see e.g. ‘Cunning package from the British’.¹²¹ Similarly, there is frequent referencing of words and phrases such as ‘trip up’ (τρικλοποδιά) and ‘tricky’ preparations – e.g. ‘British “trip up” the Greek Cypriot side: the international status of Cyprus will become questionable [if the Annan Plan is accepted]’;¹²² ‘The British are preparing tricks: permanent deviations from the EU *acquis*’;¹²³ ‘The worst plan (delusion): the Americans prepare plans’.¹²⁴ It is

¹¹⁹ These perceptions have remained unchanged for over 6 decades. In chapter 5 I discussed and presented some evidence from the press on how Greek Cypriots perceived the role of the UK and US – i.e. as Turkey-serving agents.

¹²⁰ A major Greek Cypriot argument is that Turkey is yet to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and it has not yet opened the ports and airports to Cypriot planes and ships.

¹²¹ Simerini, August 15, 2004

¹²² Simerini, March 14, 2004

¹²³ Simerini, March 3, 2004

¹²⁴ Simerini, December 3, 2003

irrelevant that it is not always clear what these 'tricky' plans are; the perception is that if the Americans or British are preparing something, it must be tricky, cunning and almost certainly against Greek Cypriots. This creates self-fulfilling prophecies: if the public constantly reads that someone is planning something cunning, it expects something cunning and when a proposal comes along from these agents it is automatically perceived as negative and a threat as it 'must be' the outcome of cunning foreign machinations. As a result the public 'demands' that any such proposals be treated as threats leading again to the same problem mentioned above.


Indicative of how the media and the public perceives the British and American interventions are also depicted in the daily cartoons of Phileleftheros, the most widely distributed newspaper.

Figure 6. 1 Britain 'butchering' Cyprus



(Source: philenews.com (February 23 2004) and <http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html>)

Figure 6. 2. America's hidden Turkish interests



(Source: philenews.com (March 26, 2006) and <http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html>)

Figure 6.1. above connotes that Britain acts as a butcher that will divide Cyprus as it wants with the blessing (and even request) of the EU. Figure 6.2. shows that behind the American behavior regarding Cyprus there is a hidden Turkish agenda. In both cases, the British and Americans are depicted as serving Turkey's interests at the expense of Greek Cypriots.

The examples above are an indication of the social context in Cyprus, which is such that people tend to see security issues everywhere, even when threats are not real or when past evidence does not corroborate the concerns. That said, it is not argued here that all foreign proposals are prepared in good faith and with the Greek Cypriot well-being in mind. On the contrary there is abundant evidence that supports the opposite; evidence that supports the constant securitization of issues and agents. Leaked documents with private electronic exchanges between UN officials indicate that there is indeed the element of trickiness when it comes to foreign interventions. An indicative example is Carl Bildt's (former Swedish Prime Minister) discussion with the UN Special Representative Tayé-Brook Zerihoun regarding the negotiation developments at the time. The former stated that they cannot move too much beyond the Annan Plan, so to convince the Greek Cypriots 'an element of theater is inevitable' (Emilianides et. al. 2010: 61). Such statements (i.e. element of theater, connoting obviously trickery) when

leaked, and regardless if they took place in private settings, only add to the distrust and the existing negative perceptions about foreign actors and allows for obstacle-free securitization.¹²⁵

Particular attention is also given to foreign attempts for direct and indirect recognition of the TRNC or the ‘downgrading’ of the RoC to the same status as the TRNC. Indicative examples used to emphasize these threats are: ‘Blair promises direct flights to the occupied areas’;¹²⁶ ‘USA: de facto recognition’;¹²⁷ ‘USA gave flight codes to Ertzian Airport [in TRNC]’ (Politis, December 2, 2004); ‘British belittle Tassos [Papadopoulos] and call Talat President’.¹²⁸

Figure 6. 3 Condoleeza Rice and 'South Cyprus'



(Source: philenews.com (April 27, 2006) and <http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html>)

The figure above shows Condoleezza Rice (former US Secretary of State) downgrading the RoC status and indirectly upgrading that of TRNC, by equating the status of the two sides. This drawing appeared after Ms. Rice, in a public statement, used the phrase ‘South

¹²⁵ It is not argued here that foreigners might not have similar positions vis-à-vis the Turkish side. Indeed, the Turkish side also complains about biased foreign agents.

¹²⁶ Politis, May 18, 2004.


¹²⁷ Politis, November 24, 2004.

¹²⁸ Simerini, October 22, 2005

Cyprus' instead of RoC.¹²⁹ In the background there is a sign saying 'SOUTH CYPRUS', connoting of course that there are two states in Cyprus, the South and North. Whether Condoleeza Rice deliberately wanted to make this distinction cannot be determined, but it is not likely given that the US government frequently reiterates its official position that there is only one recognized state in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot reaction is indicative of how internalized certain potential threats and agents. Similarly, the fact that all elite and media reacted to Rice's 'mistake' in a similar manner is also indicative of the institutionalization of reactions when it comes to specific issues (e.g. recognition) and agents (e.g. US).

Other headlines revolve around 'biased' behavior, focusing on foreign intervention pressures towards the Greek Cypriot side and favorable behavior towards Turkey. For instance, 'Bush is pressuring Tassos [Papadopoulos]';¹³⁰ 'US gift to Talat and Ankara';¹³¹ 'Matthew Braiza: we should help Turkey [with EU accession]'.¹³² Indicative of the latter statement is also the cartoon drawing below, which depicts the US forcefully pushing Turkey into the EU while at the same time 'squeezing' Cyprus, connoting that Cyprus cannot and should not be an obstacle to Turkey's accession.

Figure 6. 4. US helping Turkey enter the EU



(Source: philenews.com (June 9, 2008) and <http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html>)

¹²⁹ http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2006/06-04-26_1.cna.html

¹³⁰ Phileleftheros, February 4, 2004

¹³¹ Phileleftheros, May 30, 2005

¹³² Phileleftheros, July 19, 2006

The negative perceptions towards foreign actors and the prospects of successful securitization are further strengthened when they are connected with the Turkish army, the source of the biggest Greek Cypriot fear. For instance, while it is well known that the Turkish army is comprised primarily of US-made weapons, there is still explicit reference with the use of ‘loaded’ words such as ‘occupation’ to connect the Greek Cypriot tragedy (i.e. ongoing occupation) with a specific agent (i.e. USA) – see e.g. ‘Occupation weapons with an American identity’.¹³³ The coupling of the words ‘occupation’, ‘Turkish weapons’ and ‘American’ creates very negative perceptions in the Greek Cypriot community about the role the US has had and still has in the conflict. For the reasons mentioned above, these ‘reminders’ of the role the US has had in the Greek Cypriot tragedy allows for easier securitization of any American-related propositions for settlement.

The EU and the UN also often receive similarly negative ‘treatment’ in the media. There are also however many occasions where interventions from these actors are portrayed as positive, but only if they clearly support the Greek Cypriot positions, namely that Turkey ‘misbehaves’ or is accused of being at fault for a particular development. If an EU institution (e.g. ECJ or ECHR) supports a specific Greek Cypriot position, then the media headlines portray the development not only as positive, but also as something that supports the diachronic struggle of Greek Cypriots for justice and recognition that Turkey is to be blamed for all the problems. In such cases words such as ‘condemnation’ and ‘justice’ are used – see e.g. ‘European Court of Human Rights condemns Turkey’.¹³⁴ On the contrary, if an institution’s position is against Greek Cypriots, then the media portrays this development as either the outcome of a conspiracy or that of foreign pressures. Indicatively, ‘Turkish judge influences the ECHR’;¹³⁵ ‘Backstabbing from 4 judges of the ECHR’;¹³⁶ ‘Commission report: removes all blame from Turkey [because it accepted the Annan Plan]’.¹³⁷

¹³³ Simerini, July 15, 2004

¹³⁴ Phileleftheros, January 10, 2007

¹³⁵ Politis, October 1, 2003

¹³⁶ Politis, September 8, 2003

¹³⁷ Phileleftheros, October 6, 2004

Figure 6. 5. ECHR and Turkey



(Source: philenews.com and <http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanas/index.html>)

The figure above summarizes the abovementioned argument. The statue depicts the European Court of Human Rights (acronym ΕΔΑΔ in Greek). The little girl is supposed to be Cyprus,¹³⁸ who says: ‘if she [i.e. justice] is blind, I am an Archbishop’, connoting of course, as the hood suggests, that the ECHR is influenced or even controlled by Turkey.

6.3.3.2. References to individuals and the Annan Plan

The media focus on foreign interventions is not limited to states; often interventions are personalized and the focus shifts to specific individuals such as the UN Special Representative, EU officials, foreign Ambassadors or even the UN Secretary General. This means that individuals are perceived as a ‘source of threat’ (just like states are) and thus become part of an institutionalized securitization framework. Specific examples of such actors who are constantly portrayed as ‘friends of the Turks’ (φιλότουρκοι) and their neutrality as mediators is questioned, are Günter Verheugen;¹³⁹ Lord Hanney¹⁴⁰ and Alexander Downer.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ The image of a little girl as Cyprus is also important as it connotes how unprotected Cyprus is.

¹³⁹ German EU Commissioner. Greek Cypriots do not like Verheugen for a number of reasons with the primary ones being his suggestions that there should be direct trade between the EU and the Turkish Cypriots and for saying that he ‘felt cheated by the Greek Cypriot government [for not supporting the Annan Plan]’ (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/1460004/EU-accuses-Greek-Cypriots-of-betrayal-over-islands-peace-plan.html> [accessed 23 June 2010]).

¹⁴⁰ UK Special representative to Cyprus for the period 1996-2003.

¹⁴¹ Former Australian Prime Minister and UN Special Representative for Cyprus since 2008. I discuss how the media focuses on UN-related individuals below.

Due to their active roles Lord Hanney and Alexander Downer receive particular attention, with the latter being constantly presented by the media, the church and political elite as biased and untrustworthy and even request their withdrawal. Archbishop Chrysostomos for instance stated that Alexander Downer is ‘untrustworthy and must leave’.¹⁴² Similarly, the entire Greek Cypriot political elite, through a Parliamentary vote, is drafting a proposal requesting that the UN Secretary General relieves Downer from his duties as a Special Envoy.¹⁴³ In this case therefore it is not the UN that is questioned, but rather the individual representing the UN. The case of Lord Hanney is very different: he is almost always portrayed as an individual who is supportive of the Turkish positions, but also as an individual who pursues the British interests, again always at the expense of Greek Cypriots.¹⁴⁴ Any comments or proposals deriving from such individuals are immediately perceived as potential threats and elites and media are quick to securitize them. Indeed, securitization is almost an automatic reaction, which as explained earlier might be necessary in order to satisfy the public demands and provide a feeling that proposals from such ‘enemies’ are treated with the utmost importance (i.e. treated as potentially existential threats). Within this context there is a form of ‘involuntary’ securitization, given that elite have few options but to constantly treat such individuals as potential threats.

The last category presented here is one that deals specifically with the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, his associates and the UN-sponsored Plan. This Plan, being by far the closest the two sides ever got to a settlement, received particular attention in the press and in political discourses and it was severely securitized. As was the case with the Americans and British mentioned above, the media who were opposing the Plan securitized or better yet ‘pre-securitized’ any actions from specific individuals, meaning that the media speculated how these individuals’ positions would pose a threat for Greek Cypriots – see e.g. ‘[Alvaro] De Soto sets us up’,¹⁴⁵ connoting obviously that future actions will be in a form of a ‘trap’ and subsequently dangerous for ‘us’. The

¹⁴² Offsite, July 13, 2010 (<http://offsite.com.cy/arxeio-offsite/2918-23-01-2012.html>).

¹⁴³ <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/reportaz/459197> [accessed 30 January 2012]


¹⁴⁴ See e.g. Venizelos (2004); Emilianides et al. (2010)

¹⁴⁵ Simerini, march 17, 2004

social context, the routinized or even institutionalized securitization coupled with the internalized perceptions regarding some individuals allow for the development of successful securitization based just on speculations.

The most common headline news during that period (2003-2004) were those emphasizing the Plan's bias and the subsequent threats for Greek Cypriots – e.g. 'Annan gives everything to the Turks: building up a state in the north'.¹⁴⁶ Indicative of these perceptions is also the figure below, which argues that while the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots is 82% and 18% respectively this has no bearing on what each side receives from the Plan.

Figure 6. 6. Biased Plan



(Source: philenews.com and <http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnan/index.html>)

The securitization of specific aspects of the Plan is indicative of the necessity for incorporating the idea of multiple audiences into the theory. Frequently, during the 2003-2004 period the securitizing actors' focus was limited to only specific parts of the Plan as the goal was to 'win over' one specific audience that was directly influenced and not necessarily the entire population. An indicative example of a specific audience are the public servants, who according to the Press could lose their jobs had the Plan gone through – see e.g. 'Public servants' status is questionable with Annan Plan'.¹⁴⁷ Successful

¹⁴⁶ Simerini, march 30, 2004

¹⁴⁷ Simerini, April 10, 2004

securitization of the job security of a large percentage of the population, as is the public sector, could and was a very successful approach to securitizing the entire Plan, provided that Plan had to be accepted or rejected in its entirety.

What is more important is that if the media or other actors successfully securitize such an issue for such a large audience, the political elites' actions become extremely limited. Provided that job insecurity is particularly important and could lead to anxiety, people are likely to choose the less risky path, which in this case would be treating the Plan as a threat and thus reject it.

As demonstrated with the examples above, the frequent use of 'loaded' terms and the routine reference to potential threats from states, organizations and individuals contribute to the creation of an environment where securitization is so routinized that it becomes part of an institutionalized framework for elite, media and public alike. In turn this creates 'automated' reactions from actors and audiences that lead to involuntary securitization activities as defined earlier. Desecuritization or even less securitization becomes particularly difficult as the public is unwilling or not conditioned to accept any propositions deriving from specific non-Greek Cypriot sources; on the contrary they are conditioned to perceive such propositions as potential threats. In such social contexts elites have little incentive and much risk to attempt to desecuritize foreign interventions or specific proposals (as was the case with the job security in the Annan Plan). Instead, following the constant securitization path becomes the safest and least costly path. This 'safe' path is also evident from the official routinized discourse of the political elite, which is discussed in the next section.

6.4. Political elite and routinized securitization

I have already discussed how elites choose (or are 'forced' to choose) discourses that echo the people's perceptions of threats. What is more interesting is that all parties focus on the same issues and even use very similar phrasing. Elites are, in other words,

unwilling not to be part of the securitization discourses due to the high costs discussed earlier. Instead they choose to institutionalize responses to specific issues. The most indicative example is the issue of the Turkish guarantees, which as demonstrated in the following statements is part of all parties' political discourse:

President Christofias (AKEL): 'The Greek Cypriot public has every reason not to want the Turkish guarantees, especially now the RoC is a full member of the EU'.¹⁴⁸ He then emphasized how the Turkish guarantees are a red line for Greek Cypriots.

- DISY (Averof Neophytou – Vice president of DISY): 'The Party does not accept the Turkish guarantees or the unilateral rights of intervention'.¹⁴⁹

- DISY (Tasos Yiapanis): 'The Turkish guarantees are a red line for the vast majority of Greek Cypriots'.¹⁵⁰

- EDEK (Koulis Mavronikolas – EMP): 'The presence of the Turkish occupying army on the island is a source of tension and threat'.¹⁵¹

- DIKO (Photis Photiou – Party's spokesperson): 'For DIKO the issue of Turkish guarantees and intervention in Cyprus is a red line'.¹⁵²

What is worth noting from the examples above is how all parties use the same or very similar expressions, such as the term 'red line' and the word 'intervention'. Such expressions are part of the regular discourse and an integral part of institutionalized securitization. Issues such as the Turkish guarantees have been so deeply securitized that elite must now always treat them as an existential threat; hence the necessity to always mention how they are a 'red line'. As the argument goes, the reason elite need to use these expressions is precisely because the issues are already so deeply securitized that the audience has expectations that its elite will treat them with the utmost care and priority. As a result, some expressions regarding threats (as shown above), as well some that refer

¹⁴⁸ http://www.typos.com.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=98162 [accessed March 4, 2011]

¹⁴⁹ <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/interviews/88240> [accessed June 2 2011].

¹⁵⁰ (<http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/index.php?pageaction=k&modid=1&artid=46198> [accessed June 2 2011])

¹⁵¹ (<http://www.mavronikolas.net/> [accessed July 5 2011])

¹⁵² (<http://sigmalive.com/news/politics/156559> [accessed June 3 2011])

to the goal of the Greek Cypriot side (see below) have become an ‘automatic’ (routine) choice for elite and media.

The most frequently used phrase in regards to the Greek Cypriot goals is the ‘fair and viable solution to the Cyprus problem’ (δίκαιη και βιώσιμη λύση του Κυπριακού προβλήματος).¹⁵³ This is an expression that has been used by elite for over three decades, which subsequently (and inevitably) means that the public has accepted it and internalized it. Indeed, it is so internalized that even academics and foreign elite have adopted it.¹⁵⁴

The frequent use of expressions, even ‘positive’ (i.e. not threat-related) ones, could also be used as securitization tools if they become part of the institutionalized political discourse. The choice of ‘fair’ and ‘viable’ for instance are subjective words and open to interpretation, making them thus useful tools if the need arises. Specifically, any development that needs to be securitized could easily be presented as a threat to the viability of a (proposed) settlement. The perceptions of fairness are heavily influenced by the repeated elite and media discourse and the specific phrasing used to describe a fair solution, namely that ‘all refugees should return home’ (όλοι πρόσφυγες στα σπίτια τους),¹⁵⁵ ‘all settlers should leave’ (να φύγουν όλοι οι έποικοι), ‘all occupation troops

¹⁵³ Recently the term ‘functional’ (λειτουργική) has also been added along side fair and viable. For indicative examples see:

- President Christofias (2010): ‘I outlined to Mr. Roboy our will for a fair, viable and functional solution to the Cyprus problem as soon as possible’ (<http://www.presidency.gov.cy/>) [accessed May 23, 2010]

- President Papadopoulos (2005): ‘[...] the Greek Cypriots abroad[...] maintain a strong interest for fair and viable solution to the problem’ (<http://www.greeknewsonline.com/?p=3651>) [accessed May 23, 2010].

- President Clerides (2002): ‘I informed the Prime Minister [of Greece] that our goal remains unchanged. To find a viable, fair and functional solution to the Cyprus problem’ (www.philenews.com/afieromata/news/alitheia.htm) [accessed May 23, 2010].

¹⁵⁴ See for example ‘The Hungarian President expressed the hope that there will be a fair and viable solution to the Cyprus problem’ (<http://news.pathfinder.gr/greece/cyprus/40042.html>) [accessed May 23, 2010]. For academics see for instance ‘A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the light of International and European Law’ (Ifestos P.) (available at <http://www.ifestos.edu.gr/32RuleofLaw.htm#INTERNATIONAL%20EXPERT%20PANEL>) [accessed May 20, 2010].

¹⁵⁵ This particular expression has been maintained since 1974 by all political elite. Indicatively, when the former President of Cyprus of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou, created the Democratic Party (DIKO), the motto and essence of his proclamation speech in 1976 was “All refugees to their homes’ (όλοι οι πρόσφυγες στα

must be withdrawn' (να φύγουν τα στρατεύματα κατοχής), 'our borders are in Kyrenia' (τα σύνορα μας είναι στην Κερύνεια), etc. These are expressions used in the education system as well, thereby creating internalized perceptions of fairness from a very young age. Anything less than those positions (e.g. withdrawal of all settlers) could therefore easily be successfully securitized as 'not fair', provided how internalized the perception of fairness is within each community.

Even though the specific idea of fairness is embedded in the people's identities, there is still a common understanding that it is impossible to achieve a settlement that includes all the 'fair' positions mentioned above; indeed, some positions are no longer even negotiated (e.g. that all refugees will return to their homes). It would thus be expected that the internalized element of fairness should have been 'diluted'. Yet, elites still choose to pursue a 'fair' solution as defined above, not because they actually believe that they will be successful, but rather because of the need to maintain a patriotic image. This strategy (i.e. adoption of such discourse) is also useful as because it allows for convenient 'exit' in cases when the negotiations do not develop as planned. Elites can justify rejectionist positions based on the unfairness of a proposal or development. Given the internalized perceptions of fairness, it is not at all difficult for elites to convince audiences and the media that a particular solution or proposal is unfair and thus a rejectionist position is justified. In addition, it is almost impossible for political opponents to support a Turkish or foreign position at the expense of the Greek Cypriot one, leaving thus any securitization attempts by the ruling elite unopposed.

Even though it is tacitly acknowledged that the settlement will not be fair (as per the Greek Cypriot definition) the 'fairness variable' was never abandoned from the official discourse. There is however a shift in the focus towards the viability of the solution which can be more objectively defined but also more easily securitized. While ready to accept the lack of fairness from any settlement, Greek Cypriots are unwilling to accept that it may not be viable and it is the viability of plan or proposal (and not the fairness so

σπίτια τους). Available at: <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/reportaz/405441> [accessed January 2, 2012]

much) that actors use for securitization purposes. Indicative of this position is President Papadopoulos' well-known speech a few days prior to the Annan Plan referenda in 2004, when he asked Greek Cypriots to reject the Plan. Among other things he said that 'if the solution could not be fair, we had to at least aim to make it functional so as to be viable'. The connotation was that Greek Cypriots understand and deep down do not expect a fair solution, but they should not settle for non-viable one.¹⁵⁶ The expectations for a viable solution are particularly high given that the conflict in Cyprus is a comfortable one and the stalemate is not hurting either side (but even less the Greek Cypriots). This means that the prospects for settlement could potentially be perceived as more of a threat for Cypriots than the perpetuation of the conflict, especially if a settlement is identified as non-viable. More importantly the viability of the conflict is an issue that can be and indeed is easily securitized given the social context dominating the comfortable Cypriot conflict.

The social context and the institutionalized referencing to particular threats also influence the security grammar (i.e. speech acts) necessary for the securitization process. As the argument goes a specific security grammar, dramatization and negotiations are no longer necessary to securitize an issue. A simple reference, even a visual one suffices as the audience is already 'convinced' of the potential threat. Therefore the goal of the actors in such environments – where securitization is institutionalized – frequently shifts from *convincing* the audience to simply *reminding* it of the particular threats. Similarly the goal becomes to remind the audience that they (i.e. specific actors, party, media agent, etc.) are in line with the people's perceptions of threats and that they are the suitable agents to handle them.

Below are indicative visual images that act as 'reminders'. The use of visual images is an indication that the 'mainstream' speech acts that follow a specific security grammar are not necessary in some cases. Indeed, the connotations are clear because the perceived threats have been routinely securitized in the past and have become internalized.

¹⁵⁶ The speech is available at <http://www.tassospapadopoulos.com/easyconsole.cfm/id/46> [accessed on December 7 2010]

Picture 6. 1. No to Turkish Guarantees



Source: www.diko.org.cy

The picture above says “Send a clear message to Europe: **No** to the Turkish guarantees” and includes a military helmet with the Turkish flag. This advertisement found on billboards was for the European Parliament elections in 2009. The connotation here is that Turkish guarantees should be equated with the Turkish military and thus the prospects for another military intervention. There is no need to explain this any further; the ‘link’ between guarantees and violence is part of the existing psycho-cultural predisposition of the Greek Cypriot audience. In addition, the advertisement connotes that ‘we’ (i.e. DIKO – the specific political party) says ‘No’ to the guarantees connoting on one hand that ‘we’ share your fears and will not accept anything that could jeopardize our community’s security, and on the other that the other parties might not be doing that, or at least not to the degree that ‘we’ do (i.e. you are safer with ‘us’).¹⁵⁷

What is even more interesting is the fact that years after the referenda political parties still base their election campaigns on their positions on the Plan. The idea is that parties that have successfully ‘saved the country from the Plan’ can safeguard Greek Cypriots

¹⁵⁷ In the respective television ad, the helmet and the ‘No to Turkish guarantees’ is the same, but in the very end of the ad, there is a voice saying ‘what do the others say’? This advertisement is available at <http://www.diko.org.cy/easyconsole.cfm/id/192>

from any similar future threats.

Picture 6. 2. We say "NO" again to those who said "YES"



Source: www.diko.org.cy

Another indicative example of the abovementioned argument is the billboard advertisement above which says (in orange): ‘We say NO to those who supported the ‘YES’. We say YES to DIKO’. The message is that the voter must not support those who supported the Annan Plan, connoting that the ‘YES’ supporters would have exposed the country to dangers. What DIKO does here is attempt to securitize the alternative options (i.e. other parties) by saying that if you vote for ‘them’ you will bring to power those who supported the Plan (and who might do so again in the future). It is worth noting that the word ‘Annan’ or ‘Plan’ is not even mentioned here. The words ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are sufficient for every Greek Cypriot to make the connection, indicating again how much of a pivotal event the Plan was, how integrated the Plan is to the political and social routines and how securitized it is (especially by some parties).

What is also worth noting is that this advertisement was again for the European Parliamentary elections, which means that the elected individuals will not in theory have anything to do with the negotiations of the Cyprus Problem. Yet, this Party asks for the people to vote MEPs based on the party’s position on the Annan Plan (which took place seven years after the referenda).

The last example below is again for the 2011 local Parliament elections, but this time is for an individual of the DISY party. This candidate attempts to take advantage of another deeply securitized issue in the societal sector, namely the Greek identity. The advertisement includes his name ‘Kyriakos Anastasiades’, his profession ‘Teacher’ followed by his slogan which reads ‘Stable strength: *For the Greek education*’. One of the Greek Cypriot fears is the loss of their identity, not only because of the increasing numbers of the Turkish settlers, but also because of the Christofias’ rapprochement efforts that includes the revision of education material history books. This individual does not need to explain why he would ‘fight’ for the Greek education and why it is important. The audience knows that this specific referent object (Greek identity) is under threat with the specific government’s approaches.

Picture 6. 3. Greek education



Source: Picture taken by the author

The examples above indicate that depending on the social context securitization could occur without following the security grammar and ‘mainstream’ speech act methods and even without any negotiation between actors and audiences. Interestingly, the same environment could be the answer to one of the criticisms leveled against the theory, namely that securitization cannot be the outcome of both just a speech act (i.e. after the

utterance something is done) and a negotiation process (Stritzel 2007). What is argued here is that in areas where securitization processes become institutionalized and threats are internalized and unquestionably accepted by the public, the negotiation between actors and audiences are ongoing (decades-long) processes. During these negotiations the audiences accept and internalize the referent objects under threat, but more importantly they form perceptions about the sources of threat. Thus, in such environments a simple speech act regarding any *new* referent object could lead to successful securitization (i.e. something is done), as long as the threat and object is linked to the internalized perceptions of the audiences.¹⁵⁸ In institutionalized environments therefore securitization could be the outcome of both a speech act and a negotiation at the same time.

An indicative example of such a scenario, where the source of threat is securitized in an institutionalized manner but the referent object is new, is the natural gas found in the southeast area of Cyprus. The RoC's decision to sign exploration agreements with neighboring countries (Israel, Egypt and Lebanon) and foreign companies (e.g. Noble Energy) was not taken lightly by Turkey, which threatened to intervene should the RoC proceed with exploration.¹⁵⁹ While gas has never been a referent object for Greek Cypriots, it became very easily securitized without much negotiation. Precisely because the source of threat (i.e. Turkey) is already accepted as 'real', a few speech acts regarding this referent object were enough to convince the audience immediately without any negotiation either among the elite or between the elite and the public. Indeed, the new object was not just accepted as being under threat, but almost immediately became part of the elite's and media's securitization routines. Once again therefore the elite struggle was not so much to convince anyone about the threat, but rather to convince the audience that they are better suited to handle it.

¹⁵⁸ The term 'new referent object' refers to objects that have not been securitized in the past (e.g. settlers, guarantees, etc.), such as for instance the newly found gas reserves found near Cyprus.

¹⁵⁹ The Turkish EU minister and Chief negotiator Egemen Bagis warned Greek Cypriots that Turkey will not allow for gas exploration, noting that 'this is why we [Turkey] have the navy for' (connoting that Turkey might use its navy to prevent any gas exploration from taking place without Turkey's consent) <http://www.europolitics.info/external-policies/ankara-warns-nicosia-over-gas-and-oil-exploration-plans-art312151-41.html> [accessed October 3, 2011].

6.5. Horizontal securitization

Chapter 3 developed the hypothesis that in an institutionalized environment the securitization process could take place on a horizontal level as well, meaning that the actors' goal is not to influence large audiences – as is the case with mainstream top-down securitization – but rather only their immediate periphery such as family and peers. This process therefore could be understood as a form of 'micro-securitization' since the aim is to influence a small number of individuals rather than the entire or big parts of the society. Furthermore, on a horizontal level any individual can become a securitizing actor regardless of his/her social capital. Indeed, peers and family members may have more impact on their periphery than 'mainstream' securitizing actors such as political elite because the former have more 'relative' capital compared to the latter. A family member for instance may be able to apply more efficiently pressure on other members of the family (compared to an elite) and subsequently successfully convince their 'micro-audience' of the presence of an existential threat.

Horizontal securitization occurs when there is deviation, or prospects for deviation, from the accepted and internalized discourse on threats and from the potential disruption of the social routines (even conflict-perpetuating ones) that maintain the community's identity and way of life. Horizontal actions therefore are most evident during periods of imminent pivotal events or in the period immediately following them, given that such events jeopardize the continuation of the routines and the established discourses. The 'hyper-securitization' of such periods – characterized by constant and multi-directional securitization from several different actors, such as politicians, media, religious institutions, NGOs, academics, etc. – inevitably makes the audiences much more active and involved in the process, not only as 'recipients' that need to accept or reject an act but also as advocates of those positions.

Horizontal securitization could take place in subtle and 'aggressive' ways. Both are the outcome of peer and social pressure with the difference being in the degree of pressure and the level of dramatization. In the latter case, securitization takes place through

extreme dramatization, guilt, name-calling, ‘character assassinations’ and threats for social exclusion. Securitization on a horizontal level takes place through the personalization of (potential) existential threats, meaning that a psychological burden is placed on individuals for i) the collective security of the community and ii) the personal suffering of peers. It is this personal burden and sense of shame and guilt that could ‘force’ people to accept the institutionalized securitized positions in regards to specific referent objects (e.g. sovereignty or Greek identity) and reject any desecuritizing acts.

The Annan Plan period provides evidence for these forms of horizontal pressures. As most of the focus groups participants in favor of the Annan Plan pointed out, their peers frequently told them that ‘voting “yes” will lead to the end of Greek Cypriots’, and asked ‘how can *you* contribute to the destruction of our country?’ These ‘horizontal securitizing actors’ were personalizing the collective security, connoting that the security of the entire community was subject to the specific individuals’ choices, applying thus substantial psychological and emotional pressure on their peers to accept something (e.g. Annan Plan) as an existential threat.

Others were subjected to more indirect pressures through guilt and shame. This was done primarily by linking personal stories and tragedies to contemporary events and developments, creating thereby emotional pressure to peers who, through their deviating behavior, were considered as disrespectful of their peer’s personal drama. For instance, a peer or family member who is a refugee talks about how he had to let go of all his property and forcefully leave his house; a mother talks about how her brother is a missing person; a grandfather talks about how he lost his neighbor during the invasion, etc. These individuals will then link their personal stories to a general issue that has to do with trust (for instance), and specifically how Turkey cannot be trusted to implement X or Y plan, or that it will take advantage of any weaknesses in any settlement proposal. When focus group participants were asked how family members and peers tried to influence them into voting ‘no’, almost all mentioned the aforementioned expressions. The threat for those actors did not derive from ‘facts’ or ‘evidence’ but was based on distrust towards the ‘other’ which in turn was based on their personal experiences, which however were

unrelated to the Plan per se. It was in other words their predispositions and internalized beliefs that dictated why something was a potential threat and not their exposure to political discourses. The mechanisms used to securitize the Plan therefore were not based on evidence or the plausibility of a threat per se but rather on the personal experiences with the ‘other’. Similarly, the mechanisms used to convince their immediate periphery were based on guilt, shame and the expectations that a family and friend will respect the concerns and personal suffering of his/her friend or family member and not on the fear of reaching a ‘point of no return’ because of the potential existential threat.

This approach seems to have a significant impact on the population as individuals who never had such experiences themselves frequently reiterate these personal stories. Indicative of this argument are some of the focus groups high school students – who were born two decades after the invasion – who argued that they could never trust the Turks who forcefully drove their parents and grandparents out of their villages, and they could never understand the people who believe that Turks could be trusted. It is worth noting while the majority of the students who participated in the focus groups did not share this opinion they all acknowledged that their peers constantly used such expressions (e.g. how can you trust the ‘Turks’ who drove us out of our homes) to apply pressure on them.¹⁶⁰ The students who were opposed to the Plan perceived it as an existential threat not because they have read it, but rather because of the social environment in which they grew up. The securitization of the Plan in these cases was successful for this particular audience (e.g. students and generally young people) without the direct intervention of a ‘mainstream’ actor (e.g. elite) and without following the ‘security grammar’. Instead success is attributed to the audience’s social context and the horizontal forces dominating the environment.

Religion is also part of any social context and the role religious institutions have in the securitization processes should not be left under-examined. The latter are certainly significant actors in any country, but more so in an environment where the population is

¹⁶⁰ As discussed in chapter 4 most of the students who participated in the specific focus group were taken to the US for a month to live with Turkish Cypriots as a rapprochement project. They had in other words experiences that the ‘average’ Greek Cypriot student would not.

particularly religious, as is the case in Cyprus (Greek Cypriot community).¹⁶¹ Especially in such environments representatives of religious institutions could use the audiences' faith as a mechanism to securitize specific issues such as the Annan Plan. An indicative example is the Kyrenia Bishop, Pavlos, who argued prior to the referenda that those who vote 'yes' will not be able to enter the gates of paradise as opposed to those who vote 'no'. While for some this threat may be 'empty', for deeply religious people, especially the elderly, this approach might be much more effective than the traditional security grammar approach used by political elite. It must be noted that the Church is the most trusted institution in the Greek Cypriot community (Cyprus2015 2009). Indeed, opinion polls indicate that 45% trust the Church 'completely' or 'sufficiently'; the respective percentages for the Justice system (courts) are 43%, follow by the trust in the government (39%), armed forces (36%), the police (30%) and the political parties (13%) (ibid). The Church may therefore have a significant role to play in formulating the perceptions of people regarding political matters, such as the Annan Plan.

As was the case above with the students, securitization from religious actors was not based on the objective 'facts' on the Plan, but rather on the people's identities. The Kyrenia Bishop used the people's beliefs and religious identity to indirectly securitize the Plan by directly securitizing something else, namely the 'after life'. In other words, a deeply religious person might be unwilling to take a chance of not 'entering the gates of paradise' for the sake of supporting the 'evil' Annan Plan. In this case therefore the social context allows for the securitization of an issue without the articulation of a security grammar that would revolve around the perceived existential threat per se (e.g. the Annan Plan).

¹⁶¹ The vast majority of Cypriots (81%) believe that the place of religion in our society is very important. It must be noted that Cyprus is ranked 1st among all EU member states, with the average being at only 46% (Eurobarometer 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf [accessed September 23, 2008]). See also, a 2009 opinion poll, which indicates that 45% of Greek Cypriots trust the Church completely or very much. They trust it more than any other institution including the RoC government (39%), the courts (43%), National Guard (36%), police (30%) and political parties (13%) (Cyprus2015, December 2009).

6.5.1. Social pressure through the press

The source of horizontal pressure derives primarily from two interconnected areas: the first relates to the internalized perceived threats within the society (as mentioned above) and the second to the press; the latter could increase the social pressure by amplifying the internalized threats. Below is further evaluation of the Greek Cypriot press and how it contributes to the social pressure that feeds the horizontal securitization process. Specifically the focus is on issues that either emphasize the social impact of the ongoing occupation or on those that are used to apply pressure to Greek Cypriots who fail to conform to the existing conflict-based norms.

In the first category one frequently finds economy-related issues, which however have an impact on the society – i.e. they are not limited to the economy per se. The press in these cases links economic-related issues to the Problem. Indicative examples of such headline news are: ‘The market is full of Turkish products’¹⁶² and ‘Gambling (from Greek Cypriots) funds the pseudo-state’.¹⁶³ Such approaches emphasize how the occupation also has an economic impact, which however is up to Greek Cypriots to minimize. Such economic-related references do not argue for the support of Cypriot or Greek products, but rather for *not* supporting Turkish products. The connotation behind such news is that some Greek Cypriots essentially fund the ‘enemy’. This is unique to Turkish products; hence there is no reference for the market being full of products from the Philippines, China or Greece, since it is not considered harmful or an ‘act of treason’ to buy anything from those states. The impact such references have is real, as the products and the vendors who trade them are frequently named. There is thus direct pressure to the business people involved as they are indirectly portrayed as traitors who ‘trade with the enemy’ for the sake of profit. There is also pressure to potential buyers who knowingly support the ‘occupation force’, as Turkey is frequently described in the press. In other words, if it becomes public knowledge that ‘X’ product is Turkish, then it is the

¹⁶² Simerini, November 7, 2003

¹⁶³ Simerini, December 18, 2003

consumers' responsibility to behave 'patriotically' and boycott those specific products and vendors; The alternative is frequently equated with a mild form of treason.

Similarly, reference to gambling in the areas not controlled by the Republic does not have a moral epicenter (e.g. it is bad or dangerous to gamble), but an ethnic one; i.e. your gambling funds the *pseudo-state* and essentially the 'enemy'. The publicity such issues receive in the press applies direct pressure on the individuals who are involved in such activities, but it also allows for other Greek Cypriots to securitize their peers' activities, arguing that such actions (e.g. funding the 'enemy') is catastrophic for 'our' side and an act of treason and subsequently a source of shame for families and friends. In these cases, securitization that links threats and shame could be much more effective when it comes from peers and family members (i.e. horizontally) than from political elites (i.e. top-down). This is because it is more difficult for individuals involved in such 'threatening' social activities (e.g. gambling, or buying Turkish products) to ignore their peers than their elites.

To emphasize the severe impact the enemy has on the society the press does not hesitate to dramatize social issues and connect them to the Greek Cypriot's biggest fears. This is done by using 'loaded' words and phrases, such as 'Attila', which is one of the most sensitive words for Greek Cypriots as the two Turkish military operations in 1974 had a code name 'Attila'; hence Greek Cypriots talk about 'the Attila' when they refer to the Turkish occupation forces. Indicative of this over-dramatization is a 2005 case when – amidst the bird flu period – it was made public that chickens were transferred to the Greek Cypriot side from the Turkish Cypriot one. The issue became instantly a threat in the media with headlines titles such as 'Flying Attila: chickens are transferred from the occupied areas'.¹⁶⁴ Even chickens could be equated to the 'Attila' if they come from the northern part, reminding the public that anything related to Turkey or the 'Turkish side' is an existential threat; even chickens.

¹⁶⁴ Simerini, October 13, 2005

Similarly, over-dramatization and personalized attacks are used to explicitly remind Greek Cypriots of the norms that should not be violated. There is no hesitation to publish names in the press to apply psychological and social pressure to individuals who ‘violate’ the norms, forcing them to conform and preemptively stop any other potential ‘violators’ from engaging in any ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unpatriotic’ actions, which are always portrayed as existential threats for the community as a whole. Any personal or professional activities with Turkish Cypriots or Turkey are frequently exposed in the media and are securitized. Indicative headline news are: ‘Greek Cypriot tourist agents organize trips to the occupied areas’ (Phileleftheros, February 27, 2007)¹⁶⁵ and ‘Greek Cypriot lawyers function as agents for [Mehmet Ali] Talat’.¹⁶⁶ There are also more ‘personalized’ references where individuals are presented as ‘traitors’ or ‘unpatriotic’ even though the specific words may not be used explicitly. For instance, individuals who went to the Compensation Commission,¹⁶⁷ were placed in a ‘list of shame’ – see e.g. ‘List of shame: those who applied to the Compensation Commission’.¹⁶⁸ Others found their names in the press because they were buying Turkish Cypriot property (or did other business activities with Turkish Cypriots) – see e.g. ‘Give and take with property: Greek Cypriot businessmen are buying Turkish Cypriot properties’;¹⁶⁹ ‘Who invests in the occupied areas’.¹⁷⁰

The figure below shows a Greek Cypriot throwing his head over the barbed wire (i.e. cease-fire line) with a ‘for sale’ ticket on it. The background is the gigantic Turkish flag, which Turkish Cypriots constructed on the mountains of Pentadaktylos / Beşparmak Dağları. There is a double connotation here: the first is that some Greek Cypriots are willing to sell anything to the enemy and the second that selling ‘our’ property to the enemy is as bad as selling ourselves (i.e. our identity).

¹⁶⁵ Phileleftheros, February 27, 2007

¹⁶⁶ Simerini May 25, 2007


¹⁶⁷ The specific Commission was created by Turkish Cypriot authorities for Greek Cypriots who would like to sell their properties in the areas not controlled by the Republic. As expected it has become a big area of contention among the Greek Cypriot community as any individuals who apply for compensation are seen as non-patriots who sell out ‘our occupied lands to the enemy’.

¹⁶⁸ Simerini, July 6, 2007

¹⁶⁹ Phileleftheros, September 26, 2007

¹⁷⁰ Politis, September 21, 2008

Figure 6.7. For Sale



Source: philenews.com (November 23, 2009) and <http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanis/index.html>

This personalization in the press promotes both institutionalized and horizontal securitization. Specifically, maintaining certain issues such as the economy or loss of property securitized and into the realm of existential threats in a routine manner is not easy. This goal is achievable through the creation of public pressure and the perpetuation of securitization albeit through horizontal mechanisms rather than top-down. The media thus incorporate social pressure and shame into their mechanisms to maintain the norms around issues that cannot be easily securitized in perpetuity from elite. The exposure these issues receive in the press creates significant pressure not only to the people involved, but also to other people who might be considering acting in a similar manner, thus maintaining a deeply securitized environment and preventing the violation of the conflict-related norms that dominate the society and perpetuate the zero-sum mentalities.

6.5.2. Social pressure in the academic community

The existence of multiple audiences, as discussed in chapter 3, allows for ‘targeted’ securitization. It also makes it easier for analyzing empirically whether or not securitization has been successful and more importantly for this thesis whether it has been institutionalized and whether there are indeed horizontal processes. With these goals

in mind, this section examines the conflict-induced social pressure and the subsequent horizontal securitization within the Greek Cypriot academic community. The reasoning behind this analysis is twofold: the first is that academia is a specific audience that can be reasonably easily analyzed due to its relatively small size; the second is that it is the most educated group of the population, meaning that if they too are influenced by horizontal securitization and social pressures, then we can assume that other less educated (and knowledgeable) parts of the population will also do so.

The survey, which was distributed to the entire Greek Cypriot academic community, aimed to examine the degree of cooperation between academics on both sides of the Green Line, the problems they may have faced if they cooperated with Turkish Cypriots and the reasons why they chose not engage in any cooperation if they did not.¹⁷¹ One of the overall findings is that three out of five (59%) academics in the Greek Cypriot side never cooperated with any colleagues on the Turkish Cypriot side, while the other 41% did so side at least once, with the nature of their cooperation revolving primarily around research projects and conference and seminar organizations. Another interesting observation is the area in which cooperation occurred: of those who have cooperated, approximately one in three (30%) did so only in neutral ground (neither Greek nor Turkish Cypriot controlled areas), namely abroad or the buffer zone.

The issue of recognition and social pressure are the two primary factors leading to the low level of cooperation and the venue choices. The statistical findings on this issue (see more below) are corroborated by the focus group and interviews conducted with academics. The explanation they gave during our meetings is twofold: On the one hand the Greek Cypriot academic institutions are often unwilling to organize events with Turkish Cypriots, leaving them thus no option to engage in any cooperation in Cyprus.¹⁷² Thus their choices are limited to the events organized by neutral organizations (e.g. PRIO), that usually take place in the Buffer Zone or abroad. Others, such as Dr. 'E',

¹⁷¹ For the survey details see chapter 4 and appendix III for the survey as was distributed to the academic community.

¹⁷² Academic institutions are frequently skeptical for hosting bi-communal events out of fear of being accused of recognizing the TRNC.

pointed out that cooperation abroad is socially easier because he does not need to explain to anyone his actions or face any criticism from colleagues. What is interesting is that academics feel that any cooperation with the ‘other’ must be ‘justified’. As Prof. Constantinou emphasized the burden falls on the academics to prove to colleagues and family that their activities do not pose a threat for the Greek Cypriot community.¹⁷³ This burden and perceived obligation Prof. Constantinou mentions is to a degree quantifiable and evident from the survey. Of those who have collaborated, 16% of them noted that they would consciously *not* inform their colleagues of their activities and 14% would not inform their family members. This skeptical reaction is not unjustifiable. The survey revealed that 35% of academics who *have* cooperated with the ‘other’ faced moderate or strong opposition from their families.

The burden to ignore the securitized perceptions may be too heavy for a significant number of the academic population. These individuals therefore choose not to collaborate with the other and thus not deviate from the ‘norms’. Of those who do collaborate may choose to keep it a secret from colleagues or family members, at least at the beginning. As Dr. Charalambous noted, at the beginning she would not talk to family members about her research – that involved the teaching of Turkish language in Greek Cypriot schools – as she ‘knew how they would react and [she] did not want to deal with it’. Similarly Dr. ‘A’ said that his Head of the Department would not be very pleased if he found out about his work with Turkish Cypriots, and noted that ‘I choose not to tell him anything. He [the Head] says that it is bad publicity for the department, the university and bad for our side [i.e. Greek Cypriot] as a whole. I don’t agree with him of course, but he is the Head...’, connoting that he is in a position of power. The concern of departmental, peer and family opposition is not unsubstantiated or limited to some individuals. The survey shows that approximately one in four (24%) of those who have cooperated with Turkish Cypriots faced moderate or strong opposition from their administration (e.g. Head of Department, Dean, etc.) and colleagues.

¹⁷³ Personal interview [March 14, 2011]

Academics who have faced moderate or strong opposition noted that the administration – primarily their immediate superior (e.g. Head of Department) – as well as their colleagues were trying to present their cooperation as hazardous to their institutions, thereby presenting individual choices as a threat for the ‘collective’, namely the entire department. Their cooperation was also presented as being hazardous to the country as there was always the risk of indirectly recognizing the TRNC. On the other side there were academics, such as Prof. Constantinou, who directly responded to this criticism pointing out that ‘even if we [academics] wanted to, it is not possible for individuals to recognize a state or an entity such as the TRNC’, arguing that there are many misperceptions on the dangers behind bi-communal cooperation. These clarifications however did not mitigate the pressure he faced when he cooperated with the ‘other’; instead he was labeled as a ‘Turkophile’ [τουρκόφιλος] and ‘nenekis’ [one that said ‘yes’ to the Annan Plan] by several colleagues.

What is particularly interesting are the responses of academics who did *not* cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, when asked the hypothetical question of ‘how do you think your i) administration, ii) colleagues and iii) family would react if you cooperated with Turkish Cypriots’. The response for moderate or strong opposition was 24%, 36%, 44% respectively. In follow-up questions to determine the reasoning behind these concerns, it became obvious that the fear of recognition was at the top. Specifically, the fear of recognizing the TRNC was rated (by far) the most important reason for *not* cooperating with academics north of the Buffer Zone: 70% said that the potential recognition of TRNC is a significant (6%) or very significant (64%) reason for not cooperating with the ‘other’. Second to this on the ‘important factors scale’ came the options ‘the opportunity did not arise’ followed by ‘I am ideologically opposed’ and ‘I do not want to be associated with specific funding agencies’. It must be noted that of those who said that the opportunity did not arise, only 26% would be willing to cross over the Green Line for any form of cooperation if given the opportunity. The rest would only do it in the areas controlled by the Republic, in the Buffer Zone or abroad, indicating again ‘fear of recognition’. Approximately 15% of the respondents also rated the opposition they will

face from family, peers and administration as a significant or very significant reason for not cooperating.

What comes to the surface from these responses is that i) even among the academic community the institutionalized securitization led to the internalization of specific threats (i.e. TRNC recognition) which were incorporated into the audience's routines (i.e. work-related activities such as research cooperation); and ii) this institutionalization created both actual and expected (hypothetical) horizontal securitization from peers and family.

The argument above is corroborated by additional data from the survey, which also examined the horizontal pressure from a securitizing actor perspective. Specifically, it examined the responses of academics that were willing to engage in horizontal securitization in an attempt to influence their peers. Of those academics who did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, 30% noted that they themselves moderately or strongly opposed colleagues who did so. This opposition ranged from simply making their dissatisfaction and disappointment known, to direct and explicit disapproval of their colleagues' activities. These views were also evident in follow-up interviews. Dr. Ioannou for instance said that she frequently told fellow academics that she 'would rather not see her friends and colleagues cooperate with the Turks', even though she would not try to stop them. She would also not participate in events if she were invited as that is against her ideology, but also dangerous for Cyprus [Greek Cypriots]. Others such as Prof. 'T', stated that he does not engage in such activities and does not approve of such cooperation unless they follow strict guidelines,¹⁷⁴ while he also actively tries to influence his colleagues not to participate either. What is interesting to note is that the individuals who oppose cooperation with the 'other' use the same discourse as the elite

¹⁷⁴ While there is usually no problem with the Turkish Cypriot academics as individuals, their institutions are not recognized by the RoC. This means that in collaborative events sometimes affiliation cannot be displayed. In any meeting, such as the focus groups conducted for this thesis (at the University of Nicosia premises), it was acceptable to indicate the name and rank of academics involved, e.g. Prof. Erol Kaymak, but his institution, the Eastern Mediterranean University, could not. It must be noted that to eliminate any biases and misunderstandings the same principle was applied to all participants, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots: their affiliations were not displayed.

and media to justify their positions, indicating again an ‘automated’ response to perceived threats.

The pressure towards academics that ‘deviate’ from the norms is not limited within the boundaries of the academic world. The media not only securitizes such cooperation, but also occasionally increases the ‘cost’ for individuals who engage in such activities by publishing the names and/or pictures of those who collaborate with the ‘enemy’. Indicative of such cases is the article below entitled, ‘which academics (teachers) do most harm to our land’. The specific article provided a list of academics that were involved in bi-communal activities, making the argument that any cooperation is harmful to ‘our country’ and thus the public should know who the people generating this ‘threat’ are.

Picture 6.4. Who are the most harmful academics?



Source: www.philenews.com (December 3, 2010)

Similarly, during the Annan period newspapers opposing the Plan generated a list of research institutions and academics involved in projects funded by specific agencies such as UNDP, PRIO, USAID, etc. and made the argument that these are people who are paid by the Anglo-Americans. What they failed to mention is that most of those projects had nothing to do with the Annan Plan, or indeed with the Cyprus Problem. Despite that, a simple association with those agencies was sufficient to create pressure for the individuals involved. As Ms. Eftychiou noted ‘our names and institutions were published in the newspaper because of a project dealing with the bi-diversity of Cyprus (and was

funded by USAID). Our Director told us that it was shameful for our institution and would create numerous problems for us'.¹⁷⁵

The aforementioned examples provide evidence of how effective is the institutionalized securitization of specific agents such as the US and the UK. The origin of the funding agency (e.g. from the US) is sufficient to automatically generate perceptions of threats regardless if the actual activities associated with those agencies revolved around the Problem. This argument is corroborated by the findings from the academic survey as well which showed that of those academics who did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, 22% of them argued that 'not being associated with specific funding agencies' was an important and very important reason for not cooperating.

6.5.3. Social pressure among students and artists

This section deals with two particular sets of audiences, namely students and artists, and examines how they experience horizontal pressure and securitization. All artists participating in the focus groups pointed out that they did not face any particular societal pressures and attributed this primarily to the nature of their work. As they argued, they are generally viewed in neutral terms and the rest of the society mostly ignores them. Their bi-communal activities are mostly perceived as neither beneficial nor threatening as long as they are not funded by Turkish Cypriot agencies or other specific 'suspicious' (as they characterize them) sources such as USAID funds. In those cases they are immediately perceived as 'dangerous' and their activities draw a lot of attention in the media; the press focuses on the threats deriving from such cooperation, while the integrity of their character is frequently questioned. As Ms Skordi (a painter) pointed out 'it is very interesting that no one cares about our work and our rapprochement efforts, unless they see something as a threat'. She then added that when they receive attention, it is always in 'negative terms', highlighting potential dangers. Other participants too argued that their efforts are at best ignored and at worst they are securitized (presented as

¹⁷⁵ Personal interview [March 15, 2011].

a huge threat to the Greek Cypriot community), but they are never portrayed by the media or other agents as positive. 'It is as if no one cares to say that it is nice that Greek and Turkish Cypriots work together' Skordi noted. Perhaps a more accurate observation would be that no media or political elite is willing to *take the risk* of saying that such collaborations are positive, given that (as noted earlier) this could lead to high costs.

Participants also highlighted the impact of securitization by pointing out that when there is negative publicity the public participation decreases dramatically.¹⁷⁶ Their explanation for the decreasing participation is that Greek Cypriots do not want to be associated with any activities that could jeopardize the political efforts of the government or taint their personal image as 'patriots'. The social pressure therefore once again is not only aimed at the individuals who do engage in any bi-communal activities, but also to the broader audience that might be willing to show tolerance or respect towards such actions.

Lastly, when asked whether they faced pressure from family and friends not to engage in such activities, the response was that they did, especially if the event was securitized in the press. Evidently, the horizontal securitization takes place even in the most neutral sector of the society (i.e. artists) if the right conditions are present (e.g. negative reference in the press). This also provides an indication of how securitized some issues are; the 'neutrality' of artists disappears with the slightest hint of a perceived threat. For instance, a simple reference to the TRNC in any event is sufficient to have such an impact. Indicatively, Ms. Hadjiandreou – a Greek Cypriot pianist who cooperated with fellow Turkish Cypriot musicians in a bi-communal event funded by neutral agencies (i.e. neither Greek or Turkish Cypriot) – noted that she refused to get paid for her services when during the last day of the recitals she realized that on the event Program it was written (in Turkish only) that the event was under the auspices of the TRNC Ministry of Education.¹⁷⁷ When asked why she refused to receive a payment she said that 'I never agreed that the event would be under the auspices of an illegal entity. I was tricked and if I do not get paid no one will be able to say that I did this for the money'. It is clear that

¹⁷⁶ They did not use this terminology (i.e. securitization). They talked about the impact of constant threat-discourses in the media.

¹⁷⁷ Private interview [March 22, 2011].

artists, just like the academics, are concerned about how their actions will be perceived and more importantly portrayed in the press and elsewhere. Similarly, they are concerned of the horizontal pressures they might face from colleagues, family or the society in general.

The focus groups discussions with the high school students – ages 15 to 17 years old – yielded even more interesting results. The majority of the students in the group participated in bi-communal events, thus the focus of the discussion revolved around the peers and teachers reactions. The focus was on how the latter perceived the specific students' activities as 'shameful' and 'dangerous', and on the impact this had on the latter's future activities.

All participants commented that they faced significant social pressure from their peers and their actions were heavily securitized. Among other things, they were called 'traitors', accused of "sleeping" with the enemy' and of bringing the 'enemy into our community'. More importantly however they mentioned that they were ostracized by their classmates and often by their teachers. This was especially the case during national holiday celebrations (e.g. April 1st, the commencement of the EOKA struggle), when some of their classmates asked them to leave the celebration and go 'play with their brothers, the Turks'.

Some of their 'nationalists' classmates, as the participants called them, even created very insulting video films which were uploaded on YouTube and then disseminated the links to as many students as possible. In the video spots, besides the occasional characterizations mentioned above, they were also accused of being the 'force' that will destroy Cyprus and the Greek identity. These students, just like academics mentioned earlier, were frequently called 'nenekie' (those who voted 'yes' in the Annan Plan). When asked about family reactions (for their bi-communal activities), some students indicated that their relatives too called them 'nenekie', but did not go as far as calling them 'traitors'.

What is interesting is that during the 2004 referenda those students who were called ‘nenekie’ were anywhere from 9 to 11 years old and could not, obviously, vote or have any profound understanding of the Plan. It is worth noting that the political incorrect phrases, such as ‘nenekie’, ‘traitors’, ‘tourkosporie’ (one that is from Turkish seed) are not found in the media or the official political discourses, but only in personal and ‘unofficial’ environments (e.g. homes, coffee shops, school yards, etc.). Thus, the fact that the younger generation uses such expressions, coupled with the fact that these expressions were not used in the media (at least not frequently) leads to two major conclusions:

- i. The Annan Plan was indeed a very pivotal event that penetrated the social environment and not just the political one.
- ii. The family environment has a very significant role to play in the perpetuation of threats and the institutionalized securitization.

It must be noted that the impact of education is not discounted. Indeed, the education systems on both sides contribute to the zero-sum mentality of the younger generation and the maintenance of the perceptions about friends and enemies (see e.g. Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 2000; Spyrou 2006; Kizilyurek and Gautier-Kizilyurek 2004; Killoran 1998). What is argued here is that certain politically incorrect expressions and positions held by the younger generation are more likely to derive from the family environment and peers rather than the education system or other official narratives.

Follow-up interviews with researchers on the Problem and the education system corroborate the findings from the focus groups. Indeed, evidently horizontal securitization could take place among students even without any involvement in bi-communal activities. Specifically, Dr. Charalambous, who has examined the teaching of Turkish language in Greek Cypriot public schools, when asked about peer reactions towards students who followed the specific course, emphasized that *all* 30 students in the Turkish language class were called ‘traitors’ by their peers. In addition they were frequently called ‘communists’ as they were associated with the leftist AKEL that is a pro-reconciliation political party. If learning the Turkish language is considered an act of

treason, then it is not surprising that bi-communal cooperation is perceived as much more dangerous.

The examples mentioned above do not just demonstrate the existence of social pressure, on horizontal (i.e. peer to peer) and top-down (i.e. media to public) levels. They also provide clear indications of horizontal securitization. The referent object is usually the Greek Cypriot identity, but the threat does not derive *directly* from the enemy, but rather from the actions of individuals within the Greek Cypriot community; actions that make the enemy-threat more probable. This is of particular importance because the threats and the ontological insecurity is not the outcome of ‘enemy’ actions as is usually the case with the mainstream reading of the theory. Securitization aiming to maintain the people’s ontological security is institutionalized therefore regardless of the actions of the ‘other’. Indeed, that actors and audiences alike are more concerned by the actions of people from their ‘own’ community than of those by the ‘other’. This is not surprising however given that any action from the ‘other’ will be automatically perceived as a threat, whereas acts from our ‘own people’ requires more effort. The most efficient and effective to maintain certain issues and acts as existential is through institutionalized and horizontal securitization that frequently preempts individuals (as demonstrated above) from engaging in any ‘dangerous’ activities.

In addition, the examples above also provide very clear indications of institutionalization. We observe the same perceived threats, discourses and even specific phrasing from elite and public alike. The fact that the younger generation too uses the same phrases and discourses – even though they have never themselves experienced those potential threats from the pivotal events – is indicative of the institutionalized securitization impact. It is clear that institutionalized securitization more easily leads to horizontal securitization, which in turn promotes the perpetuation of ‘conflict norms’ and discourages any deviation. This is particularly evident from the student focus group. When the students were asked whether they would continue to participate in bi-communal events only very few responded positively. Some said they might do so in the future, but others were more explicit indicating that while they do not agree with the ‘fascist classmates’ (as they

called them) they do not want to be isolated or have to deal with the pressure from peers and teachers alike. Horizontal securitization and psychological bullying therefore, has a major impact: it ‘forces’ individuals to conform to the established norms (e.g. maintain no relationships with the ‘enemy’) and leads to the continuation of conflict-perpetuating routines.

6.6. Social context, bottom-up and involuntary securitization

Two of the main hypotheses of the thesis claim that under certain conditions securitization could occur in a bottom-up manner (HII) and that the process, when taking place in an institutionalized framework with horizontal and bottom-up forces, could lead to involuntary securitization (HIII). As already discussed, these conditions are found in environments that foster the perpetuation of conflict-related routines as is the case for instance in protracted ethnic conflicts.

Chapter 3 explained how bottom-up securitization could occur in direct and indirect ways. The former refers to cases of full ‘role-reversal’ where a specific audience becomes the actor and the decision-makers become the recipient (and thus the audience). The latter refers to cases where a specific audience influences the actors into securitizing an issue and the former do not therefore become actors per se, but they are the driving force behind the top-down securitization. The latter case also refers to pressure at the bottom, which is what leads to involuntary securitization thereby linking closely the two hypotheses (bottom-up and involuntary). Indeed, it is the forces at the ‘bottom’ that lead to involuntary acts on an ‘actor’ level and the horizontal forces that lead to involuntary acts on an ‘audience’ level.

The direct form of bottom-up securitization is particularly difficult to demonstrate and prove given the absence of a single voice by the audience and the presence of official (written or oral) discourse. This is especially the case when the audience is the entire population. However, it becomes a more feasible task when examining smaller sets of audiences such as the academic community or members of a specific political party.

Using again the Annan period as an example, there were cases where supporters of a political party would gather together (forming thus a significant enough audience) to securitize the Plan, aiming to influence their respective decision-makers who could make the official party decisions regarding the Plan. This was particularly the case with AKEL, a party that did not formulate an official position until the very end (either in favor or against it). AKEL was in a particularly difficult position as the leftists and AKEL are traditionally the ones closer to Turkish Cypriots and the force behind most rapprochement efforts. The difficulty arose because DISY, the right-wing party, already endorsed the Plan and urged its voters to vote ‘yes’ even though the vast majority of the (Greek Cypriot) population indicated well in advance that it would reject the proposed settlement. The ‘natural’ or ‘expected’ AKEL’s decision would be to support the Plan as well; however it faced a twofold dilemma: on one hand it would be particularly difficult to justify why the pro-settlement party would not support a proposed settlement, especially when the so-called nationalists (i.e. DISY) supported it. On the other hand AKEL knew that the Plan would be rejected and that a vast majority of its voters were against it, so it did not want to support a ‘lost case’ that could potentially create instability within the ‘base’ of the party.

Trying to weigh these two options, AKEL did not formulate an official position until a few days before the referenda. It was this delay that led to bottom-up securitization within the party. Members of AKEL from several villages formed groups and demanded that their leadership acknowledge the dangers deriving from the Plan and take an official stance of rejection. These groups went to the Party’s premises and their local representatives to express their views and explain their positions vis-à-vis the Plan.¹⁷⁸ The decision-makers thus became the audience who needed to accept or reject the people’s securitizing acts. The bottom-up securitization was successful as officially the Party eventually rejected the Plan even though it clearly stated that it was not against it.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ There were cases where these groups would take with them their voting booklets and threatened to burn them, should their Party not take an official position that would acknowledge the dangers of the Plan (interview with AKEL MP, May 3, 2011). The connotation was that they would not be able to vote and thus the Party would suffer political losses.

¹⁷⁹ Indicative of the impact of such pressures is the AKEL official position a few days prior to the referenda, which stated that ‘we say “no” to solidify the “yes”’ (λέμε «όχι» για να τσιμεντώσουμε το «ναι»), arguing

A similar situation took place within the right-wing party, albeit the bottom-up securitizing acts were unsuccessful. A significant percentage of the party's voters – and some members of the party – warned that they considered the Plan an existential threat and that they would reject it and would not vote for the Party should it choose to support it. The Party ignored them and openly supported the Plan. This led to the withdrawal of several members of the Party and the formation of a new party (EVROKO) with more hardline positions. Similarly, in the next elections DISY percentages dropped from the usual (over) 34% to 28% in the 2004 elections for MEPs, indicating clearly that a significant number of its voters 'abandoned' the party (at least temporarily).¹⁸⁰

What is also worth noting from the evidence above is the idea of 'cost' for actors who choose to deviate from the established norms. In some cases the cost is objective and real (as was the case with DISY above). This may not always be the case though. This seems to be however irrelevant as people, especially (most) political elites, are risk averse and choose the least risky path. Even the possibility of cost therefore may be enough for them to choose the safe path which could be the perpetuation of the status quo (i.e. what AKEL did in the example above).

Indirect bottom-up securitization, which also leads to elite involuntary securitization, is easier to observe and demonstrate. This form of securitization occurs because of the audiences' expectations regarding the issues that must be treated as a threat. The expectations are evident from opinion polls demonstrating what the public considers to be important. The impact of these expectations are seen from how elites react to the public demands and more specifically from the elite's positions during their political campaigns. As already noted, the handling of the Cyprus problem is the primary deciding factor for Greek Cypriots when it comes to choosing their political representatives. This means that

that the Party did not have sufficient time to convince the public for the Plan and mitigate the people's fears. They thus chose to reject it temporarily so that they can promote it at a later time in an efficient way that would guarantee acceptance.

¹⁸⁰ Past DISY percentages in elections previous to the 2004 referenda were as followed: i. 1996 – Parliamentary elections 34.5%; ii) 1998 – Presidential elections 40%; iii) 2001 – Parliamentary elections 34%; iv) 2003 – Presidential elections 39%.

elites, whether they want to or not, must treat the Problem as a priority and in a way that meets the public's fears and concerns. More than half of Greek Cypriot voters (55%) would vote for a political party based on its positions on the conflict (Ant1 March 2010).¹⁸¹ When this is juxtaposed to the aforementioned polls that clearly indicate that security-related issues (e.g. Turkish guarantees, army, settlers, etc.) is the most important concern (see e.g. Cyprus2015, 2011), it becomes evident that Greek Cypriots are primarily interested in how their potential political leaders will handle these aspects of the Problem. The audience, using the public opinions as a 'voice', lucidly advocates what it considers to be a threat and essentially asks the elite and media to treat them as such. The cost of neglecting these concerns or attempting to desecuritize them (or even decrease the level of securitization) might therefore be particularly costly for elites. The most rational approach for elites and the media is thus to respond to public demand and maintain the securitization routines so as to indicate that they take into consideration their concerns and fears. In this case therefore the 'involuntary' aspect is not in the strict sense, namely that these elites do not have the option, but rather that the option is very costly and thus 'irrational' to the degree that it becomes an unrealistic alternative.

This environment inevitably leads to institutionalized securitization as the process become part of the elite and media routines and the same discourse is reiterated constantly. More importantly however is that this institutionalization develops into a weapon with which elites attempt to benefit by distinguishing themselves from other elites and parties. The elite efforts, as mentioned earlier, is not so much to convince the audience of a threat but rather to convince them or remind them that they are the best agents to handle it. This 'actor-benefiting' securitization is therefore the outcome of indirect bottom-up forces. The fact that actors benefit from this institutionalized environment however eliminates incentives to either desecuritize the environment, which means that once the processes become part of the routines they cannot be easily changed or be interrupted. Instead they are more likely to be perpetuated.

¹⁸¹ The other 45% is distributed as follows: 21% consider the economy as the most important factor, 13% the party's MPs, 6% other governance issues, 2.5% the party's leader, 3% did not answer or respond.

Before proceeding to further analysis it is worth noting that I do not argue that these audiences' demands develop by themselves without the contribution of securitizing actors. Indeed the deeply securitized environment could be the outcome of top-down securitization processes that took place in the past. What is argued is that once the process is institutionalized, bottom-up processes could take place without the contribution of the elite at the top because the threats are internalized and the (expected) securitizing acts are part of the audiences' conflict perpetuating routines.

All securitizing acts are done in order to benefit the actor. However, in environments where securitization is institutionalized and ongoing and the aim is not to convince but rather to remind of one's ability to handle a threat, the processes tend to become more strategic (rather than ad hoc) aiming not only to create short-term benefits (e.g. access to extraordinary measures) but also long-term such as the development of a social context dominated by perceptions that link specific threats with specific actors. Strategic and routinized acts could more easily create sustainable mental links of how specific actors are more suited to handle specific threats. Political elite and media agents therefore strategically choose the areas and issues in which they have comparative advantage over their opponents and institutionalize securitization processes with the aim to appear as 'specialists' in the handling of specific threats.

In the case of Cyprus each party struggles to maintain an explicit image vis-à-vis the Problem. For instance the socialist party, EDEK, promotes the image that it is 'fighting hard' (harder than the rest) for the Cyprus problem as opposed to other parties that might be perceived as 'softer'.

Picture 6.5. EDEK - Struggling for the future



Source: Picture taken by the author

The picture above of a billboard advertisement for the EDEK says ‘For the fights, for consistency, for the future. NOW EDEK’. The connotation is that the two most powerful parties (AKEL and DISY) do not fight hard enough for Greek Cypriots; unlike EDEK, they make too many concessions and they are inconsistent with their positions during the negotiations. EDEK frequently attempts to securitize the two major parties’ approach to the Problem. Indicatively, the EDEK honorary President, Dr. Lyssarides, emphasized that ‘the current government (i.e. AKEL) as well as the opposition (i.e. DISY) will bring the country at the ‘edge of destruction’ if they do not change their approach’.¹⁸² When Dr. Lyssarides was asked what more they should do, his response was that they should make far fewer concessions and fight for what is ‘right and just’, referring to issues such as the withdrawal of troops and settlers, abolition of intervention guarantees, freedom of movement, etc.

‘Tailored’ securitization does not just revolve around the broad ideology on how the problem should be handled (see e.g. EDEK above), but also around specific issues that are of particular importance for the people. One such issue is the rotating presidency,

¹⁸² This position has been reiterated in the press but also noted in a private interview with author (May 12, 2011).

which is not accepted by 72.6% of Greek Cypriots (Ant1, March 2010).¹⁸³ This issue came to the surface when President Christofias reached an agreement with the Turkish Cypriot leader Talat, generating the immediate response from Greek Cypriot parties, the media and the public. The Greek Cypriot population after decades of being a politically homogeneous state cannot easily accept that every few months or years its leader will be a non-Greek Cypriot. This concern is exacerbated further by the fact that the non-Cypriot leader will be from the ‘enemy camp’ who will most likely (it is perceived) will serve Turkey’s interests and not those of the Cypriots.

What is interesting is not so much the reaction (which was expected), but rather how AKEL and DISY reacted. The government party (AKEL) instead of justifying its decision based on political arguments, it focused on its opponent’s (DISY) similar actions, arguing that DISY accepted it as well in the past.¹⁸⁴ DISY, under the public pressure, reacted saying that it does not agree with this specific form of rotating presidency as proposed by Christofias. On the contrary, to be in line with the public views it securitized the issue arguing that it is a ‘huge error’ (μέγα σφάλμα).¹⁸⁵ AKEL’s reaction to focus on its opponent rather than the argument per se can be explained by, and demonstrates the presence of, institutionalized securitization and the severe bottom-up pressures. While the leftist President and his supporting party (AKEL) do not oppose the concept of rotating presidency they knew that it was a deviation from the mainstream positions and a disregard of a deeply securitized issue. Given that it was impossible even for the bigger party to desecuritize an issue that is so routinely securitized, its strategy was to ‘take along’ the major opponent (DISY) so as not to be the only deviating party. It was for this reason that DISY reacted; it did not want to be perceived as a ‘deviating party’ too.

Other parties reacted more aggressively and used the public view to strengthen their positions. For instance, EDEK President, Yiannakis Omirou, suggested that there is a

¹⁸³ Rotating presidency refers to scenario where the presidency will be rotated between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

¹⁸⁴ See e.g. Mr. Evagorou (AKEL spokesman) position <http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/383937> [accessed June 10 2011]

¹⁸⁵ See e.g. Mr. Pourgourides (DISY spokesman) position (<http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/242793>) [accessed June 10 2011]

referendum among the Greek Cypriot community to let the public decide whether they want or not a rotating presidency or not.¹⁸⁶ EDEK also launched a direct attack on DISY, arguing that the latter portrayed the rotating presidency as a threat only after they realized what the public wanted (i.e. gave in to bottom-up pressures).¹⁸⁷

The fact that elite are unwilling to negotiate without the approval of the public first demonstrates the impact any deviation from the internalized views (e.g. perceived threats) could have on the elite. The decades-long institutionalized securitization regarding specific issues such as the rotating presidency may be beneficial for some actors (and even the outcome of their actions), but at the same time it also creates social contexts where elite are unable to move towards desecuritizing and conflict-diminishing positions, at least not without huge political costs.

Picture 6.6. Withdraw the rotating presidency



Source: Author's photograph

¹⁸⁶ See <http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/381137> [accessed June 10 2011]

¹⁸⁷ Specifically, the EDEK Press office issued an announcement on 26/2/2010 saying: It is very belatedly that DISY realized that the rotating presidency and the weighted voting system will never be accepted by the Greek Cypriots. Once Christos Pourgourides and the DISY spokesman realized that the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots will never accept the violent violation of Democracy and the heavy insults towards every Greek Cypriot citizen deriving from the anti-democratic proposition of the President Christofias, they run 'all sweaty' to align themselves with the *public demand* for the withdrawal of the rotating presidency and the weighted voting system (my translation, my emphasis).

Capitalizing on its diachronic position EDEK ‘advertised’ its routinely-held positions. The billboard above says: ‘To withdraw the rotating presidency. NOW EDEK’, reminding the public which party is best suited to deal with this threat.

The fourth major political agent, the Democratic Party (DIKO), also reacted demonstrating again the impact of bottom-up securitization. Specifically, Photis Photiou, a senior member of DIKO, in a radio interview explicitly said that if the public considers the rotating presidency to be a threat, then the political elite have no choice but to follow the people’s demand and thus withdraw it from the negotiations table (Ant1 radio, July 30, 2011). The emphasis was on the public demands and not necessarily on whether or not he, or his party, believe that rotating presidency is a threat for the community. Such reactions also demonstrate that elite follow the opinion polls and arrange their agenda accordingly to meet the public demands.

It must be emphasized that the rotating presidency is not a unique issue. On the contrary it is just an indicative (albeit important) example of one of the many issues that is deeply securitized that also force elite to maintain a routinized behavior vis-à-vis perceived threats.

As demonstrated with the cases of AKEL, DIKO, DYSH and EDEK,¹⁸⁸ bottom-up and ‘involuntary’ securitization is indeed possible. The securitizing acts on elite level, involuntary or not, is just half the process. The other half is the audience reaction, namely to accept or reject the act. As argued in chapter 3 and as demonstrated above with the students and the academic community, the public may have to involuntarily accept some acts, even if they do not necessarily agree with the actors’ assessments. As was the case the with the securitizing actors, the cost of not accepting or attempting to oppose established securitized issues could lead to significant social costs, such as social exclusion or penalties at work. It is precisely this ‘involuntary’ acceptance of acts that

¹⁸⁸ It is worth noting that by examining the positions and reactions of the four aforementioned parties (DISY, AKEL, DIKO and EDEK) one explores the entire spectrum of elite positions on the Problem. Indicatively the ‘big four’ received, in the 2011 parliamentary elections, 92% of the votes out of the 97% valid votes (<http://www.kyproekloges.com/>).

allows for the perpetuation of an institutionalized environment. The constant securitization conditions on one hand the audiences to easily accept some acts, but at the same time it is this ‘automatic’ acceptance that allows for such frequent securitization of the same issues and the repetition of the same discourse (even with very similar phrasing by all elites and media).

It is worth reiterating that there are two forms of ‘involuntary’ securitization: the first deals the conditioning of people to the degree that they cannot contemplate the alternatives of non-securitization; the second deals with the lack of realistic options for either elite or audience. The focus was primarily on the latter. The first kind is particularly difficult to separate from the overall social context because one is part of and influences the other. The social context in Cyprus for instance – that is dominated by internalized threats – is what decreases the chances that actors and audiences alike will even consider the possibility that something that is already securitized is no longer a threat. Precisely because they cannot even contemplate any alternatives to the existing (institutionalized) securitization framework, the threats and discourses become even more internalized, shaping subsequently the social context into an environment that supports this form of ‘involuntary’ securitization. It is for this reason that some elites, such as Dr. Lyssarides and religious leaders mentioned earlier that they consider any desecuritization or less securitization activities as a threat and a potentially ‘fatal’ mistake for Greek Cypriots. Similarly, for the same reason parts of the audience consider individuals who cooperate with the ‘other’ or they do not support the established norms as ‘traitors’. These audiences do not have dilemmas for accepting or rejecting a securitizing act; for them there is only one path, namely the one that supports the established and institutionalized securitization framework. In these cases therefore it is not as if ‘volition’ is actually taken away from these individuals; the argument is rather that they are conditioned in a way that they do not face any dilemmas to accept or reject acts as they only see one available path.

6.7. Conclusion

The empirical evidence from the case of Cyprus provided evidence on how the variables found in ethnic conflict environments could relatively easily lead to the institutionalization of the securitization process. It also demonstrated how the media contributes towards maintaining issues related to the conflict constantly securitized. This constant securitization leads, as demonstrated through opinion polls and surveys, to internalized perceptions about threats, which in their turn create an environment with significant social pressures among the different audiences and at the elite level. It is precisely these pressures that allow for the creation of different modes of securitization, namely horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary.

The empirical support provided here also helps link the theory of securitization with other fields of security studies, such as that of protracted ethnic conflicts. It was argued that the variables found in protracted ethnic conflicts open the door for routine securitization. It is also evident however that the reverse is also true. One of the reasons ethnic conflicts are often protracted is precisely because they cannot be desecuritized because of the institutionalized processes that dominate the environment. This could help us understand better why some conflicts are protracted and why external agents such as the EU and the UN are unable to effectively intervene and resolve them. These thoughts are examined further in the final chapter of the thesis.

Chapter 7: Concluding remarks and prospects for further research

There is little disagreement that securitization theory has been receiving growing attention in the security studies literature. This thesis contributes to the literature by exploring on one hand two under-examined areas – the importance of the audiences in the process and that of social context – and on the other by introducing the idea of institutionalized and the subsequent forms of horizontal and bottom-up securitization. More specifically, the thesis focused on how a particular social context, namely that of protracted ethnic conflicts, creates fertile ground for the process of securitization to become part of the political and social routines and eventually institutionalized. How and why protracted ethnic conflicts create suitable conditions for institutionalization to occur was demonstrated with several examples from the case of the Cyprus conflict. Using the same case study the thesis also demonstrated how once institutionalized, securitization is no longer limited to a top-down process (i.e. elite to audience), as it could also take place in a horizontal (i.e. audience to audience) and bottom-up (i.e. audience to elite) manner. These horizontal and bottom-up processes in turn help maintain the institutionalized environment by frequently limiting the options of securitizing actors and audiences alike creating thus a form of ‘involuntary’ securitization. These processes inevitably also contribute to the preservation of conflict-perpetuating routines that are frequently the causes for negotiations deadlocks and subsequently the prolongation of conflicts. The protractedness of some conflicts and institutionalized securitization are therefore closely linked. Indeed, the latter seems to be a prerequisite for the former. This is not to say that protracted ethnic conflicts are what cause institutionalized securitization or the reverse. What is argued is that each one contributes to the reproduction and continuation of the other.

This thesis makes a threefold contribution: i) it offers a refinement of the theory of securitization by introducing how successful securitization could become institutionalized and also develop in different forms (horizontal and bottom-up); ii) it links further the theory of securitization with the literature on protracted ethnic conflicts and more

specifically on the impact securitization has on conflict resolution efforts; and iii) it profoundly links securitization with the case of the Cyprus conflict, offering a more elaborate view on why the conflict remains unresolved despite the benefits that would derive from a reunification of the island.

The introduction of bottom-up and horizontal securitization is a theoretical contribution that is not however limited to securitization theory, but rather extends to the broader security literature and more specifically to that of ethnic conflicts. For instance, the concept of horizontal securitization and the idea that any person can be a 'securitizing actor' allows for further exploration of the concept of 'political entrepreneurs' (Lake and Rothchild 1996), namely that on a micro-level every person can either be, or support, a political entrepreneur by engaging in horizontal peer-to-peer pressure and influencing his immediate periphery, if not the masses.

Similarly, the idea of bottom-up and involuntary securitization could also contribute to our understanding of why political entrepreneurs act the way they do. The current approaches argue that these individuals may adopt extreme positions to perpetuate the conflict so as to personally benefit (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Kaufman 1996). The assumption is that elites, belligerent or not, consciously aim to maintain an environment of hostility because it would be beneficial for them, meaning that they would choose to maintain such environments, even if they had the option to do the opposite. These approaches however do not explore the possibility of 'involuntary' behavior, which, as demonstrated in chapter 6, in some environments may be a real possibility. It is worth recalling that the term involuntary does not connote the absence of choice per se, but rather the fact that some (elite and public) are conditioned not to see the alternative options or they can see them, but given the social context, some choices become unviable options due to the extremely high cost the entail and are thus abandoned.

Another relatively under-examined area is that of the public's preferences and more specifically how it is usually assumed that people would choose conflict resolution over conflict perpetuation. Thus, the possibility that the public may consciously or

subconsciously choose the perpetuation of a conflict is largely ignored, with some notable exceptions such as Mitzen (2006). As demonstrated in chapter 6, in protracted ethnic conflicts institutionalized securitization contributes to the development of specific public preferences that make the latter more likely to accept and even need a securitized environment and subsequently the presence of extreme and conflict-perpetuating elite positions. Political entrepreneurs therefore in such environments may not really be ‘entrepreneurs’ that manipulate the public, but rather agents who follow the public demands regarding the handling of the conflict. The existence of extreme positions, therefore, may indeed derive from political elites, but the driving force behind such behavior may be the bottom-up forces and the need for the continuation of specific routines, even the ones that perpetuate the conflict.

With this in mind we should also consider the possibility that elite actions may be restricted, meaning that they may be ‘unable’ to create a conflict-resolution discourse or even alter the existing conflict narrative, even if they wanted to. In cases where the public expects the perpetuation of the conflict, the choice of not being an active participant towards that goal (i.e. be part of conflict-diminishing processes) may have significant political costs, even if the alternative (i.e. be part of the conflict-perpetuating processes) does not necessarily guarantee significant benefits given that all elite will act in a similar way. The elite dilemma, therefore, may not be whether they want to promote an environment of either enmity or amity, but rather whether they will support the only available option, namely that of enmity. They do not therefore necessarily need to *create* the environment as argued by Lake and Rothchild (1996), but rather choose if they will actively be part of it or not and subsequently have a role in its reproduction.

The concepts of institutionalized, horizontal and involuntary securitization also contribute to our understanding of why desecuritization becomes less likely in protracted ethnic conflicts despite the absence of violence and the presence of potential benefits from a resolution. While Mitzen’s (2006) argument about the need for ontological security through conflict-perpetuating routines is valid, it does not explore how those routines are maintained for prolonged periods, especially in cases when there is no violence or other

reasons for the conflict to persist. Deeply securitized environments ‘condition’ the vast majority, elites and non-elite, not to see the non-conflict alternatives – i.e. desecuritization – and maintain the routines that people are most comfortable with, namely those that revolve around the securitization of internalized threats regarding the enemy ‘other’. In such environments strategies of desecuritization, such as the objectivist, constructivist and deconstructivist ways (Huysmans 1995) are particularly difficult to be implemented given that securitizing actors and audiences alike may be unable to see either the possibility or the benefit of such alternatives.

While the abovementioned argument may be valid for the majority of the people it does not mean that all individuals are conditioned into not seeing conflict-diminishing alternatives. There are individuals, elite and parts of the audiences, who do ‘escape’ from the social construction of conflict-identities and the securitized habitus and could thus seek change and the development of desecuritization processes. The reason why in protracted conflicts – such as the one in Cyprus – they remain unsuccessful is largely due to horizontal and bottom-up securitization. As demonstrated by the surveys and focus groups in chapter 6 the bottom-up and peer-to-peer pressures do not allow for deviations from the established norms and routines either on an elite or on a public level. Subsequently, conflict-perpetuating routines may persist even in cases where some individuals or groups desire and seek change. In particular the horizontal pressures make it extremely difficult for the few who want change to disrupt the routines that are expected by the majority, not least because they cannot find a sufficient audience to follow them.

As demonstrated with the case of Cyprus, the concepts of institutionalized, bottom-up and horizontal securitization, contribute therefore to our understanding of why intractable conflicts remain unresolved, despite the absence of violence, the ripe conditions for a settlement, or even the obvious and quantifiable potential benefits from a resolution. Specifically, in Cyprus the conditions were very ripe: the country became an EU member (decreasing thus the security concerns for both sides), there has been no violence since 1974 (with some very minor exceptions) and studies have shown that the potential

economic benefits of a unified Cyprus would be significant enough to tempt even the relatively well-off Greek Cypriots (Oslen, Antoniadou and Mullen 2008; 2009; 2010). Yet, as demonstrated in chapter 6 desecuritization attempts that could contribute towards the reunification were constantly securitized. Indeed, the data indicates that the public and elite are conditioned into focusing only on the threats, failing to see the potential benefits of desecuritization. Those who do see the benefits and were willing to deviate from the norms frequently ‘succumbed’ to the horizontal and bottom-up pressures.

Understanding these horizontal and bottom-up securitization processes may also be of use for conflict resolution analysts dealing with conflict resolution of protracted conflicts. These different forms of securitization proposed in this thesis are useful for such analyses not least because they take into consideration the public’s behavior (towards the conflict) *within* each community and not the public’s behavior towards the local ‘enemy-other’ or foreign agents. The literature frequently focuses on mechanisms on how to bring two conflict sides together, usually assuming that the major obstacle is finding willing members of *each* side to engage in rapprochement and conflict resolution activities with the ‘other’. These approaches however rarely focus on the intra-community struggles and more specifically on the horizontal securitization that prevents ‘willing members’ either from commencing such activities or from having a wider impact on the society. Similarly, bottom-up, horizontal and ‘involuntary’ securitization is also useful for examining spoilers’ behavior in such conflicts. As the argument goes, their behavior may actually be the outcome of either ‘conditioned mentalities’ or ‘involuntary’ acts. There is, therefore, a need to consider the ‘tools’ used by conflict resolution analysts and negotiators to overcome the obstacles that are many times systemic (i.e. the outcome of the social context) and not individual-based (i.e. the outcome of one specific elite’s behavior).

Horizontal and bottom-up securitization activities are also therefore a form of resistance mechanisms for either domestic or foreign interventions aiming to change the status quo, even if that change could lead to conflict resolution. This is especially applicable to foreign interventions – mainly if they derive from particular agents (in the case of Cyprus,

the UK and the US) – even if the foreign actors follow liberal peacebuilding intervention approaches.¹⁸⁹ As Richmond and Mitchel (2012) point out the impact of liberal peacebuilding interventions are influenced by the everyday practices and agencies of local actors. What is argued in this thesis is that in environments with institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization the every-day practices (vis-à-vis the conflict and the relevant interventions) could be to a certain degree ‘fixed’ and predictable. More importantly however they are particularly resilient to change and contribute to the perpetuation of the established resistance mechanisms towards any form of foreign intervention (liberal or not).

While the aim of the thesis was not to make propositions on how to resolve the Cyprus conflict or indeed any other protracted ethnic conflict, the detailed analysis of the case study allows for some broad recommendations, especially on issues related to securitization. In chapter 6 there was particular emphasis on the centrality of the conflict for elite, media and public; centrality which does not allow for desecuritization prospects and subsequently for a conflict settlement. One of the most interesting characteristics of environments where securitization is institutionalized is that efforts for desecuritization may be perceived as threats and thus be securitized (usually in a horizontal and bottom-up way). With this in mind, mechanisms that can be useful for desecuritization – such as constructivist strategies, namely the objective change of perceptions about who or what is a threat, or deconstructivist strategies, namely attempts to ‘humanize’ an ‘enemy other’ by linking it to additional identities that may be more acceptable (Huysmans 1995) – may raise reactions and lead to further securitization instead of desecuritization.

What is recommended, therefore, is not to focus on desecuritizing activities, as is usually the case with confidence building measures in protracted conflict environments, but rather to aim towards less securitization until a state of a-securitization is reached, meaning there are no efforts of either securitization or desecuritization. Not securitizing something raises far less reactions than attempts to actively desecuritize it through

¹⁸⁹ Such interventions may commence with a conservative (mostly top-down) approach but they aspire to move to the orthodox and more bottom-up position and if possible even have an emancipatory graduation – albeit the latter has proved to be particularly difficult (Richmond 2008).

specific actions such as bi-communal activities. Clearly, and as argued in this thesis, a-securitization is not an easy target either, especially for issues that are deeply institutionalized, given that the public may actually expect certain issues to remain securitized. The focus at the beginning should be on issues that are not linked to pivotal events and are somewhat low in the hierarchy of security concerns for each side. For instance, environmental issues could relatively easily remain desecuritized or a-securitized and could under some circumstances even enjoy positive securitization – that is present the lack of cooperation on environment issues as a threat. To a lesser degree some economic issues could enjoy similar treatment as long as they are not linked directly to the Problem – for instance, selling Greek Cypriot property to Turkish Cypriots would generate reactions, whereas economic activities through the Green Line and under the Green Line Regulation would not. The problem with the latter however is that they may not generate reactions but at the same time they seem to be ineffective. The dilemma therefore is whether each side should attempt to engage in activities that would be practically effective (e.g. create closer links between the two communities) but could potentially lead to securitization, or maintain less effective but also less securitized activities. What is required therefore are elites who are less risk averse and would be willing to promote and support positions that would have an impact on the resolution efforts. These are elites who must be willing to withstand the securitization forces that will occur on a horizontal and bottom-up level. More importantly there is a need to attempt to interrupt the institutionalized processes that maintain the internalized threat-perceptions.

The latter argument is particularly important to eliminate or reduce the bottom-up forces that help maintain securitization in an institutionalized form. The goal therefore is to start re-conditioning Cypriots to the idea that not *everything* related to the ‘other’ is a threat. Efforts to change the Cypriots’ identities altogether so as to accept the ‘other’ as a friend instead of an enemy will face severe reactions and securitization. What is recommended therefore is something along the liberal-functionalist approaches, where at the beginning to have a series of desecuritization activities for only some less sensitive issues (e.g. environment) that will allow Cypriots to see that under some circumstances the ‘other’

may not be a threat. Once these perceptions become widely accepted desecuritization in other areas might become easier. This is clearly a very long-term process that may require even a generation change to have spillover impact into other sectors such as the political and the societal. As argued below even this option is particularly difficult to achieve for as long as securitization remains institutionalized.

Such ‘functionalist’ approaches form the idea behind Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), which aim to create spillover effects from low-level activities into issues of high politics. Such low-level activities include common projects such as the Nicosia Master Plan – which dealt with the sewage system in Nicosia and required the collaboration between the two municipalities of the city – to smaller in scale bi-communal activities such as art-related events and research and environmental projects. In theory it is possible to have spillover effects. In this thesis a claim is made that such functionalists approaches do not work in environments where securitization is deeply internalized and institutionalized. The environment is such that it does not allow the effects of such activities to enter the realm of high politics. The severe bottom-up and horizontal forces ‘block’ the path towards the top-level elites who are responsible for the conflict resolution negotiations. Similarly, horizontal securitization reduces the chances for a continuous presence of even the small-scale low-level desecuritizing activities and almost eliminates any possibility of accepting any such activities on a high politics level. Such conflict resolution mechanisms, is argued in this thesis, are therefore highly unlikely to work for as long as securitization remains institutionalized and the horizontal forces are strong. Such goals become even harder to achieve if the elites are unwilling to take risks that could however potentially lead to political cost. With this in mind small scale desecuritization activities can have an impact (through spillover) only if they are combined with the support of elites and media who will be willing to withstand the horizontal and bottom-up forces. The first step however should be a-securitization behavior from elite before they even attempt to engage in small desecuritization cooperative activities with the ‘other’.

In regards to Cyprus specifically, analysts and negotiators should also take into consideration the centrality of the Problem and how it revolves around specific pivotal events. The fact that the Cyprus problem is heavily linked to the pivotal event of 1974 (for Greek Cypriots) and 1963-67 (for Turkish Cypriots) is not necessarily negative, in the sense that the conflict does not 'grow' from aggressive and existential ongoing developments, as is the case for instance with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the further we move from the pivotal events, the lesser the impact of that event may be on the securitization processes. Maintaining therefore an a-securitized environment will become easier in time especially considering that the younger generations will have no personal experiences regarding those events and less attachment to them. That said, by the same token the fact that there is no hurting stalemate and/or developments reduces the incentives for a settlement, at least in the form that is currently being negotiated (i.e. bi-zonal, bi-communal federation).

Further research

There is little doubt that the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence presented in this thesis could be improved and elaborated with further research, which could focus either on an empirical level – i.e. examination of more case studies – or on a theoretical one – i.e. by using the ideas of institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization for other aspects of the theory that have not been examined in profoundly in this thesis, namely desecuritization processes (and not just securitization). I have already discussed how the goal should be first to maintain an a-securitized environment before proceeding to desecuritizing acts, so as to reduce reactions and further re-securitization. Attention in this regard could be given to the role of the media, which as demonstrated in chapter 6, has an integral role to play in the institutionalization of the securitization processes. Indeed, the close relationship between media and securitization and the impact they have on each other (Vultee 2011) deserves more attention. Specifically, more research is required to determine the interplay between the media and elite activities and how they influence each other into maintaining such resistant-to-desecuritization environments. The focus, however, should not be limited to ad hoc one-time securitization incidences

but also to the perpetuation of the same securitization processes. With this in mind, constructivist strategies that focus on understanding how something becomes part of the 'drama' and the threat (Huysmans 1995) must also focus on how to de-link political discourses in the media from the pivotal events that are connected to deeply securitized issues that are non-negotiable. Similarly, further research is required to examine whether and how media agents could potentially contribute to routinized desecuritization.

The empirical data for this thesis derived solely from the Greek-Cypriot community, meaning that there is no comparison either between the two communities, or between Cyprus and other similar conflicts. Thus, additional data from other cases either in Cyprus (i.e. the Turkish Cypriot side) or from other areas – such as Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Israel-Palestine, etc. – would certainly add more validity to the theoretical claims of this thesis and clarify the impact the social context has on the securitization processes. Similarly, but for different empirical outcomes, it would be interesting to examine in a comparative manner cases such as Northern Ireland and how elites and the public managed to overcome problems of institutionalized securitization and promoted desecuritization. Furthermore, but along the same idea, the concept of horizontal securitization could be further explored to identify more clearly the forces behind such processes. This requires targeted questionnaires on the entire population (and not just a specific audience as was done for this work) to quantify the most influential factors.

Lastly, some of the ideas presented here could be extended to other types of conflict. It would be particularly interesting to see whether the same securitization processes could develop in non-ethnic or protracted conflict cases without internalized perceptions about enemy 'others' and without historical animosities. Such cases for instance could be the institutionalized securitization of terrorism in the US after the pivotal event of September 11 2001. Similarly, immigration and economic-related issues are likely to continue to dominate many states' discourses and occupy an elevated position in the security concerns of the populations. How these threats that have no specific 'enemy-other' and are not linked to historical experiences could become part of routinized securitization

discourse will also be a challenge.¹⁹⁰ Despite any potential challenges this thesis, with the concepts of horizontal and bottom-up securitization, can provide a good starting point for understanding how securitization processes can persist to the degree that they become institutionalized.

¹⁹⁰ It is worth recalling that the so-called Paris School deals with the issue of immigration and routinized securitization, albeit not in a way portrayed in this thesis.

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Simerini (records are available in digital form at PIO and electronically at www.simerini.com.cy)

Taxidromos (records available only in hardcopy form at PIO)

Vima (records available only in hardcopy form at PIO)

Appendix I: Interviews

- Dr. Vasos Lyssarides (Former President of the Parliament – EDEK Honorary President) [July 23, 2010 and May 12, 2011]
- Mr. Demetris Eliades (Minster of Defense) [February 3, 2010]
- Prof. Andreas Theophanous (Academic) [February 9 and 11, 2011]
- Dr. Erol Kaymak (Academic) [February 10, 2011]
- Dr. Constadina Charalambous (Academic) [March 14, 2011]
- Ms. Evi Eftychiou (Sociologist) [March 15, 2011]
- Ms. Andri Hadjiandreou (Musician) [March 22, 2011]
- Prof. Costas Constantinou (Academic) [February 18, 2011]
- Mr. Andreas Christofides (United Nations-backed Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters (TCCCM) [June 18, 2010]
- Mr. Panayiotis Loizides (President of the Greek Cypriot Chamber of Commerce) [June 16, 2010]
- Mr. Kemal Baykali (Deputy Secretary General External Relations – Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce) [June 17, 2010]
- Andreas Nicolaou (Chief of Fire Department) [June 23, 2010]
- Dr. Achilles Emilianides (Lawyer / Academic) [February 18, 2011]
- Mr. Michalis Kontos (Researcher / author) [February 16, 2011]
- Dr. Christina Ioannou (Academic) [February 16, 2011]
- Mr. Michalakis Adamides (Director, Kronos Press Agency)
- Mr. Marios Hadjistyliis (Journalist – Politis newspaper) [June 25, 2010]
- Ms. Maria Patsalidou (civil servant) [June 26, 2010]

Anonymous:

- Dr. “T.” (Academic) [February 17, 2011]
- Mr. “M” (Journalist) [June 26, 2010]
- Mr. “S” (Journalist) [June 26, 2010]
- Dr. “A” – (Academic) [February 18, 2011]

- AKEL MP (politician)* [May 3, 2011]
- DISY MP (politician)* [May 4, 2011]
- DIKO MP (politician)* [May 10, 2011]
- EVROKO official (politician)* [May 12, 2011]

* The MPs for each of the aforementioned political party range from 1 to 6. This means that indicating even the first letter of their names will ‘give away’ the identity of the interviewee.

Appendix II – Focus Groups

Roundtable 1: Artists. There were a total of 10 participants, five Greek and five Turkish Cypriots. The group included painters, composers, musicians, dancers and designers. [June 17, 2009]

Roundtable 2: NGOs. There were a total of 11 participants, six Greek Cypriots and five Turkish Cypriots, who either created or were members of NGOs. Some of the NGOs were bi-communal while others were Greek or Turkish Cypriots, which, however, engaged in bi-communal activities. [October 14, 2009]

Roundtable 3: Academics. This roundtable was comprised of 8 academics, four from each side. All participants came under their personal capacity and did not represent their academic institutions. [November 4, 2009]

Roundtable 4: Students. Twenty high school students from both sides of the Green Line participated in this roundtable. Some of them participated in a US-sponsored program that sent Greek and Turkish Cypriots to the US for a month. With them were two teachers that “supervised” the entire meeting. [December 2, 2009]

Roundtable 5: Civil servants. In this roundtable there were only 4 participants, two from each side, who were involved in the Master Plan. The Master Plan was the only pre-2003 cooperation between the two sides and was in regards to the sewage system in the old city of Nicosia. [January 20, 2010]

Appendix III - Academic Survey

Cooperation Across the Divide

Introduction

Dear Colleague,

Thank you for taking the time to complete this short survey (approximately 10 minutes).

The aim of the survey is primarily to:

- (i) examine the degree of cooperation between academics working in the (Republic of Cyprus) government-controlled areas and Turkish Cypriots (and/or other non-Turkish Cypriot) academics **across the Green Line** - i.e. academics who work in the areas not controlled by the Republic of Cyprus
- (ii) examine any potential problems and concerns academics in the government-controlled areas may have in regards to such collaborations.

The term “academics” refers to both teaching faculty and researchers (the term does **not** refer to administration personnel).

The term 'Greek Cypriot side' refers to the Greek Cypriot community (as a whole) in Cyprus

The term 'government controlled areas' refers to the areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus - i.e. south of the Buffer Zone.

The survey is anonymous and confidential and will be used only for research purposes, including a PhD dissertation.

Thank you in advance for your help

Constantinos Adamides, MA, MBA, PhD (c.)

* How risky do you believe the **PROCESS** of cooperating with Turkish Cypriot academics is for the Greek Cypriot side? (1 being not risky at all, and 5 very risky)

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ Do not Know

[Reset](#)

* How risky do you believe the **OUTCOME** of a cooperating (of any form) with Turkish Cypriot academics is for the Greek Cypriot side? (1 being not risky at all, and 5 very risky)

- ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ Do not Know

[Reset](#)

* Have you ever cooperated with Turkish Cypriot academics for any academic activities? (e.g. for a conference or seminar organization, lecture, publication, research project, etc.). NOTE: Collaboration could have taken place **anywhere** in Cyprus (either side) or abroad.

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

[Reset](#)

* Your cooperation was with Turkish Cypriot academics who worked at (please choose all that apply):

- ☐ Academic Institution(s)
☐ Research Center(s)
☐ NGO(s) (but not a Research Center)
☐ Local authorities (e.g. municipalities, community centers, etc.)
☐ Other (e.g. professional associations)

[Reset](#)

The cooperation was **mostly** an initiative of:

- ☐ Either Greek or Turkish Cypriots
☐ Other (e.g. PRIO, British Commission, Fulbright, etc)

[Reset](#)

* Who initiated the cooperation(s)?

- ☐ Always Greek Cypriots
☐ Mostly Greek Cypriots
☐ (Approximately) half the times were Greek Cypriots and half the times Turkish

Cypriots

- ☐ Mostly Turkish Cypriots
- ☐ Always Turkish Cypriots

[Reset](#)

What was the nature of your cooperation? (please choose all that apply)

- ☐ Partnership in a research project
- ☐ Conference organization
- ☐ Seminar organization
- ☐ Training (e.g. for an EU-funded project)
- ☐ Co-authorship of article/book
- ☐ Teaching (e.g. guest lecture in his/her class)

[Reset](#)

Other

* Where has this cooperation taken place? (please choose all that apply)

- ☐ In the areas not controlled by the government
- ☐ In the government controlled areas
- ☐ In the Buffer Zone (e.g. Ledra Palace)
- ☐ Abroad

[Reset](#)

* Would you cooperate with Turkish Cypriot academics if you were asked to hold the meetings in the areas **NOT** controlled by the RoC government?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ Yes, but only in the Buffer Zone
- ☐ No

[Reset](#)

* During the last decade, how many times have you cooperated with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐ More than 5

[Reset](#)

* When you cooperate with Turkish Cypriot academics, do you consciously choose **NOT** to inform some of your colleagues about your collaboration?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

[Reset](#)

* When you cooperate with Turkish Cypriot academics, do you consciously choose **NOT** to inform some of your family members about your cooperation

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

[Reset](#)

* How does the academic administration (e.g. Rector, Dean, Head of Department) of your institution react to your cooperation(s) with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ Strongly opposed
☐ Moderately opposed
☐ Neutral
☐ Moderately supported
☐ Strongly supported

[Reset](#)

* How does the **majority** of your colleagues with whom you **frequently** interact – e.g. from your department - react to your cooperation with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ Strongly opposed
☐ Moderately opposed
☐ Neutral
☐ Moderately supported
☐ Strongly supported

[Reset](#)

* How does your family and/or close friends react to your cooperation with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ Strongly opposed
- ☐ Moderately opposed
- ☐ Mildly opposed
- ☐ Neutral
- ☐ Mildly supported
- ☐ Moderately supported
- ☐ Strongly supported

[Reset](#)

* Your cooperation(s) was (were) funded by (Please choose all that apply):

- ☐ It was not a collaboration that required any funding
- ☐ Research Promotion Foundation
- ☐ USAID
- ☐ UNDP
- ☐ The EU (e.g. LLP, Commission, FP7, etc.)

[Reset](#)

Other (please specify)

* How would you characterize the overall perception of the following funding agencies within the Greek-Cypriot academic community (1 being very negative and 5 being very positive)

	1	2	3	4	5	n/a
RPF (Research Promotion Foundation)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
EU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
UNDP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USAID	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Bi-communal NGOs (e.g. PRIO)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

[Reset](#)

* If there were an **agreed** settlement to the Cyprus Problem, would you be willing to cooperate more frequently with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ No, it will not change my current approach towards this issue (i.e. neither increase nor decrease)
- ☐ Yes, but only if other colleagues do the same
- ☐ Yes, I will certainly increase the frequency (regardless of what others do)
- ☐ It will decrease the frequency

[Reset](#)

* How significant are the following reasons for **not** cooperating with Turkish Cypriot academics? (1 being insignificant and 5 being very significant)

	1	2	3	4	5
The opportunity did not arise	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am ideologically opposed to such collaborations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It might cause me problems at my working environment	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It could upset my colleagues	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It could upset my family	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It could upset my friends	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not want to be associated with specific funding agencies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not want to recognize the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Reset](#)

Other (please specify)

* Would you consider cooperating with Turkish Cypriot academics in the future?

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes, even if there is no agreed settlement to the Cyprus problem
- ☐ Yes, but only if there is an agreed settlement to the Cyprus Problem

[Reset](#)

* If there was an opportunity for cooperation, would you be willing to participate if the meetings were held (please choose all that apply):

- ☐ In the RoC government controlled areas?
- ☐ In the areas not controlled by the RoC?
- ☐ In the Buffer Zone
- ☐ Abroad

[Reset](#)

Other (please specify)

Which of the following would be possible reasons for which you would refuse to hold academic cooperation meetings in the areas NOT controlled by the RoC government? (please choose all that apply)

- ☐ Ideological reasons (e.g. I do not want show my passport or ID at the crossing points)
- ☐ I do not want to recognize (directly or indirectly) the "TRNC"
- ☐ I am concerned about my safety
- ☐ I do not want to be the cause of any problems at my working environment
- ☐ I do not want to upset my colleagues and/or my institution
- ☐ I do not want to upset my family and/or friends

[Reset](#)

Other reason (please specify)

It has been suggested that the consequences of academic collaboration are different across fields or disciplines. In your understanding, what is the degree of risk associated with academic cooperation between GC and TC academics and researchers in the following fields or disciplines?

* How do you think the academic administration (e.g. Rector, Dean, Head of Department) of your institution would react if you cooperated with Turkish Cypriots academics?

- ☐ Strongly oppose
- ☐ Moderately oppose
- ☐ Neutral
- ☐ Moderately support
- ☐ Strongly support

[Reset](#)

* How do you think the **majority** of your colleagues with whom you **frequently** interact – e.g. from your department – would react to your cooperation with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ Strongly oppose
- ☐ Moderately oppose
- ☐ Neutral
- ☐ Moderately support
- ☐ Strongly support

[Reset](#)

* How do you think your family and/or close friends would react to your cooperation with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ Strongly oppose
- ☐ Moderately oppose
- ☐ Neutral
- ☐ Moderately support
- ☐ Strongly support

[Reset](#)

How do you react to colleagues' cooperation with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ Strongly oppose
- ☐ Moderately oppose
- ☐ Neutral
- ☐ Moderately support
- ☐ Strongly support

[Reset](#)

In which of the following fields (if any) do you believe a cooperation could pose more risk for the Greek Cypriot side? (1 being no risk and 5 being very risky)

	1	2	3	4	5
Political Science	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Economics and Business Studies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Natural Sciences (e.g. physics, chemistry, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Arts (e.g. Music, art, dance, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Environmental Studies	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Social Sciences (e.g. sociology, anthropology, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Humanities (e.g. Languages, Literature, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Engineering	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Reset](#)

* How do you think the perpetuation of the Cyprus problem influences academic cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots? (1 being very negatively and 5 being very positively)

- ☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5

[Reset](#)

* How often do you discuss with colleagues from your institution the possibility of working with Turkish Cypriot academics?

- ☐ Never
☐ Rarely
☐ Sometimes
☐ Often
☐ Always

[Reset](#)

* Would you publish academic research outcomes that could potentially have negative political consequences for the Greek Cypriot side?

- ☐ No
☐ No, at least not until there is an agreed settlement to the Cyprus Problem
☐ Yes, academic research should be distinct from politics

[Reset](#)

* Would you publish academic research outcomes that could potentially have benefits for the Turkish Cypriots?

- ☐ No
☐ No, at least not until there is an agreed settlement to the Cyprus Problem
☐ Yes, regardless if there is an agreed settlement or not

[Reset](#)

Demographics

* What is your gender?

- ☐ Male ☐ Female

[Reset](#)

* What is your age?

- ☐ 18-24 ☐ 25-34 ☐ 35-44 ☐ 45-54 ☐ 55-64 ☐ 65+

[Reset](#)

* Where do you work?

- ☐ State University ☐ Private University / College ☐ Research Center / NGO

[Reset](#)

* What is your area of expertise?

- ☐ i. Finance, Accounting, Management, Marketing
☐ ii. Other Business School Department
☐ iii. Economics
☐ iv. Political science, International Relations
☐ v. European Studies
☐ vi. Sociology, Anthropology
☐ vii. Other Social Science Department
☐ viii. Engineering (e.g. mechanical, computer, electrical, etc.)
☐ ix. Science Department (e.g. physics, chemistry, etc.)
☐ x. Humanities (languages, literature, etc.)
☐ xi. Education
☐ xii. Music, Dance, Art
☐ xiii. Communications, Media
☐ xiv. Law
☐ xv. Architecture
☐ xvi. Environmental Studies
☐ xvii. Other (please specify)

[Reset](#)

Thank you for completing the survey

Appendix IV – Settler population calculations

The population north of the Buffer Zone has changed significantly since 1974. The extraordinary increase, as argued here, cannot be attributed to a natural population growth but rather to the arrival of Turkish settlers.

The number of settlers is highly contested, ranging from 50,000 to 180,000 depending on the sources. The RoC statistical service placed the number of settlers in 2009 between 160,000 and 170,000. Turkish Cypriot official sources placed their number in 2006 at 70,500. Other scholars argue that the number is even lower: Dodd (2004) and Hatay (2005), for instance, argue that their number does not exceed 50,000; a figure which is even lower than the official Turkish Cypriot estimations. The Turkish Ministry of Interior announced that there are 146,000 Turkish citizens working and living in TRNC (Vasiliou 20.3.2007, Politis newspaper), a number that is much closer to the RoC's estimations. International reports (e.g. Laakso 2003) argue that the figure, at least until 2001, was close to 114,000. It is clear that there is no agreement on the number of settlers. There seems to be however an agreement on the TRNC population, which means that the number of settlers, as discussed in Chapter 5, is simply a question of definition – i.e. who is a settler.

The tables below show the different population estimates in the areas not controlled by the RoC.

Table 1: TRNC census-based population (TRNC sources)

Period	1974	1996	2006	2011
TRNC population	120,200	200,587	256,644	294,906
Percentage Increase from 1974		67%	114%	145%

Source: <http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitma/en/index.asp?sayfa=haberdetay&newsid=1115>

Table 1 above indicates the TRNC population after censuses conducted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. The increase from 1974 to 2011 was 145%. What is particularly

interesting to note are the huge increases between 1996-2006 (28% increase) and 2006-2011 (15%). This increase, for the period 1996-2006 is equated to 2.7% per year and for the period 2006-2011 3% per year. These are extraordinary growth rates which, as argued below, are unlikely to be attributed to natural population growth.

Table 2: Turkish Cypriot Population (Greek Cypriot sources)

Year	1974	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
Turkish Cypriot population	120.2	108.3	102.4	106.2	101.2	91	87.9	88	89.2
% change from 1974	100	88%	82%	86%	81%	71%	68%	68%	69%

Source: Statistical Abstract 2009 (Cyprus Statistical Service)

Table 2 above shows the estimated figure of *just* Turkish Cypriots (i.e. not TRNC population), which is close to 90,000. Given that Greek Cypriots accept the overall TRNC population figures as described in Table 1 above, it means that according to these sources, the number of settlers is estimated at slightly less than 200,000. The reasoning behind the Turkish Cypriot population decrease is that many Turkish Cypriots migrated and gap has been filled with the Turks, mainly from Anatolia (Besim and Jenkins 2006).

Table 3: Turkey's Population Growth Rate

Period	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Avg
Growth rate (%)	1.27 %	1.24 %	1.20 %	1.60 %	1.30 %	1.09 %	1.06 %	1.04 %	1.01 %	1.31 %	1.27 %	1.24 %	1.22%

Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/turkey/population_growth_rate.html

Table 3 above shows *Turkey's* population growth over the past 11 years. Turkey is considered to be one of the fastest growing states in the world and yet the average population growth rate is only 1.22%. This means that if the TRNC had a similar growth rate its population should be today around 188,000 (Table 4 below), a figure significantly lower than 295,000. With these calculations the number of settlers could be estimated to be slightly over 100,000, which is basically somewhere between the official Greek and Turkish Cypriot figures.

Table 4: TRNC *Expected* Population Growth *

Period	1974	1996	2006	2011
TRNC population	120,200	156,951	177,185	188,260
Percentage Increase from previous period		31%	47%	57%

* These are NOT actual population numbers. These are numbers calculated based on Turkey's average population growth rate for the 11-year period 2000-2011 (1.22%). The assumption is that Turkish Cypriots would have over this period a similar population growth rate as Turkey. Thus, if the population since 1974 kept increasing at a rate of 1.22% per year, the TRNC population would have been in 1996 approximately 156,000, in 2006, 177,000 and in 2011, 188,000. These numbers are significantly lower compared to the actual population numbers as shown in Table 1. The *actual* annual population growth rate for the TRNC is close to 2.5%, which is twice as much as that of Turkey (over the past 11 years at least) and almost 2.5 times that of the Republic of Cyprus. Given that it is highly unlikely that the TRNC experienced such extraordinary natural growth rate, the difference between the assumed numbers and the actual numbers must be foreigners.